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DIVINE DISGUISE IN HOMER'S *ILIAD*

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DIVINE DISGUISE IN HOMER'S *ILIAD*

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There are about twenty passages of Homer's *Iliad* in which various gods disguised as human beings interact with mortal characters. The approach of this study to these passages is primarily literary rather than theological or philosophical. The thoroughness and consistency of the gods' disguises in appearance, speech and action—they are virtually "human" when disguised--suggest that the poet introduced a god into his narrative in this way not because the story required an essentially divine *action*, but because the poet required a divine *presence*—one perceptible to his audience but not to the mortal characters in the epic.

In introducing a disguised god into the narrative, the poet consistently adapts the god to the mortal situation as depicted in the narrative. A god's disguise-persona is nearly always familiar to the mortal he confronts, and is regularly modeled on a character appropriate to the scene and to the type of action the god performs. Detailed analysis of the speeches of the disguised gods points to characterizations which are intentionally consonant with the disguise-persona (Chapters 1 and 2).

The theories of B. Snell and H. Erbse—according to whom Homer could not speak of purely human motivation, but needed the gods to explain every sort of human action—can thus be refuted. To be sure, Homer's gods advise, encourage, and rebuke mortal characters on the occasions when they appear in disguise, but throughout the *Iliad* mortal characters do the same many times when no divine disguise is involved (Chapter 3).

Since the poet often ascribed to his gods no essentially divine action, what was he seeking to add to his narrative through their disguised presence?

The answer is irony, or a difference in perception between the audience and the mortal characters who are part of the events described by the poet. In each passage investigated the god's presence highlights the limitations, and in particular the ignorance, of the mortal character, thus contributing to the tragic quality of the *Iliad*.

There are appendices on the textual question at Book 14. 136a and on divine appearances in the *Odyssey*.

INTRODUCTION

A. The Secondary Literature.

To the best of my knowledge, there exists no full-length study of divine disguise in the *Iliad*. Even the number of articles dealing specifically with this topic is relatively small. On the other hand isolated remarks in works dealing more comprehensively with the Homeric gods or with Homer generally abound, and it would be impossible to summarize them here. I propose therefore in the following summary to deal primarily with that Homeric scholarship of the last 30 years which seems to me particularly influential or useful on the subject of divine disguises. I summarize here first the articles and then the pertinent sections of two books that are important to my work. In addition each of these scholars' work will be referred to at relevant points in the study which follows.

H. J. Rose, in his "Divine Disguisings,"[1] poses two questions: 1) which gods disguise themselves, and 2) how effective are the disguises? "The first question is soon answered; it is regularly the greater deities who appear in disguise."[2] Dispensing in this way with the first issue, Rose devotes the main section of his essay to the second, namely, whether the poet and his audience thought of divine disguises as "magical metamorphoses" or "merely human attempts...at concealing one's real identity."[3] Rose concludes: "...if they [i.e., the gods] do not come to destroy,...they veil their terrible splendor, though they may do so but thinly. An observant man...can sometimes penetrate the disguise, at least enough to know that he is confronted with something more

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[1] *Harvard Theological Review* 49 (1956): 63-72.
[2] Ibid., p. 65.
[3] Ibid., p. 66.

than a fellow-mortal...."[4] This answer is, I think, unsatisfactory, but it raises an interesting question: where and why does Homer allow certain of his mortal characters to be "observant" and penetrate a god's disguise? Both the issue of the effectiveness of divine disguise and the poetic purpose behind the relatively few cases of recognition will be taken up below in Chapters I and II of this study. Rose's further assertion that the gods' disguises are more flimsy from the back than from the front[5] is, as we will see, untenable.

The work of Guy Lavoie,[6] which will be discussed fully below,[7] investigates chiefly four "métamorphoses divines" (Poseidon as Calchas, Apollo as Periphas, Phaenops, and Lycaon). Lavoie contends that "les motivations des métamorphoses divines peuvent reposer sur de vieilles traditions mythologiques ou des conceptions religieuses, qu'elles soient contemporaines de l'auteur ou anciennes."[8] These mythological traditions and religious concepts are, specifically, Poseidon's mantic connections and Apollo's association with the sun and with wolves.

Jenny Clay, like H. J. Rose, approaches the question of divine disguise from the point of view of physical reality.[9] If Rose was concerned with the general effectiveness of divine disguises, Clay is interested in what sort of physical changes Homer and his audience believed necessary in order for a god to seem like a human being. Accordingly, she uses the word "transformation" to refer to the gods' assumption of human disguise

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[4]Ibid., p. 71.

[5]Ibid.

[6]"Sur quelques métamorphoses divines dans l'Iliade," *AC* 39 (1970): 5-34.

[7]Chapter I, section D.

[8]Ibid., p. 5.

[9]"Demas and Aude: the Nature of Divine Transformation in Homer," *Hermes* 102 (1974): 129-36.

throughout her article, which is primarily a thorough lexicographical study of Homeric words denoting body/shape and voice. She concludes:

> The Shield of Achilles shows the gods to be both larger and more beautiful than men. Hence the assumption of a human form requires a diminution of their stature. But a complete metamorphosis also demands a concomitant change in voice or manner of speaking. The Homeric gods, then, differ from men not only in immortality and stature. A less obvious but equally important difference is the fact that the gods speak differently than men, and thus to appear as men and to speak like them, the gods must change both in *demas* and *audê*.[10]

This is, it seems to me, a valid assertion, but it leaves open the question, why the poet chose a certain shape for a certain deity in a given passage. It leaves aside, too, the issue of disguise proper, i.e., the concealment of the god's true identity by a false one, and this is after all the situation which the poet creates by disguising the gods. I will deal with this issue primarily in Chapters III and IV below.

Warren Smith[11] follows very much in Clay's footsteps in approaching the issue from the side of physical transformation, but he goes further in arguing that "many passages point to the utter alienation of divine from mortal in appearance and nature; because of this alienation, the gods need to take on human form to soften the differences when they pass into the mortal realm."[12] While Smith's skepticism vis à vis traditional anthropomorphism is thought-provoking, I believe that his theological explanation of what I see as a poetic problem is unsatisfactory. I do not accept the premise that Homer

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[10]Ibid., p. 136.

[11]"The Disguises of the Gods in the *Iliad*," *Numen* 35 (1988): 161-178.

[12]Ibid., p. 161.

was constrained by his belief in the gods' "otherness" to disguise them before bringing them into contact with mortals. To be sure, the audience must remain aware in each instance that a superior being is behind the shape of Calchas, Periphas, etc.; but the very humanity of the gods' behavior when they are disguised must make us skeptical of Smith's contention that Homer is somehow at pains to *emphasize* the gods' inhuman qualities. This line of thinking fails to take into account the poetic contexts from which the various examples of divine disguise have been excerpted.

Pierre Chantraine, in a more comprehensive study,[13] devotes several pages to the disguises of the gods. Unlike Rose, Clay, and Smith, Chantraine is less interested in the physical transformation implied by divine disguise than in the underlying reason for the gods' assumption of human forms. Working from the general assumption that "L'anthropomorphisme homérique est une forme de rationalisme,"[14] Chantraine contends that the origin of this kind of divine intervention is in human experience, "où l'intervention inattendue d'un ami ou d'un inconnu a pu, plus d'une foi, dans une circonstance grave, exercer une influence décisive."[15]

Wolfgang Kullmann, in his *Das Wirken der Götter in der Ilias*,[16] argues for the view that the poet of the *Iliad* is a rationalizing thinker. Accordingly, the gods' disguises are a means for the poet to make palatable for his audience the divine intervention which was a necessary element of epic poetry as he inherited it from his predecessors. In the present study I proceed on the assumption that Kullmann's view is essentially correct. However, both

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[13]"Le divin et les dieux chez Homère." In *La notion du Divin, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique I*, pp. 47-79. Geneva: Vandoeuvre, 1952.

[14]Ibid., p. 63.

[15]Ibid., p. 61.

[16]Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956.

Kullmann and Chantraine fail to address an important question. Granted that divine disguise is evidence for the rationalization of Greek epic, how does our rationalizing poet exploit the situations he creates by masking the gods? It is in order to find an answer to this question that I undertake the following study.

B. The Passages.

I have singled out the passages listed below for detailed examination in this study. The list consists of nineteen items. Some of the individual items encompass two or three passages when it has seemed convenient to discuss these together. Thus, for example, Ares' appearance as "a man" will be discussed in connection with his Acamas disguise, and Poseidon's Calchas-disguise is listed as one item, although, disguised as the famous seer, he confronts two consecutive groups of mortals.

By disguise I mean the assumption of a human form by a god for the purpose of preventing recognition by any mortal the god may confront. I leave aside the so-called "bird epiphanies" and passages in which a god has human shape but makes no attempt to conceal his identity. An instance of the latter is Athena's interview with Achilles in Book 1. The goddess "stands," has hands and eyes, is therefore in human shape, we assume, but addresses Achilles as herself and is recognized by him. Similarly, when Poseidon and Athena visit Achilles to reassure him during his battle with the Scamander, it is said of both deities that δέμας δ' ἀνδρεσσιν ἐίκτην. Although this involves a gender change for Athena (unless we translate ἀνδρεσσιν with Kullmann as "Menschen"[17]), Poseidon introduces himself and Athena:

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[17] *Das Wirken der Götter*, p. 101.

τοίω γάρ τοι νῶι θεῶν ἐπιταρρόθω εἰμὲν
Ζηνὸς ἐπαινήσαντος, ἐγὼ καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη. (Poseidon to Achilles, 21. 289 f.).

1. Athena as herald, 2. 279 ff. Athena, sent by a concerned Hera and undisguised, has roused Odysseus to prevent the Greeks from returning home. Once he has driven them back to the place of assembly, the goddess takes the shape of a herald and silences the crowd "so that the foremost and hindmost sons of the Achaeans might hear and understand the counsel."[18] Though the herald is not identified, this passage will be examined because the goddess has masked her own identity.

2. Iris as Polites, 2. 786 ff. Iris, sent by Zeus, assumes the voice (and appearance) of Priam's son Polites, the Trojan look-out, and informs the assembly of the approach of the Greeks. The brusque tone of the speech of "Polites" has led some scholars to excise the lines which state that Iris is in disguise, thus making the goddess deliver her speech *in propria persona*. In any case, Iris rebukes Priam for talking pointlessly and orders Hector, Polites' elder brother, to draw his forces up outside the wall. Hector obeys.

3. Iris as Laodice, 3. 121 ff. Presumably sent by Zeus, Iris informs Helen of the impending μονομαχία between Menelaus and Paris and makes her long for her former life. Helen consequently goes out onto the wall to observe the duel.

4. Aphrodite as maidservant, 3. 383 ff. The goddess' disguised attempt to bring Helen to Paris' bed fails when Helen sees through the disguise. Resorting to threats, Aphrodite attains her goal.

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[18]All translations are my own unless otherwise specified.

5. Athena as Laodocus, 4. 85 ff. Athena, at Zeus' behest and disguised as a Trojan nobleman, persuades Pandarus to shoot Menelaus in violation of the oaths of truce. The goddess herself then deflects the arrow so that Menelaus is only very slightly wounded.

6. Ares as Acamas, 5. 460 ff. Ares, incited by Apollo, assumes the form of the Thracian leader Acamas. Either appropriating the fiction that Aeneas has fallen, or being unaware that Apollo has in fact removed the hero, leaving an εἴδωλον of him lying on the field, Ares encourages the Trojans, who subsequently turn the tide of the battle.

7. Hera as Stentor, 5. 784 ff. Hera, concerned at the plight of the Achaeans, has obtained Zeus' permission to drive Ares, who is aiding the Trojans, from the field. Before Athena sees to this task specifically by inciting Diomedes, Hera, disguised as Stentor, helps the Achaeans in a general way by shouting encouragement to them and by striking "strength and spirit into each of them."

8a. Poseidon as Calchas, 13. 39 ff. With Zeus' attention turned elsewhere, Poseidon, who has been watching the Achaean set-back with anger and concern, is free to rally them. Disguised as the seer Calchas, he advises and refreshes the two Ajaxes. As he is leaving them, they realize that they have been visited by a god.

8b. Moving along, Poseidon addresses a group of younger Achaeans (13. 95 ff.). It is assumed that the god retains the shape of Calchas in this passage.

9. Poseidon as Thoas, 13. 215 ff. Assuming the form of the Aetolian Thoas, Poseidon encourages Idomeneus, who subsequently has an ἀριστεία.

10. Poseidon as an aged man (παλαιῷ φωτὶ ἐοικώς), 14. 136 ff. In this passage Poseidon encourages the wounded and despondent Agamemnon. A

textual variant of Zenodotus (136a) specifies the "aged man" as Phoenix, the fatherly companion of Achilles.

11. Apollo as Asius, 16. 712 ff. Taking on the form of Hecabe's brother, Apollo gives avuncular advice to Hector. Following this advice, Hector deals the final blow to Patroclus.

12. Apollo as Mentes, 17. 73 ff. Disguised as the leader of the Cicones, Apollo warns Hector not to try to take Achilles' horses, but to avenge the death of Euphorbus. Though this admonition is heeded for the moment, Hector later makes an attempt on the horses, an action which ends in failure and the loss of one Trojan.

13. Apollo as Periphas, 17. 319 ff. As in item nine above, the god assumes the shape of an older, trusted familiar of the mortal he addresses. On this occasion Apollo is disguised as an aging herald in the service of Aeneas' father Anchises. As a result of his encouragement of Aeneas, the Trojans, currently in retreat, turn to face the Achaeans.

14. Athena as Phoenix, 17. 553 ff. Taking on the form of Achilles' aged companion, Athena encourages Menelaus to defend Patroclus' body and bring it intact to Achilles.

15. Apollo as Phaenops, 17. 582 ff. In the shape of Hector's favorite ξεῖνος, Apollo urges the Trojan leader to attack Menelaus, who is attempting to retrieve Patroclus' corpse.

16. Apollo as Lycaon, 20. 79 ff. In this disguise, Apollo urges Aeneas to face Achilles. This effectively delays Achilles' progress, but Aeneas is curiously abandoned by Apollo and has to be rescued by Poseidon.

17. Apollo as Agenor, 21. 599 ff. Disguised as a son of Priam, Apollo lures Achilles far from the main action, thus giving the Trojans time to make good their retreat into the city. Having accomplished his goal, Apollo reveals

himself sardonically to his mortal pursuer (οὐ μέν με κτενέεις, ἐπεὶ οὔ τοι μόρσιμός εἰμι, 22. 13).

18. Athena as Deiphobus, 22. 226 ff. Assuming the form of Hector's favorite younger brother, Athena persuades Hector to stop running and face Achilles. In an action that has disturbed generations of commentators, Athena later retrieves Achilles' spear for him, thus giving him the decisive advantage over Hector, who has only a sword.

19. Hermes as the son of Polyctor 24. 346 ff. In the only disguise in the *Iliad* in which a deity appears to a mortal as someone unfamiliar to him, Hermes, following Zeus' order, leads Priam safely through the Achaean camp to Achilles' hut. On arrival the god reveals his true identity and instructs the old king to supplicate Achilles.

C. The Argumentation.

I will begin the descriptive section of this study by examining how Homer introduces the disguised god. Three observations will be made on the basis of this examination. 1) The poet, as scholars have often noted, shows a marked preference for disguising his gods as specific individuals who are familiar to the mortal character; 2) the assertions of Clay and Smith, made on the basis of lexicography and theology, that the poet everywhere adapts both the shape and the voice of the god to the mortal he/she impersonates can be supported from the *poetic* context of each passage involving disguise; 3) though in all but one case the disguise-identity assumed by the god is familiar to the mortal he confronts, not all the characters whom the gods impersonate are previously known to the audience. The length and detail of each description of a god's disguise-identity varies according to whether the poet expects his audience to know the character impersonated. Thus, when

Athena is said to resemble Phoenix, no more than his name is given because the audience knows him from Book 9. When, on the other hand, Apollo impersonates Asius, the poet devotes four lines to a description of that otherwise unknown figure. From the kind of detail that the poet presents in the fuller descriptions it is clear that each disguise is chosen in order to be both appropriate to the situation in which the god intervenes and familiar to the mortal whom the god confronts.

Next we will look at the words and deeds of the disguised gods. It will become apparent that divine disguise, despite the fact that a mortal occasionally penetrates it, is not as superficial as Rose suggests when he speaks of "a treatment of Odysseus' outward form much like the treatment the gods give their own bodies when they wish to appear to mankind."[19] The disguise, indeed, seems in nearly every case to extend beyond appearance and voice to action and speech. Thus what Athena says when disguised as Phoenix is plausible coming from Phoenix. In the case of an otherwise obscure character such as Periphas, the aged herald, the poet has composed a speech which is appropriate to an older man. Similarly, an action such as Poseidon's striking the two Ajaxes with a σκηπάνιον can be regarded as consonant with the character of Calchas, whom the god is at that moment impersonating. Moreover the underlying pathos of certain speeches of the disguised gods is a result of their seeming, to the mortal character(s) addressed, to come from the mortal the god is impersonating.

The thoroughness of divine disguise leads us next to ask about the effects of disguised divine intervention. We will see that the gods, when disguised, affect the mortals emotionally and physically, by advising and

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[19]"Divine Disguisings," p. 65. The reference is to the scar by which Eurycleia recognizes Odysseus.

informing them. Aside from physical intervention (such as striking strength into a hero's limbs), then, the disguised gods affect the mortal action of the *Iliad* by means available to human beings as well as gods. This consideration prevents us from agreeing with Snell and other scholars that Homer could not explain human motivation in purely human terms. If this were the case, we would expect to find the gods speaking and acting in a way that mortals do not. As it is, the gods, when disguised, rarely do or say anything essentially divine, and, even when they do so, they act more often to enable a mortal to carry out his own preexisting intention than to supply such an intention. The question that must of course arise next is, if the gods are not needed in order to motivate human actions as only gods could, why has the poet brought them in at all?

The clue that provides an answer to this question is the high frequency of deliberately ironic language in the speeches of the disguised gods and in those of the mortals they confront when these last actually speak. This striking feature of many of the passages points to the irony inherent in the situation existing in all the passages examined: disguise serves to prevent the mortal characters (usually) from recognizing which god, or indeed that any god, is present while the audience is at all times aware of the god's true identity and intentions. This double perspective that we discern in the passages involving divine disguise contributes to the tragic quality of the *Iliad* because the audience is thus enabled to observe mortal characters acting in an ignorance which the audience, thanks to the poet, does not share.

I. INTRODUCTION OF THE DISGUISED GOD.

The first thing to strike one about the passages in the *Iliad* in which gods assume human disguises is their diversity. The passages vary greatly in length from Hermes' elaborate performance as the son of Polyctor (24. 339-459) to Athena's brief stint as an anonymous herald (2. 279-282). This noticeable difference in length is indicative of a corresponding difference in importance for the story. Athena's herald, for example, has only the auxiliary function of quieting the crowd so that Odysseus' speech, which is the main event, can be heard by all. On the other hand, Hermes' Polyctorid has a lengthy exchange with Priam in which several of the *Iliad's* most weighty themes are touched upon; and in addition he miraculously guides the Trojan king undetected through the Achaean camp to Achilles' hut. If we add to this the diversity of the disguises themselves, ranging from aged maidservants to vigorous warriors; the disparity of purpose behind the disguise, ranging from deceit through reassurance to the straightforward dispensing of information; and Rose's contention that an observant mortal is as likely to see through a disguise as to be taken in by one, it appears that we are investigating an extremely complex phenomenon.

Careful study of these diverse elements, however, reveals that they can be grouped into categories. Although these individual categories recur regularly, and a pattern thus emerges, the extremely broad variation allowed within this pattern militates against the addition of a "disguise scene" to the

list of typical scenes. As Warren Smith[20] has pointed out, the use of vocabulary denoting resemblance—such as ἐοικώς, εἰσάμενος, εἰδόμενος, ἴκελος— gives these passages an affinity with the similes, which are an established unit of Homeric composition. Very often elements of embassy or exhortation "scenes" are prominent in disguise passages. The result in these cases would be quite a unique hybrid as seen from the perspective of generic-scene analysis. It is not, therefore, with a view to proposing a new type-scene that I undertake the following analysis. Rather, my purpose is to define the parameters of this study and to raise questions to be discussed later.

A. Specification of the Assumed Identity.

It is clear that two pieces of information must be presented in order for disguise to be involved at all. First, the god's true identity must be stated, and second, a disguise-identity must be involved. In almost every passage that presents a god in disguise, the assumed identity is that of a specific individual. The simplest way for the poet to indicate this is to use the name of the individual in question. In nearly all instances the name is in the dative case, dependent upon an adjective or participle denoting resemblance. The following two descriptions are typical in this respect:

"Ηρη, / Στέντορι εἰσαμένη μεγαλήτορι χαλκεοφώνῳ (5. 784 f.)

'Απόλλων / Φαίνοπι 'Ασιάδῃ ἐναλίγκιος, ... (17. 582 f.)

There are five passages in which the disguise identity is not specified by name. Of these, two are not problematic because the individual's identity is established by other means. Hermes, in Book 24, takes on the form of a young man (24. 347). During the course of the god's interaction with Priam, he

[20]"The Disguises of the Gods," p. 161.

discloses further that he is a Myrmidon and the seventh son of Polyctor (24. 397-399). These "facts" establish his individuality; he cannot be mistaken for any other young man. In Book 3 Aphrodite, disguised as an old maidservant, fails to deceive Helen. Though the poet does not give her a name, he tells us that she had accompanied her mistress from Lacedaemon where she had been a skilled worker of wool, and was especially beloved of Helen (3. 387 f.). Aphrodite's disguise is thus modeled upon an individual mortal; the maidservant is not merely generic. A third passage, that in which Athena appears as a herald, is a real exception to the generalization that the gods disguise themselves as specific individuals. It is not, however, difficult to see why this is so. As noted above, the mention of Athena is brief and her function is auxiliary to her protégé, Odysseus. Her actual words and gestures are not reported and must have been the usual ones employed by the heralds to quiet crowds; they did not concern the poet, whose focus was on Odysseus and his impending speech.[21] (According to Willcock,[22] Athena is present merely to explain the "hush of expectancy in the throng.") The remaining two passages involve textual and interpretive problems which we note in passing and will return to below. The first locus is Poseidon's appearance as an unnamed παλαιὸς φώς at 14. 136; a line added by Zenodotus would specify the aged man as Achilles' companion and mentor, Phoenix. The second involves Poseidon's speech of exhortation at 14. 364-377. No disguise, or indeed appearance, is mentioned for Poseidon here. Is he to be thought of as disguised at all, and, if so, as what or who?

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[21]For Ares' appearance as a "man," see below, p. 82, n. 112. Generic disguises are rather common in the *Odyssey:* cf. 7. 20, Athena as νεῆνις; 8. 9, Athena as herald; 8. 194, Athena as a "man"; 13. 222, Athena as a shepherd.

[22]M. M. Willcock, "Some Aspects of the Gods in the Iliad," *BICS* 17 (1970): 7.

However these questions may be resolved, it must be admitted here that absolute consistency of detail is something we should not expect to find in the *Iliad*. Because of the various compositional layers or strata, disputed in their specifics but generally accepted as evident to some degree, we cannot often make rules that hold true in all cases. A certain tendency may be in evidence which has not, however, affected the whole text uniformly. The most we can ascertain concerning the issue at hand is that there is a strong tendency for the poet to disguise his deities as specific individuals. Later, on the basis of sufficient evidence in the form of this and similar tendencies, we may hope to draw conclusions about the intentions of the architect of the *Iliad* as we have it, to whom I will refer for convenience as Homer.

B. Vocabulary Denoting Resemblance.

We now turn to the narrative introductions of the passages in question. As shown above, both the true and the assumed identity of the god will be stated by the poet in each case. The first issue for discussion will be the manner in which the god's resemblance to the specific mortal is conveyed in the text. A second issue, arising from discussion of the first, involves the reported characteristics of the mortal whom the god impersonates. Is the poet's choice of disguise suited to the god's purpose as stated or implied in the text?

The words used to denote likeness or resemblance in the passages in question are ἐοικώς/ἐικυῖα, εἰσάμενος/εἰσαμένη (with variations ἐεισάμενος/ἐεισαμένη), εἰδόμενος/εἰδομένη, εἴσατο, ἐναλίγκιος (once only, 17. 582), ἰκέλη (once only, 4. 86). The first two are forms of the perfect participle of ϝείκω (be like, resemble). The others are various aorist forms associated with the root ϝείδω, not counting the two adjectives, ἐναλίγκιος and ἴκελος, the last

of which has an obvious connection with τείκω (it is sometimes written εἴκελος). Of these, ἐοικώς/ἐικυῖα and εἴσατο/εἰσάμενος are the most frequently occurring expressions of similarity. Smith has collected several examples to demonstrate the ambiguity of the perfect participle of τείκω. Though I question the validity of some of his examples,[23] he has demonstrated convincingly that forms of ἔοικα can be used to introduce either a "simile (he was *like* night, they were *like* bees) [or] transformation in another shape (she *likened* herself to an old woman)...."[24] Smith further points out that the poet, "aware of the ambiguity in his own language," often specifies the kind of resemblance in some way. In descriptions of disguise, the accusative of respect proves useful to this end:

Δηιφόβῳ ἐικυῖα δέμας καὶ ἀτειρέα φωνήν· (22. 227)

εἰσάμενος Κάλχαντι δέμας καὶ ἀτειρέα φωνήν· (13.45)

Sometimes it is the mention of visible characteristics of the assumed identity that reveals that the poet intends his audience to understand the similarity in terms of appearance.

...κούρῳ αἰσυμνητῆρι ἐοικώς,

πρῶτον ὑπηνήτῃ, τοῦ περ χαριεστάτη ἥβη. (24. 347 f.)

γρηῒ δέ μιν ἐικυῖα παλαιγενέι προσέειπεν / εἰροκόμῳ (3. 386 f.)

In most cases it would be absurd to assume that a god resembled the mortal in question in any way that excluded appearance, because that is how other mortals would be expected to "recognize" the disguise-persona.

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[23]In particular Smith's suggestion that βροτῷ ἀνδρὶ ἐοικώς at 5. 604 might refer to behavior rather than appearance seems to press the point: "Does Homer suggest that in some general way for a god to come down from Olympus and stand beside mortals is to behave like, 'be like' a man?" ("The Disguises of the Gods," p. 162)

[24]Smith, "The Disguises of the Gods," p. 161.

There are, however, three passages in which only the voice is mentioned (φθογγήν, 13. 215, 2. 791; φωνήν, 20. 82). Failure to look either at the context of the specific epiphany, or to realize what is involved in general in divine disguises in the *Iliad*, has led to the erroneous conclusion that the god assumes only the voice of the mortal in these passages.[25] Apollo likens his voice to that of the Priamid Lycaon:

υἱέι δὲ Πριάμοιο Λυκάονι εἴσατο φωνήν· (20. 82)

As in the case of Poseidon's Thoas disguise, the god is addressed by the mortal he confronts, in this instance Aeneas:

Πριαμίδη, τί με ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντα κελεύεις... (20. 87).

It seems unlikely that Aeneas would both recognize and address a mere vocal presence without noticing or suspecting a god's activity. In addition, a more general statement of Apollo's resemblance to Lycaon is made at 20. 81, suggesting that more than the voice is involved:

τῷ μιν ἐεισάμενος προσέφη Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων.

This formulaic line also occurs in the second of these passages. In Book 2 Iris "likened herself in voice to Polites son of Priam" (2. 791). But, after the poet explains who Polites was, we read the same formula as at 20. 81, this time with Iris instead of Apollo filling out the line:

τῷ μιν ἐεισαμένη προσέφη πόδας ὠκέα Ἶρις· (2. 795)

Whatever other function this line may perform here (see below, p. 39), it permits us to assume a more general kind of resemblance than that which line 2. 791 specifies.[26] More importantly, the picture of a mere voice (or of Iris appearing as Iris but speaking with Polites' voice) addressing the Trojan

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[25]Cf. Dietrich, "Epiphanies," p. 61; Kullmann, *Das Wirken der Götter*, p. 98.

[26]Cf. M. Willcock, *The Iliad of Homer* (2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), *ad loc.*

assembly is absurd. In this passage at least, it is not difficult to see why the poet may have wanted to emphasize the voice, since it is the words of the goddess that Hector recognizes as divine:

..."Εκτωρ δ' οὔ τι θεᾶς ἔπος ἠγνοίησεν (2. 807).

We are not told *how* Hector recognizes the feature that the poet mentions specifically as altered by the goddess.[27] It is evident however that the other members of the Trojan assembly do not recognize that a god is present. Unless one of the two absurd alternatives mentioned above is accepted, Iris must look like Polites to those present, in addition to sounding like him to everyone but Hector.

Are we to imagine Idomeneus addressing the disembodied voice of Thoas (ὦ Θόαν, 13. 222) after he has been accosted by Poseidon, εἰσάμενος φθογγὴν 'Ανδραίμονος υἱι Θόαντι? In light of the many passages in which the disguise is clearly *seen*, it would seem unlikely that Thoas is only heard here.

The actual transformation of a god is never described in detail in the *Iliad*.[28] As the preponderance of participial and adjectival forms suggests, the poet presented divine disguise to his audience as a *fait accompli*, not a process or an event.[29] Despite ambiguities of vocabulary, and notwithstanding occasional emphasis on the auditory aspect of a disguise, divine disguise in the *Iliad* always involves a visible mask that obscures the god's true identity and resembles some mortal character. These observations support the conclusions of J. S. Clay. On the basis of a lexicographical study of the words

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[27]Cf. Apollo as Periphas (esp. 17. 323 and 333 f.), where the god is said to resemble Periphas in respect of his δέμας, yet Aeneas recognizes that a god is present by looking at him (ἐσάντα ἰδών).

[28]Cf. Kullmann, *Das Wirken der Götter*, p. 98.

[29]The finite εἵσατο occurs only twice (2. 791; 20. 81). Both times there is specific reference to the voice, but the poet does not otherwise elaborate upon the action of transformation.

δέμας and αὐδή, that scholar has shown what the poet's underlying assumptions about divine transformation must have been.[30] The "transformation," then, would always have aimed at scaling the god down for human perception.

C. Characteristics of the Disguise-Identities.

Another feature of many of these introductory passages is the addition of details pertaining to the character whose identity is assumed. The listing of these characteristics may encompass one to three whole lines (2. 790 ff.; 3. 396 ff.) or be quite perfunctory, consisting of a single phrase (4. 87; 5. 462). At times nothing more than the mortal's name (or name and patronymic) is given (17. 555; 20. 81).

The poet devotes over two entire lines to the description of Aphrodite's disguise in Book 3 (386-8). As in the case of the more famous Stentor (5. 785 f.), this old maidservant exists only at the moment her identity is assumed as a disguise. She is not heard from again in the *Iliad*. Though unnamed, as we have noted, she is characterized as a specific individual. The poet tells us 1) that she is an old woman with gray hair; 2) that she had attended Helen in Lacedaemon; 3) that she was especially skilled in wool-working; 4) that Helen was especially fond of her.[31]

While it is certainly not an insignificant detail, we will pass over the woman's advanced age and gray hair for the present (it is after all the impossibility of concealing Aphrodite's immortal beauty by the appearance of an old woman that explains Helen's penetrating the disguise). Each of the three remaining characteristics is important because it tells us something of

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[30]See Clay, "Demas and Aude," p. 136.

[31]Taking Helen as subject of φιλέεσκεν (3. 388), cf. Willcock, *The Iliad of Homer, ad loc.*

the old woman's relationship to Helen. That she had been with Helen in Sparta means that the association was a long-standing one; the woman's skill in working wool may mean that she was a frequent companion to her mistress, who is weaving when we meet her for the first time; but most important of all is Helen's special affection for the old woman. The composite of these characteristics (including now the age of the woman) is a beloved old servant, just the sort of person who might be trusted with a message of a private nature, i.e., someone Paris might actually have sent to his wife with an erotic invitation. Because of the servant's special relationship to Helen, Aphrodite would expect to inspire immediate trust and secretly gain compliance with her design—assuming, that is, that Helen is taken in by the disguise. Of course the mortal woman penetrates the mask immediately and completely in this instance, but it is evident that the disguise is both adapted to the situation and tailored to be an effective source of persuasion.

In Book 16 (715 ff.) Apollo assumes a disguise which proves more effective than Aphrodite's. Hector, uncertain whether he should order his troops to safety within the city or charge again into the fray, is holding his horses at the Scaean gate. Apollo approaches him disguised as Hecabe's brother Asius and encourages him to charge. (This Asius is of course not to be confused with the hot-headed son of Hyrtacus, leader of the ill-fated charge of Book 12. 108 ff.) Hector's uncle is not mentioned elsewhere in the *Iliad*. His characteristics are listed in lines 16. 716-719. He is a vigorous and mighty warrior (716), and a Phrygian (719), and his presence is therefore entirely appropriate to the battle scene. As Hector's uncle (717 f.), he is both familiar to and, we will assume, older than the Trojan commander, hence a persuasive source of advice. This time the god's mask, fully appropriate to

the setting and tailored to gain the trust of the mortal confronted, is not penetrated. Along with Hector's belief in the disguise (we assume Hector is taken in since we do not hear that he was not), goes his acceptance of the advice of "Asius," and he charges Patroclus (16. 727 ff.).

Later, to encourage Aeneas, Apollo assumes the form of Periphas (17. 323 ff.), a character found nowhere else in the poem. As a herald (324 f.), Periphas is not unsuited to the battlefield. His advanced age (κηρύσσων γήρασκε, 325), his position in the house of Anchises where Aeneas had grown up, and his talent for well-intentioned (and presumably good) advice (φίλα φρεσὶ μήδεα εἰδώς· 325) mark him as familiar and persuasive vis à vis Aeneas. The fact that Aeneas sees through the disguise (to some extent at least, see below, p. 98) does not prevent the conclusion that this disguise, too, is tailored to the poetic situation and to the mortal character whom the god confronts.

Iris' Laodice-mask is similar. Laodice herself appears but briefly in Book 6, where she is being escorted to her room by her mother Hecabe. The characteristics attributed to Iris in this passage again display appropriateness to the situation and familiarity with the mortal whom the goddess addresses. As sister-in-law to Helen and wife of the Antenorid Helicaon, Laodice has a special interest in the events transpiring outside, free access to the women's quarters, and familiarity with Helen.

The four scenes just discussed have particularly elaborate descriptions of the disguise-personas involved. This is explained by the fact that in each instance the character whose form and voice are assumed is entirely or virtually unknown to the audience (or reader) of the *Iliad* at the moment of his or her introduction. Evidently not wishing to confront his audience with bare names (i.e., because he wanted his audience to have certain information

about these minor characters in mind), the poet characterizes his supernumeraries in these passages. A look at the characteristics supplied by the poet reveals that he is concerned in each case to make the god appear as someone familiar and trustworthy to the mortal he approaches. Further, the disguise-identity in each case belongs to a character who might himself plausibly have been on the scene.

A further characteristic shared by these passages is the so-called ring composition. For example, in the passage in Book 3 in which Aphrodite appears as Helen's maidservant (3. 386) we hear that Aphrodite addresses Helen looking like an old woman. After we have learned the old woman's pertinent characteristics in lines 387-88, the poet tells us again, in 388, that Aphrodite addressed Helen disguised as the old woman described. The following diagram clarifies the ring-compositional element in the remaining three passages.

3. 121-129

Ἶρις δ' αὖθ' Ἑλένῃ λευκωλένῳ ἄγγελος ἦλθεν,
εἰδομένη γαλόῳ, Ἀντηνορίδαο δάμαρτι,
τὴν Ἀντηνορίδης εἶχε κρείων Ἑλικάων,
Λαοδίκην, Πριάμοιο θυγατρῶν εἶδος ἀρίστην.
τὴν δ' εὗρ' ἐν μεγάρῳ· ἡ δὲ μέγαν ἱστὸν ὕφαινε,
δίπλακα πορφυρέην, πολέας δ' ἐνέπασσεν ἀέθλους
Τρώων θ' ἱπποδάμων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων,
οὓς ἕθεν εἵνεκ' ἔπασχον ὑπ' Ἄρηος παλαμάων·
ἀγχοῦ δ' ἱσταμένη προσέφη πόδας ὠκέα Ἶρις·

16. 715-720

ταῦτ' ἄρα οἱ φρονέοντι παρίστατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων,
ἀνέρι εἰσάμενος αἰζηῷ τε κρατερῷ τε,
Ἀσίῳ, ὃς μήτρως ἦν Ἕκτορος ἱπποδάμοιο,
αὐτοκασίγνητος Ἑκάβης, υἱὸς δὲ Δύμαντος,
ὃς Φρυγίῃ ναίεσκε ῥοῇς ἔπι Σαγγαρίοιο·
τῷ μιν ἐεισάμενος προσέφη Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων·

17. 322-26

κάρτεϊ καὶ σθένεϊ σφετέρῳ· ἀλλ' αὐτὸς Ἀπόλλων
Αἰνείαν ὄτρυνε, δέμας Περίφαντι ἐοικώς,
κήρυκι Ἡπυτίδῃ, ὃς οἱ παρὰ πατρὶ γέροντι
κηρύσσων γήρασκε, φίλα φρεσὶ μήδεα εἰδώς·
τῷ μιν ἐεισάμενος προσέφη Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων·

There is nothing startling about this structure. One similarity of disguise passages to similes has already been noted (see above, p. 13 f.). A frequent feature of the latter is that a phrase denoting similarity both opens and closes them (cf. 22. 93-96). In addition, ring composition is a very common feature of both Homeric epics. In the passages under discussion in this study, this kind of composition serves to remind the audience of the true identity of the speaker. To whatever extent we may view the *Iliad* as evidencing either oral or written composition, it is agreed by most scholars that the poem was intended for oral presentation to a listening audience. Thus, even if the poem was composed in its entirety by a literate poet, certain features of oral composition would certainly have been retained because they were useful in oral presentation. We have been examining passages in which short instances of ring composition serve an important purpose. Because two identities are in play, one of which has to be set forth in some detail (cf. the similes which also involve two entities), a reminder in each instance of the true identity of the character about to speak assures clarity of perception on the part of the audience.

We now turn to a passage which has proven problematic since Alexandrian times but benefits from a comparison with the passages discussed above. This is Iris' appearance to the Trojan assembly in the guise of Polites (2. 790 ff.). Aristarchus remarked that Polites would have been an appropriate character to bring news of the Achaean advance. He objected, however, that this fairly young Priamid rebukes his father (2. 796 ff.) and gives his elder brother, Hector, orders (2. 802 ff.). Aristarchus' solution was to unmask the goddess by athetizing the description of her disguise (2. 791-795).

Iris, he seems to have felt, could bring news, rebuke, and give orders without being insubordinate to the Trojan king and heir apparent.

Hartmut Erbse has recently given a convincing defense of the text as it stands without Aristarchus' athetization.[32] That scholar notes that it would be highly unusual for a god to appear undisguised to a group of mortals. Notwithstanding some disputed passages (notably Poseidon's leading the Achaean rally at 14. 364 ff.), Wolfgang Kullmann's explanation of this generalization is quite convincing. He writes, "so leuchtet ein, warum die Götter...nicht mehr beliebig als Götter auftreten konnten. Denn in der Wirklichkeit hätte dieses Auftreten keine Entsprechung gehabt, da die Vorstellung, daß die Götter sich einer Gesamtheit von Menschen zu erkennen geben, für den Glauben der homerischen Zeit ausgeschlossen ist."[33] Erbse further points out that line 807 ("...but Hector did not fail to recognize the word of the goddess") makes no sense unless Iris is disguised; Aristarchus' attempt to take ἠγνοίησεν as "disobey" is unconvincing. Finally, Erbse shows that what might seem insubordination to one observing the scene from the point of view of family relationships is actually indicative of the urgency of the situation. We may thus consider lines 791-95 secured insofar as they do not clash with the speech immediately following. We note in passing the underlying assumption of both Erbse and Aristarchus, that what Iris says when disguised as Polites should be appropriate to Polites.

Structurally these lines are quite similar to the four passages we have looked at above in evidencing ring composition. 790 f. state the true and the assumed identity of the speaker, 792-794 give details about an otherwise

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[32] Hartmut Erbse, *Untersuchungen zur Funktion der Götter im homerischen Epos* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986), p. 62 ff.

[33] Kullmann, *Das Wirken der Götter*, p. 95.

unknown character, and 795 reiterates the true identity of the speaker and reminds the audience that disguise is involved.

There is, however, a problem in these lines concerning the whereabouts of the real Polites. The difficulty centers on lines 792-793:

ὃς Τρώων σκοπὸς ἷζε, ποδωκείῃσι πεποιθώς,
τύμβῳ ἐπ' ἀκροτάτῳ Αἰσυήταο γέροντος,

Willcock comments as follows.

> It is a little difficult for our more rational minds to see what exactly is meant by the statement that Iris came in the shape of Polites, who had been watching for the Greek advance. We instinctively assume that the person who came must have been *either* Iris *or* Polites. If the former, then what was Polites doing while Iris was addressing the Trojans? Still sitting on the tomb of Aisyetes (793)?
>
> The answer is that Polites indeed came running from his look-out post on Aisyetes' tomb; his message was of urgent importance, and suddenly there was new fire and life in the Trojan assembly. In this enhanced vividness, the Greeks saw the presence of a god; and what god but Iris, the divine messenger? So Iris was there in the shape of Polites, and (as Homer tells us) it was Iris that spoke to Priam and Hector.[34]

In order to explain his reading of the passage, Willcock has so paraphrased it that the problem seems not to arise. But underlying the paraphrase, "who had been watching for the Greek advance," is the assumption that the reader would otherwise translate, "was watching for the Greek advance." Only in

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[34]M. M. Willcock, *The Iliad of Homer*, 2 vols. (London: St. Martin's Press, 1978) 1: 212-213. Willcock's interpretation of the phenomenon of divine disguise is more fully expressed in his "Some Aspects of the Gods in the Iliad," (*BICS* 17 [1970]: 1-10) and shares an affinity to the views of W. F. Otto (*The Homeric Gods: the Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion.* New York: Thames and Hudson, 1979, trans. Moses Hadas).

this way could the question arise, "Where was the real watchman when Iris brought the news?"

We can begin to solve the difficulty when we realize that Willcock, who has clarified so much in his commentary, has for once obscured the poet's meaning with this paraphrase. I believe the main problem arises from a misunderstanding of ἶζε (792). If we compare the other passages we have examined in which a god's disguise-identity is described in some detail, it becomes clear that the current whereabouts of the mortal in question is never specified. In fact, there is only one disguise passage in the *Iliad* in which this question is allowed to arise.[35] No one has even posed the question, "Where is the real maidservant, Asius, Periphas, etc. ?" Yet in these passages, and many others as well, an imperfect is used. A few examples: 3. 388, the maidservant ἤσκειν εἴρια καλά; 16. 720, Asius Φρυγίῃ ναίεσκε; 17. 325, Periphas παρὰ πατρὶ γέροντι / κηρύσσων γήρασκε; 13. 218, Thoas Αἰτωλοῖσιν ἄνασσε. In each of these passages the imperfect is used to give a characteristic of the mortal whose identity the god assumes (cf. Smyth's "Imperfect of Description").[36] Because verbs such as ἤσκειν, ἄνασσε, ναίεσκε, and γήρασκε, even when used in connection with a specific location, do not as strongly imply that the subject is currently in that location, no confusion has arisen in those passages. The word ἶζε, on the other hand, can very easily be taken to mean, "he was [at that time] sitting." Based on analogy with the other

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[35]Cf. Apollo as Agenor. Here the god removes the mortal whose form he is about to assume from the action altogether. The *Odyssey* is sometimes quite explicit on this subject. At 4. 653 ff., Noemon remarks to Antinoos,

> ἐν δ' ἀρχὸν ἐγὼ βαίνοντ' ἐνόησα
> Μέντορα, ἠὲ θεόν, τῷ δ' αὐτῷ πάντα ἐΐκει.
> ἀλλὰ τὸ θαυμάζω· ἴδον ἐνθάδε Μέντορα δῖον
> χθιζὸν ὑπηοῖον. τότε δ' ἔμβη νηὶ Πύλονδε.

Similarly, while Athena, impersonating Telemachus, is busy hiring a ship and collecting a crew for it (*Odyssey* 2. 383 ff.), the real Telemachus is at home among the suitors (2. 382).

[36]H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, revised by G. M. Messing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 425.

passages, however, it seems more likely that the poet intended to give a characteristic of Polites ("who usually sat as watchman") rather than specify his location. If this interpretation is correct, we need not attribute a mysterious irrationality to Homer and his audience. It is simply Iris who addresses the Trojan assembly disguised as Polites, not a bizarre mingling of divine and mortal identities.

It is perhaps quibbling to point out that the optative clause, ὁππότε...ἀφορμηθεῖεν Ἀχαιοί (794), does not admit of a rendering, "*the* Greek advance." "*Any* Greek advance" would, I think, be preferable, since it brings out more clearly that the watchman, who did not know that the Greeks were about to advance and could therefore not have been awaiting a particular event, could only have been waiting for whatever *indefinite* time the Greeks might set out from the ships. This clause, especially since the context can be shown to demand it, describes a general activity rather than a single occurrence.

In this passage too, then, the disguise identity is specifically appropriate to the situation: Iris brings her message to the Trojans in the shape of their watchman. Not only is Polites a plausible mask because of his usual occupation; as a son and younger brother, his abrupt manner in addressing Priam and Hector reflects and, in a sense, dramatizes the urgency of the situation.

We now turn to passages with less elaborate descriptions of the disguise personality. The significance of these passages is that they assume the audience knows precisely the sort of thing about the characters here introduced which the poet felt obliged to relate to his hearers concerning the less well-known characters in the passages discussed so far.

Poseidon approaches Idomeneus as Thoas at 13. 215 ff. As shown above, although only the voice is mentioned, we must assume that Poseidon resembles Thoas visibly during his interaction with Idomeneus. In addition to stating Thoas' name and patronymic, the poet reminds his audience that Thoas ruled the Aetolians in Pleuron and Calydon. More important than the geography, however, is that he was "honored like a god among his people" (218).

In contrast to the characters we have looked at so far, Thoas is not new to the audience at this point in the epic. At 2. 638 ff. the Catalogue presents him as the successor of more famous men (Oeneus and Meleager) but emphasizes that he now rules *all* the Aetolians. Thoas makes an appearance at 4. 527 ff., where he kills the Thracian Peiroös but has to retreat before he can take spoils. At 7. 168 Thoas is among those who volunteer to face Hector in single combat and is therefore in company with the most prominent of the Greek heroes. Just over 100 lines before Poseidon's interview with Idomeneus, Thoas is found among the κοῦροι νέοι (13. 95) addressed by Poseidon disguised as Calchas. An attentive audience might be expected to retain from these passages the knowledge that Thoas belongs to the younger generation. Not only is this implicit in the catalogue entry, but Thoas is mentioned among those explicitly addressed as κοῦροι νέοι. Perhaps more noticeable than Thoas' age is that of Idomeneus, whose "green old age" is stressed often in the poem, especially in his approaching ἀριστεία.

The poet could thus expect his audience to be aware at least of the difference in age between the two warriors. This awareness renders the information given in 17. 216 f. extremely pertinent. Because of his respected position as ruler of all the Aetolians, the younger Thoas can approach Idomeneus on terms that allow him to encourage and exhort the older and

more prominent Cretan king.[37] There can be no doubt that Idomeneus knows Thoas (he recognizes him in this passage, cf. 13. 222), but the poet needed to stress an aspect of this character that rendered him suitable to his function. The audience is made to feel that it was entirely plausible for Thoas to exhort Idomeneus to rejoin the fighting.

At 5. 784-792 Hera appears as the famous Stentor. Perhaps because his name was or became proverbial, this single mention of him (the real Stentor does not actually appear in Homer) has led to a great deal of speculation. Was he Arcadian or Thracian? Were these lines originally composed for an epic in which Stentor was prominent and then mechanically repeated here? Stentor has even been deemed "isolated" and the lines referring to him removed.[38] It should, however, be clear from examples such as Helen's maidservant, Periphas, and Asius that the gods occasionally disguise themselves as characters that are not mentioned elsewhere. Hera's assumption of Stentor's appearance and voice here is entirely similar to those passages, except that she does not confront one mortal only, but rather seeks to rally the Argive host. What makes Stentor appropriate is of course his incredibly loud voice.[39] A feature that may be connected with Stentor's proverbiality is his name, which means "Roarer."[40] But whether Homer's audience knew who Stentor was, or began to apply the name to anyone who had a loud voice because they were impressed with this passage of the *Iliad*, is

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[37]Similarly, Christoph Michel, *Erläuterungen zum N der Ilias* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1971, pp. 49 f.) who adds, "Er hält auch keine Rede, sondern es entwickelt sich ein Gespräch, wie es unter Ebenbürtigen und Gleichgesinnten üblich ist." Michel refers also to 15. 283 f., where Thoas has "dieselbe doppelte Funktion (Krieger und Ratgeber) wie Idomeneus."

[38] See Pauly-Wissowa, 2336-2339 (Zweite Reihe [R-Z], Fünfter Halbband "Silacenis-Sparsus") for fuller details.

[39]Smith has mistakenly attributed this characteristic to Hera herself, "Disguises of the Gods," p. 174.

[40]*RE* 2336.

unimportant. The poet has mentioned the characteristic that he wants his audience to have in mind, and that is Stentor's vocal prowess.

Another partaker of Stentorian isolation is Phaenops, whose form is taken by Apollo at 17. 582 ff. The name occurs elsewhere in the *Iliad* only as a patronymic (5. 152; 17. 312). But the Phaenops in this passage, being a son of Asius, is a member of the younger generation. He is mentioned only here. The poet, though, takes the time to introduce Phaenops' pertinent characteristics to his audience: he was dearest to Hector of all his ξεῖνοι, and was the son of Asius, the leader of the disastrous charge in Book 13.[41] Phaenops is thus a bit better woven into the fabric of the story than Stentor, but this is easy to explain. Because the disguise tends to be familiar to whomever the god confronts, it is just such a personal and genealogical detail as we find here that the poet is likely to mention. Stentor's voice is more important than his family background, because Hera addresses the entire Greek army.

An issue that our discussion may shed some light on is line 17. 585. It is bracketed by editors and commentators because it is lacking in several manuscripts. The line itself is of minimal significance for interpretive purposes because it merely repeats information given two or three lines above. However, if allowed to stand, it creates a ring composition and brings the passage into line structurally with several other passages in which a little-known or unknown character is introduced as a disguise. Without line 585 the description is unique because it introduces at some length an otherwise unfamiliar mask-identity without reminding the audience who is actually about to speak. Slight as this evidence is, it is in favor of retaining line 585.

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[41] See Willcock's genealogical note *ad* 13. 560.

It is not the case, it must be pointed out, that each time a god takes the shape of a relatively obscure character, that character is introduced in detail. The following passages reveal that such non-entities can be sufficiently characterized with a name and a formulaic phrase.

In Book 4 Athena appears to the archer Pandarus in the form of one Laodocus. Beyond his name and patronymic the poet supplies only the observation that he was a "mighty spearman" (κρατερῷ αἰχμητῇ, 4. 87). This of course does nothing to distinguish him from the numbers of mighty spearmen in the *Iliad*. In fact, the phrase enrolls Laodocus among them, and that is a pertinent detail. Were he an archer himself, Laodocus would have no need of the archer Pandarus to shoot Menelaus. Such an unobtrusive, "formulaic" detail can thus be placed in a context where it takes on a unique significance. It is also important to realize that Laodocus, because he is a son of the important Trojan elder Antenor (cf. 3. 262, where Antenor accompanies Priam to the oath ceremony; also 3. 203, where he relates an anecdote concerning Menelaus and Odysseus), would be an impressive source for the suggestion to shoot Menelaus. Disguised as a warrior of noble Trojan birth, Athena can convincingly pretend to speak for the other Trojans when addressing Pandarus.

Another obscure and even less clearly characterized figure is "Mentes, a leader of the Cicones." Apollo assumes his shape at 17. 73 when addressing Hector. There is no problem with his being present on the battlefield. As a Trojan ally and a leader, the real Mentes could accost and advise Hector (cf. 5. 470 ff.). But there seems to be no peculiarly appropriate feature attached to this Mentes. Perhaps, as Willcock speculates on the basis of a passage in *Odyssey* 1 (105 ff.), where Athena assumes the form of another (Taphian) Mentes, "the name Mentes has a formulaic association with such an

epiphany."[42] This kind of association is made even more probable by the significance of the name Mentes, "Advisor," "Encourager." In the *Odyssey* Mentes' role is that of advisor to the young Telemachus. The *Iliad*'s Mentes, though in a comparatively minor way, advises Hector.[43]

Likewise, the Thracian Acamas, whom Ares impersonates at 5. 461 ff., has a certain generic appropriateness to the situation but no characteristic that makes him particularly well-suited to approach the Priamids. Unlike Mentes, Acamas appears in the so-called Trojan catalogue (2. 844) and is heard of a little later. At 6. 8 Telamonian Ajax kills him.

Athena's unnamed herald (2. 279 ff.) is similar to Mentes and Acamas in general battlefield appropriateness. Like Stentor, he is particularly well suited to a situation in which the deity wants to address a crowd.

It must now be abundantly clear that no mechanically repeated pattern is used to introduce a god in disguise. The poet may describe an unknown or obscure character, endowing the disguise identity with vivid and pertinent characteristics, or he may leave the mask virtually blank except for one or two details that serve to place it in the context of the passage in which it occurs.

At 20. 79 Apollo disguises himself as Lycaon, a son of Priam, and addresses Aeneas, urging him to face Achilles. This Lycaon, not to be confused with the father of Pandarus, is one of the more interesting minor warriors in the *Iliad*. Later on (21. 34-135), he will without success supplicate Achilles in an important scene which Walter Marg has investigated in an

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[42] *ad* 17. 73 (vol. 2, p. 256).

[43] Cf. *RE* XV, 1 (Mazaios-Mesyros), 961. Also Gregory Nagy, *Comparative Studies in Greek and Indic Meter* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 266-269. Nagy argues for a connection between μένος and μιμνήσκω on the model of γένος and γίγνομαι. Μέντης would thus, according to Nagy, mean "Reminder," because he reminds people of their μένος. I find Nagy's etymology plausible but would prefer the translation, "Admonisher."

influential article about the *Iliad's* battle passages.[44] By Book 20, however, the audience has met Lycaon only once, and rather peripherally at that: Paris dons his brother Lycaon's breastplate before meeting Menelaus in single combat at 3. 333. This is not something that the poet would have counted on his audience to recall, nor does it offer any point of comparison for Apollo's imitation of Lycaon. I very much doubt that there is any significance to be read back into the present scene from Book 21. The irony of Lycaon's urging Aeneas to face Achilles might have been evident in retrospect when, unarmed, he falls victim to that warrior himself. However, "Lycaon" in our passage is only a disguise.

Though the poet sketches him with very few strokes, Lycaon is not merely unobtrusive in the situation and familiar to Aeneas (who recognizes him, cf. 20. 87); he is also is a son of Priam, a feature which is emphasized in three ways. First, it is the phrase υἱέι δὲ Πριάμοιο and not just a patronymic that is used; second, this phrase stands at the beginning of a line (20. 81); and third, Aeneas addresses Lycaon as Πριαμίδη only (20. 87). This will remind the audience of Aeneas' standing dissatisfaction with the amount of honor Priam accords him (cf. 13. 460 f.). This hint of rivalry, or even hostility, between the two families may also be reflected in "Lycaon's" encouraging Aeneas to face an enemy he knows he cannot overcome and then abandoning him to his fate, so that Poseidon, rather uncharacteristically, feels compelled to rescue the Trojan Aeneas. For now we note that Lycaon is an especially effective disguise for Apollo because of his family background.

At 21. 545 the audience is introduced to Agenor, son of Antenor. Apollo sends him to face Achilles and then takes up a position leaning

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[44]Walter Marg, "Kampf und Tod in der Ilias," *Die Antike* 18 (1942): 167-179.

against the famous oak tree in the middle of the battlefield, watching for the moment when he will have to rescue Agenor. The image of Apollo leaning against the tree is not only an illustration of the contrast between the god, who is secure in the knowledge of his immortality, and the man who believes his life at risk; it also informs the audience that Agenor will need and receive help of some kind.

It is, I think, significant that the poet indicates no awareness on Agenor's part of the god's presence. Apollo speaks no words of encouragement to him, he merely casts courage into Agenor's heart (21. 547) and stands by to "fend death from him" (21. 548). To judge only by Agenor's monologue (21. 553-570), the warrior stands his ground in the end because there is no direction in which he can hope to outrun Achilles; flight being impossible, he reflects that it is easier to fight facing one's enemy and that Achilles is, after all, mortal. Apparently Agenor considers the odds better (though not good, cf. 21. 570) if he stays to face Achilles. When it is clear that Agenor is about to lose, Apollo makes him vanish and sends him calmly from the battle.[45] Assuming his form in all respects, the god leads Achilles on a chase.

Clearly, nothing needs to be added by way of description of Agenor when Apollo assumes his shape at 21. 600. The audience knows all it needs to know: since Agenor gets into the situation on his own terms (whatever part Apollo plays in motivating him to face Achilles, Agenor, as we have seen, is unaware of the god's presence), he cannot but be appropriate to it. Agenor is

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[45]This is the only time that the poet of the *Iliad* states explicitly that a mortal whose shape is assumed by a god is elsewhere. The focus is no longer on Agenor once he is out of the action, but this is a clear indication that divine transformation in the *Iliad* is not a poetic mixture of mortal and divine identities. We may assume that in each case in which the deity is disguised as a mortal, that mortal is elsewhere. Cf. above, note 35.

not familiar to Achilles in the same way that the other disguise characters we have examined are familiar to their interlocutors. But Achilles and the real Agenor have indeed met, and Apollo's purpose in assuming the disguise is served so long as Achilles recognizes him as a man he wants to kill.

When Athena appears as Phoenix at 17. 555, the audience is expected to remember him from Book 9. The poet specifies the goddess' outward appearance by his name only. Phoenix' concern for the Achaeans as a group was previously evident in his being at the assembly rather than in Achilles' camp before the embassy. In fact he undertakes the embassy in order to convince Achilles to return to the fighting and bursts into tears (9. 433) out of fear for the Achaean ships just as he begins to speak to Achilles. The presence of "Phoenix" among the other Achaeans rather than in Achilles' camp, then, is entirely plausible. It need hardly be said that Menelaus would know Phoenix.[46]

Neither does Calchas need to be introduced at 13. 45, when Poseidon disguises himself as the seer and approaches the Ajaxes. Calchas has a prominent role in the second assembly in Book 1, and the audience, whether it knew him only from that passage or from elsewhere as well, would not be confused when the poet gave them nothing but a name to identify the god's disguise.

Athena's insidious impersonation of Hector's brother Deiphobus (22. 226 ff.) is introduced without so much as a mention of his patronymic. Though modern readers may think of Deiphobus as an obscure minor warrior because of an aversion to the *Iliad's* lengthy battle scenes, Homer's audience would certainly have remembered him. The use merely of his

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[46]Ameis-Hentze object, "ἀτειρέα φωνήν· wenig passend für den γεραιὸς παλαιγενής." But the words apply to Athena's divine voice, not Phoenix' mortal one.

name may, I think, be taken as evidence that they were expected to know who was meant. Deiphobus is one of the most frequently-encountered characters whose form is taken by a god in the *Iliad*. A son of Priam, he is one of the squadron leaders mentioned at 12. 94 and is quite active in Book 13. At 13. 156 ff. Deiphobus is moving confidently through the thick of battle and faces the Cretan Meriones, whose spear shatters on the Priamid's shield. At this, Deiphobus retires and Meriones goes for another weapon. This indecisive encounter by itself does not much distinguish Deiphobus, but at 13. 401 ff. he has what could almost be termed a miniature ἀριστεία. More accurately expressed, Deiphobus is a thorn in Idomeneus' side during the latter's ἀριστεία. Deiphobus attacks Idomeneus, hoping to win vengeance for the death of Asius, misses, and kills a certain Hypsenor. He vaunts that Asius has an escort to Hades. Idomeneus then kills two Trojans and addresses his vaunt in turn to Deiphobus. Deiphobus informs Aeneas of the death of his γαμβρός Alcathoös, and, together with Paris and Agenor, they approach the Cretan contingent. Deiphobus launches his spear, once again missing Idomeneus, this time killing Ascalaphus, a son of Ares. As he is taking this man's helmet, Deiphobus is wounded in the arm by Meriones, the first man he faced in Book 13 (closure?) and retires. We are later reminded of this when Paris informs Hector of these and other events (781 ff.). Deiphobus is thus far and away the most warlike of the Priamids, after Hector, and it is easy to see why his presence would inspire Hector to stand and fight and would elicit from Hector such a remark as ἦ μέν μοι τὸ πάρος πολὺ φίλτατος ἦσθα / γνωτῶν (22. 233 f.).

A passage in which a god appears to a mortal as someone entirely unknown to him is found in Book 24. Here (24. 346 ff.) Hermes accosts Priam disguised as "the seventh son of Polyctor," a Myrmidon. The singularity of

this disguise is instructive. Because of the unusual nature of the requirements of the plot, no one familiar to Priam would plausibly be on the battlefield at night, know his way through the Greek camp, and have information concerning the condition and location of Hector's corpse. The fact that Hermes disguises himself as someone who is plausible in all these respects indicates that the poet felt it more important for the disguise to fit the mortal situation than to be recognizable to the mortal confronted. The exchange between Hermes and Priam shows that the god goes to great lengths to acquire the trust of the mortal. It is by making Priam trust him that Hermes gains the Trojan king's cooperation. Hermes' Zeus-given task is to bring Priam safely to Achilles, if we look at the situation for a moment from the viewpoint of the god as a character in the story. Hermes' efforts to gain Priam's trust are necessary because he must assume the shape of someone unfamiliar to Priam. By contrast, the gods elsewhere gain the cooperation of the mortals they confront almost entirely through the disguise they assume. In some passages the familiarity seems calculated to inspire trust as in the case of Athena's Deiphobus. When Apollo appears to Achilles as Agenor, the disguise is effective because it inspires hostility. In all instances discussed so far, except Hermes, the disguise elicits a response from the mortal confronted by false recognition.[47]

Once again, Poseidon's παλαιὸς φώς disguise may be an exception. We have seen that this passage is unusual in that the disguise does not consist of a specific identity, though that is what we would expect when a god confronts a single mortal in disguise, based on comparison with the other similar

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[47]Mentes/Athena's appearance to Telemachus (*Odyssey* 1. 105) is similar to our passage in that the character Mentes is plausible in the situation but unfamiliar to the mortal confronted. See further Appendix B.

passages. We can now assert that, underlying the oddity we have already noted, there is the further unique feature that we know nothing of this aged man's relation to Agamemnon. If the disguise identity is not specified as someone known to Agamemnon, then it is not calculated in the same way as the others to gain a mortal's cooperation. But the question whether there is some point to the vagueness we have observed in this disguise, or whether Zenodotus' line specifying the old man as Phoenix should be accepted, must be left until further aspects of divine disguise have been discussed.

D. Disguise Features with a Special Connection to a God.

In the context of our examination of why the poet selected a particular identity for a given god, there is one more issue we must deal with. G. Lavoie has argued that certain divine metamophoses are particularly well suited to the god himself. In the case of Poseidon as Calchas, e.g., Lavoie demonstrates that Poseidon, in ancient times, had close connections to mantic deities and himself possessed "des attributs mantiques." He concludes, "... si Homère lui donne cette apparence, c'est qu'il se fait l'écho d'une vieille tradition qui trouvait dans la mantique un commun dénominateur entre le dieu et Calchas."[48] In Apollo's epiphanies as Periphas and Phaenops, Lavoie sees significance in the element φα in each name, suggesting that god's association with the sun.[49] The poet has also, according to Lavoie, chosen the name Lycaon because of Apollo's epiclesis Lykeios.

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[48]Ibid., p. 17.

[49]Homer, of course, distinguishes between Apollo and Helius, but Lavoie asserts that there were cultic connections between the two gods. He points to the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (among other ancient sources) in arguing for the antiquity of this connection. See "Métamorphoses divines," pp. 19 f.

Lavoie is arguing for two separate kinds of association between the god and his disguise. On the one hand there are associations that involve an important attribute of the mortal whose form is taken as a disguise. It is almost as if the mortal had something in common with the god. Calchas was a prophet; Poseidon was (or had been) a god of prophecy. Of course Calchas is primarily and explicitly associated with Apollo, who is well known as a god of prophecy so that one is tempted to see coincidence in the Calchas-Poseidon connection asserted by Lavoie. A more easily demonstrable common feature--one not mentioned by Lavoie— is shared by Iris and Polites. A standing epithet of Iris is πόδας ὠκέα (2. 790, 795) #. Is it entirely coincidence that Polites, in doing his job as look-out, relies upon his ποδωκείῃσι (2. 792)? Lavoie asserts a deliberate similarity of the name Acamas ("Tireless") to several of Ares' epithets, e.g. ἄατος πολέμοιο.[50] He does not note that Acamas is a Thracian, which is probably a more important common element between man and god in this instance.[51]

It must be admitted that a god occasionally appears disguised as a mortal who shares some more or less significant characteristic with him. This is, however, an unusual feature of the disguises in the *Iliad*, and, where it does occur, it is of secondary importance.

Secondly, the name chosen for a disguise may be significant of some aspect of the god himself or of his cult. However, it is far more important in the context that, e.g., Periphas is a trusted, older associate of Aeneas and that his presence on the battlefield is plausible, than that his name contains the element φα. This element may have struck the poet as somehow appropriate,

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[50]"Métamorphoses divines," p. 18 f. , other examples questionable.

[51]For a full account of Ares' Thracian connections and possible Thracian origin—with numerous references to the text of the *Iliad*—, see *Der kleine Pauly*, 1: 526-529.

perhaps because of Apollo's connections with the sun, but little or nothing would be lost to the story if Periphas had some other name. If, on the other hand, he were a stranger to Aeneas, or were a maidservant with no place on the battlefield, the passage would cease to be Iliadic.[52]

E. Summary.

We may now draw certain conclusions about the way in which Homer specifies the god and his disguise in the *Iliad*. First, the poet demonstrates a strong tendency to disguise the gods as specific individuals. The clearest exception to this generalization is Athena's appearance as an anonymous κῆρυξ. We have seen that this vagueness corresponds to Athena's role in the passage, which is a "supporting role," secondary to Odysseus, and one which does not require the goddess to exchange words with an individual mortal. The exception, however, is instructive, for it shows by contrast the validity of our conclusion: in general, the gods appear disguised as particular individuals and interact with individuals or small groups of named individuals.[53]

Second, although Homer's vocabulary of resemblance was inherently vague, two points can be made about it. Where divine disguise is involved, the resemblance is specified by the context as both visual and auditory. One or both of these aspects may be mentioned explicitly, but both are always implicit in the context. In this connection the work of J. S. Clay and of Warren Smith is helpful, because these two scholars suggest plausibly that the

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[52]In cases where the name seems to be chosen primarily for its significance, the meaning is appropriate not to the particular god, but to the function required by the situation. Cf. Stentor and Mentes (above, notes 38 and 43 respectively).

[53]Poseidon, as Calchas, addresses first the two Ajaxes, then a group of seven younger Achaean warriors named at 13. 91-93.

poet and his audience had the underlying assumption that the gods were both physically and vocally different from human beings. The second point of interest about the vocabulary of resemblance is that it invariably presents the disguise itself as a *fait accompli*; nowhere is a process of transformation set forth. The emphasis is thus squarely on the god as he intervenes in mortal affairs, not as a figure of theological interest.[54]

Third, as regards the descriptions of the disguise identities, we have seen that they can be placed on a kind of spectrum according to the amount of detail the poet furnishes. At one extreme are passages in which from one to three entire lines are devoted to describing a disguise; at the other extreme are disguises indicated with nothing besides a name and (sometimes) a patronymic. About two thirds of the disguises in the *Iliad* lie at one or the other of these extremes. This fact makes it statistically unlikely that coincidence might vitiate the following conclusions. When a god disguises himself as a character who is (as yet) unknown to the audience, the poet describes that character most fully. Such passages often take the form of short ring compositions, designed to impress upon a listening audience, which was hearing of the character in question for the first time, who was actually about to speak. On the other hand, when a character was already well known to the audience, the poet was free to omit details beyond the name. Thus, when Apollo appears to Hector as Asius, the latter is fully described and the audience then reminded that it is Apollo, *disguised* as Hector's uncle, who is really about to speak. But when Poseidon visits the Ajaxes in the form of

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[54]I do not suggest that Homer had no religious interest, nor that we should not attempt to abstract theological material from the epics. I mean to suggest that disguise is specifically designed as a means of allowing gods and men to interact, and that the poet is more concerned with this interaction than with the details of what a god "had to do" in order to prepare for an encounter with a mortal.

Calchas, the poet uses no more than the seer's name, evidently expecting the audience to remember him from Book 1 (and perhaps other accounts of the Trojan War).

The detailed descriptions of characters who are unfamiliar to the audience are the most instructive because they reveal what sort of features the poet thought relevant. By extension, we can assert that these are the same kinds of characteristics the audience should have had in mind when familiar figures were introduced as disguises by name only. In each of the extended descriptions the familiarity of the disguise persona to the mortal confronted is stressed. Very often, the two mortals are related or at least members of the same household. A look at the disguises that are less fully detailed reveals that in every instance (except Hermes in Book 24) the disguise-persona is familiar to the mortal whom the god addresses, whether this is explicitly stated or not. Each of the lengthier introductions also describes the disguise in terms that render it entirely appropriate to the situation portrayed in the poem. We saw, for example, that Helen's maidservant was the sort of character who might plausibly have done what Aphrodite pretends to do. Similarly, even in passages with briefer descriptions, what detail *is* added has the function of fitting the disguise character into the poetic situation. It is no accident, for example, that the briefly described Laodocus of Book 4 is an αἰχμητής.

II. SPEECH AND ACTION OF THE DISGUISED GOD.

A. The Problem of Categorization.

Having discussed at some length the ways in which the poet introduces the gods in disguise, we now turn to our examination of what the masked gods do. The discussion in this section will be confined to the most concrete terms possible in the interest of finding some means of categorizing the activities of the gods in their disguises. For this reason discussion of the larger questions involving 1) the effects on mortals of the gods' speeches and actions, i.e., the extent to which motivation of human action is represented as being of divine origin in these passages, and 2) the effects on the audience, i.e., the poetic reasons for disguised divine intervention in mortal affairs, will be postponed. Here we will concentrate on whether a disguised god speaks or acts or both, and to what extent his speech and/or actions are consonant with the disguise-persona he has assumed.

It is nearly always the case that a god speaks when in disguise. Though no speech is quoted for Athena when she is disguised as a herald, it is evident that she uses language in some way to quiet the excited Achaeans:

...παρὰ δὲ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη

εἰδομένη κήρυκι σιωπᾶν λαὸν ἀνώγει, (2. 279 ff.).

The only real exception to this generalization is Apollo when disguised as Agenor (21. 599 ff.). This disguise occurs near the end of Apollo's series of

delaying interventions in the later Books of the *Iliad*. In order further to postpone the fall of Troy, Apollo intends to lead Achilles on a wild-goose chase while the Trojans and their allies retreat to the safety of the city. No verbal persuasion is required: Achilles takes Apollo for Agenor, whom he was about to kill, and gives chase accordingly. His purpose attained, Apollo speaks only to reveal himself rather sardonically to Achilles (22. 8-13). Except in this one instance, then, the gods take on a human disguise only when they intend to accomplish their purposes at least in part by talking to someone.

This is of course implied by what we found to be the essential twofold transformation of the gods in Homeric epic. Since they everywhere disguise both their voices and appearances, it is to be expected that the gods would usually make use of both aspects of their disguises. To put it another way, because the god is normally mistaken for some specific mortal (or at least not recognized as himself), and because he nearly always addresses someone directly, we are justified in assuming that he has altered both his form and his voice.

When seen from the point of view of speech, the passages under discussion may be divided into two broad categories. The first and most numerous group consists of those passages in which the god delivers his speech and immediately departs. The mortal addressee responds, then, not in word but in deed. Into the second category fall the remaining passages. In these, the mortal addressee answers the god in a speech of his own. Often, the god then makes a second speech in answer to the mortal's remarks so that a more or less elaborate exchange develops. The longest exchange of this type is that between Hermes, disguised as the son of Polyctor, and Priam (24. 346 ff.). The shortest is between Athena, disguised as Phoenix, and Menelaus. In this

passage, Menelaus answers Athena's single four-line speech (17. 556-559) with a six-line speech of his own (17. 561-566).

I propose these two categories primarily for the sake of convenience in organizing the discussion, although we may discover that some of the passages assigned to one category or the other have more in common than the presence or absence of a mortal reply. Some organizational principle must be adduced in order to prevent chaotic presentation of the material. I hope nevertheless to avoid introducing a false clarity through the rigid application of categories. One might be tempted to adopt the categorization proposed by some previous scholar. Kullmann has arrived at one of the most complete classifications of divine epiphany in the *Iliad*,[55] and he, too, has arranged epiphanies "in fremder Gestalt" in two categories. His criterion, however, is whether the disguised god is active among a number of people or in the presence of one person only. It is doubtful, in my opinion, that any of the three passages that Kullmann has assigned to the latter category really belongs there.[56] First, the dream (2. 16 ff.) does not pretend to be anything other than a dream. Its assumption of the form of Nestor is probably intended to make it seem to Agamemnon a "true" dream rather than a "lying" dream. To this extent the passage presents a disguise and one that is successful, but Agamemnon does not take the dream for Nestor himself. Second, it is arguable that Helen is not alone when Iris, disguised as Laodice, finds her weaving (3. 121 ff.). No one is mentioned at first as being present in the room with Helen, but when she exits weeping she is accompanied by her

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[55]*Das Wirken der Götter*, pp. 99-103.

[56]However, two Odyssean passages do involve a disguised divinity appearing to one mortal only: Athena, disguised as a young girl, leads Odysseus into the Phaeacian city (7. 20), but the Phaeacians do not see them; the same goddess, disguised as a shepherd, informs Odysseus, who awakens alone on the beach, that he is in Ithaca.

two servants Aethre and Clymene (3. 141 f.),[57] and one might assume that they had been there all along. Third, Priam is clearly not alone with Hermes,[58] but accompanied by the herald Idaeus (cf. 24. 325; his speech at the arrival of Hermes, 24. 354-357; and 24. 470, where he remains with the wagon as Priam enters Achilles' hut). Because of the unsatisfactory features of this method of categorization, I have introduced my own here, one that, as far as possible, takes for its criteria demonstrable characteristics of the passages to be examined.

We will begin with the briefest and proceed to the lengthier and more complex examples. There is, as it happens, no correspondence between the length of the introduction of a disguise and the length of the speech delivered in that disguise.

B. Category 1: The Mortals are Silent.

The first of these two large categories admits of a further subdivision. Five of the passages in which only the god speaks contain addresses to two or more mortals at once. Thus, Hera, disguised as Stentor, and Ares, disguised as Acamas, address unspecified numbers of people (Ἀργεῖοι and υἷες Πριάμοιο respectively). Poseidon, as Calchas, approaches first the two Ajaxes and then a group of seven named κοῦροι νέοι. Disguised as Polites, Iris appears before the entire Trojan assembly and, though we must assume that she is heard by all present, she explicitly addresses only Priam and Hector. In the remaining seven passages, though it is often clear that others are present, the disguised god addresses only one mortal at a time.

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[57]I read βοῶπις with the *OCT*, rather than Βοῶπις.

[58]Kullmann mistakenly refers to Hermes' disguise-persona as "Polyktor" rather than the son of Polyctor.

Towards the end of Book 5 the battle begins to go badly for the Achaeans. They are not in rout but are retreating in an orderly fashion before Hector and Ares (5. 699-701). Nevertheless, Hera enlists the aid of Athena, and the two goddesses, with Zeus' consent, make their way to the battlefield with the intention of helping the Achaeans. Most of these are massed about Diomedes (5. 781 f.) and are described as similar to lions or boars. As we have seen, Hera's disguise as Stentor makes her quite unobtrusive in the situation. We must now see whether her brief, five-line speech (5. 787-791) is appropriate to a mortal like Stentor. Ameis-Hentze point out that the first line (5. 787) seems exaggerated in view of the fact that the addressees have just been described as ferocious wild animals. It is true, of course, that the Achaeans are in a much more desperate situation when Agamemnon speaks this same line (8. 228; cf. 8. 216 f. for a description of the dangerous situation). We should, however, avoid labeling as *too* exaggerated a line which is not intended to be a description of the prevailing state of affairs, but to sting the addressees to courageous action. The next statement ("As long as glorious Achilles went into battle, the Trojans never came out before the Dardanian gates." 5. 788-790) may indeed be an exaggeration resulting from this same desire to encourage by berating. It is in any case not consonant with reports elsewhere in the *Iliad*. The last line (5. 791), as noted by Ameis-Hentze, is "eine absichtliche Steigerung der Wirklichkeit in der Leidenschaft."[59] The whole speech, then, that Hera delivers when disguised as Stentor is somewhat more passionate that the situation might seem to call for. Still, there is nothing unusual, let alone un-human, about this kind of exhortation in the context of the *Iliad*'s battle passages, and I think it would be entirely

[59]See Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.* for parallels.

plausible that Stentor himself should attempt to encourage his fellow Achaeans by accusing them of having relied too heavily on Achilles in the past. The tacit suggestion that they are not a very frightening group of warriors in Achilles' absence is not true (as the narrator has made clear in his simile, 5. 782 f., not to mention the rest of Book 5), but they have been weakened by his withdrawal from the fighting, and the supposititious Stentor's implication is thus an effective goad:

ὣς εἰποῦσ' ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου (5. 792).[60]

The group addressed by Ares disguised as Acamas (5. 464-469) is no doubt smaller than Hera/Stentor's Ἀργεῖοι, but there are a good many sons of Priam mentioned in the *Iliad*, and several must be thought of as present in this passage. Things have been going badly for the Trojans, and their misfortune peaks as Diomedes puts Aeneas out of commission, going so far as to attack and wound Aphrodite when she attempts to rescue her son. Apollo steps in to look after Aeneas, removes him from the field, and leaves an image of him for the Achaeans and Trojans to fight over. The god further incites Ares to remove Diomedes from the fighting and himself withdraws to the Trojan acropolis. We have already seen that Ares' disguise is appropriate not only to the situation but is reminiscent of the god's Thracian connections. As a battle exhortation it is of course natural in the mouth of the war god, but is his speech similarly tailored to the mortal situation? Ares begins with a rebuke, "sons of Priam, that Zeus-nurtured king, how long will you permit the host to go on being killed by the Achaeans? Until they are fighting right before the sturdy gates?" (5. 464-466) He then draws their attention to the εἴδωλον of Aeneas and urges them to rescue their "noble companion." As we

[60]The same line, used of the effects of a mortal's speech, is found at 13. 155 (the speaker is Hector) and elsewhere.

have seen, encouragement through rebuke is part and parcel of Homeric warfare and is therefore not something which would seem unusual to the mortals addressed in any passage. The reference to Aeneas "lying dead"[61] is a detail of the speech which the poet has deliberately fitted to the state of affairs as perceived by the mortals on the battlefield. Thus it seems that Ares has said nothing disguised as Acamas that the real Acamas could not have said.

As in the case of Hera as Stentor, Ares' encouragement is effective in a general way. In fact the same line occurs at the end of both speeches (allowing for the difference in the gender of the participles: εἰπών at 5. 470, εἰποῦσ' at 5. 792). Both speeches bring about the spirit of a rally which will be led by the man who is subsequently encouraged to do so. After Hera has harangued the Argives so as to raise their fighting spirit, Athena goes (undisguised) to Diomedes, who proceeds to charge. He will even wound Ares, who had raised the spirits of the "sons of Priam" just before Sarpedon stung Hector (δάκε δὲ φρένας Ἕκτορι μῦθος, 5. 493) into leading the Trojan rally. In these passages, of course, there is nothing unusual about the fact that no one replies. Both speeches are directed to a group and intended to have a general effect rather than to persuade someone in particular to undertake a specific action.[62]

Poseidon's address to the κοῦροι νέοι (13. 95-124) is similar in that it proposes no specific undertaking. The poet describes those that Poseidon

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[61]Cf. Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.* It is clear at any rate that Aeneas would have died of his wounds had he not received divine assistance (cf. 5. 311). That Ares intends to represent him as dead here is indicated by the imperfect ἑτίομεν (5. 467); cf. *Odyssey* 11. 484, Odysseus to the spirit of Achilles: πρίν μὲν γάρ σε ζωὸν ἑτίομεν ἶσα θεοῖσιν. Thus κεῖται here (as often) means "lie dead" rather than merely "lie."

[62]I take the phrase in Ares' speech, σαώσομεν ἐσθλὸν ἑταῖρον (5. 469) as part of the general exhortation. The plural, "let us save our noble comrade," is broad in comparison, e.g., to Apollo's advice in similar situations. Cf. 16. 721 ff., where, disguised as Asius, he brings it about that Hector attacks Patroclus; 17. 75 ff., where, in the guise of Mentes, the same god advises Hector to leave off chasing Achilles' horses and avenge Euphorbus. Ares here uses the supposed corpse of Aeneas to spur on the group of Trojan princes.

addresses here as disheartened, weeping, and sure of their own destruction (13. 85 ff.). In addition, the poet tells us no less than four times what the effect of Poseidon's speech is. First, we learn that the god has gone to urge on those Achaeans who are behind the lines (83). After the speech, we hear again that, "playing the leader in this way, the Earthshaker urged the Achaeans on" (125). The Greek word used in both places is ὦρσεν. Just before the speech, the poet tells us that Poseidon "incited strong squadrons" (ὤτρυνε, 90). Ameis-Hentze interpret, "bewirkte durch seine Ermunterung, daß sie sich zu starken Phalangen zusammenschlossen." Finally, the god, "encouraging them, addressed winged words to them" (ἐποτρύνων, 94). The intent and effect of the speech are thus clearly stated by the narrator to be morale-oriented rather than to suggest some specific point of strategy.

It is often assumed that Poseidon continues here, from his immediately preceding interview with the two Ajaxes, in the shape of Calchas. To my knowledge this assumption has gone largely unchallenged, but also it has not been much argued for. In fact there are good reasons for assuming that when Poseidon addresses the young warriors behind the line he retains the appearance of the prophet. This is implicit in the lines which form the general introduction to Poseidon's intervention in Books 13 and 14. Lines 13. 44 f. state that the god, disguised as Calchas, "stirred up the *Achaeans*." While the Ajaxes are certainly Achaeans, one might expect from this introduction that the god would approach others who fit the description. Further strengthening this expectation, line 13. 46 adds that he went *first* to the two Ajaxes. The first "episode" is then rounded off at 13. 81 (ὣς οἱ μὲν...), and τόφρα δέ (13. 83), beginning the new episode, picks up the notion of a series implied in πρώτῳ (13. 46) and unites these two interventions under the one disguise. In addition, the tone of the speech suits Calchas well. Michel

remarks, "Auch hier ist die Maske des Kalchas von Bedeutung: kraft seines Alters und Amtes als οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ' ἄριστος (A 69) besitzt er Autorität im Heer; als Älterer mahnt er die κοῦροι νέοι (V. 95)."[63]

This speech is different in two ways from those of Hera and Ares. First, it is addressed to a group of named individuals and, second, it is longer (30 lines) and much more complex. If length and elaboration are accepted as indicative of emphasis in Homer, this speech is thus more important than the shorter and more general paraeneses of Hera and Ares. The content has been examined with special attention to the character of Calchas by Michel, and his discussion can be summarized as follows. The phrase ἡγεμόνος κακότητι (13. 108) is especially effective coming from Calchas because, through no fault of his own, he was party to the beginning of the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon and was unjustly abused by the latter. Again, when "Calchas" explains the young warriors' reluctance to fight (μεθημοσύνη) as a result of this quarrel, it is very much in character for the real Calchas of Book 1, who was involved in those events. Michel also defends the integrity of the speech (which has often been impugned) on grounds of structure and content. Structurally, he argues, the speech is a single ring composition (see his diagram, pp. 41 f.); the content is from beginning to end adapted to the poetic context of the speech (see mainly pp. 40 ff.). There is nothing, then, that would prevent this speech being given by the real Calchas. In fact, it is so "in character" for the prophet that, if the poet did not tell us otherwise, we would have no clue that Calchas himself is not speaking.

The immediately preceding passage, in which Poseidon approaches the two Ajaxes in the shape of Calchas, presents a speech that is similarly

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[63]*Erläuterungen*, p. 39.

integrated into its context. At this point in the story the Trojans have driven the Greeks over their defensive wall and back among the ships (13.50). Zeus, satisfied that events are proceeding in accordance with his plan, turns his attention elsewhere (13. 1 ff.). Poseidon can thus make his stately way to the battlefield in the much admired lines, 13. 10-37, without being detected by Zeus. Disguising himself as Calchas, the god sets about bolstering the Greek cause by addressing the two Ajaxes.

The appropriateness of the disguise itself has been pointed out by Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.*: "Poseidon nimmt die Gestalt des Kalchas an wegen des Ansehens, welches dieser Seher genoß: vgl. A 69 ff." Michel has once again indicated some ways in which the speech is in character for the seer. "Als Älterer, 'Gewichtiger'... scheint 'Kalchas' berechtigt, auch den Besten einen Rat zu geben. Aus seiner Eigenschaft als Seher läßt sich auch das Pathos der Rede verstehen, der Hinweis auf Hektors frevelhafte Lyssa..., der Wunsch, ein Gott möge die beiden ermutigen."[64] Poseidon's speech is thus quite in character for Calchas.

What follows, however, is controversial. H. J. Rose describes the god's subsequent action this way: "He begins to behave in a way hardly appropriate to the old prophet, for he strikes both of them with his staff (N 59 ff.), and then hurries away."[65] This view is consonant with that expressed by Leaf and Bayfield *ad* 13. 59. These commentators identify the staff as "the symbol of magical power," comparing the staff of Hermes (24. 343), and assert that "in the *Iliad* it is found only in books of the Third Stratum" (curiously, they do not assign Book 13 to the "Third Stratum" elsewhere; cf. pp. xx ff.). In this view the staff is taken as belonging primarily to Poseidon and the blow struck

[64]Michel, *Erläuterungen*, p. 34.

[65]H. J. Rose, "Divine Disguisings," p. 67.

with it as more in character for Poseidon than Calchas. Ameis-Hentze, however, have claimed "Das σκηπάνιον ... führt Poseidon als Seher Kalchas, wie die Priester ein σκῆπρον als Zeichen ihres Amtes tragen...." Seen in this way the staff itself is part of the disguise rather than a piece of divine paraphernalia, and the gesture made with it might accordingly be in character for Calchas. It is certainly not unique in the *Iliad* that one man strikes another with a scepter or staff. In Book 2, when the host fails Agamemnon's "test," Odysseus goes about striking the commoners with the royal scepter in his attempt to drive them back into the place of assembly. In the *Iliad*'s final Book, the distraught Priam drives the Trojans from his vestibule with harsh language and his σκηπάνιον (24. 247; the word is found only here and at 13. 59). These two passages do not, of course, prove that the blow of the staff is in character for Calchas, because the intent of Odysseus and Priam is punitive, and they use their staves in anger on men lower in rank than themselves. "Calchas'" attitude towards the Ajaxes is, on the other hand, respectful throughout. He encourages them mostly by expressing his confidence in their ability to "save the Achaeans." The passages cited do, however, remind us that, more often than not, scepters are carried and used by mortal characters in the *Iliad*. The most convincing evidence for the view that the blow from the staff is in character for Calchas is found in the speech of Oilean Ajax (13. 68-75). He has just realized that it was not Calchas who spoke, but some god, and he explains to Telamonian Ajax how he has noticed this. In brief, he could see that it was not Calchas (13. 71 f.) and he felt increased eagerness and strength (13. 73-80). They have thus experienced the *effects* of the blow, but apparently not the blow itself, as something which they cannot attribute to Calchas. Because the Ajaxes do not mention the blow, Leaf and Bayfield comment, "...the heroes do not seem to notice the blow at all...."

The reason that they do not mention it, I would assert, is that they are discussing elements of the preceding events that support the conclusion οὐδ' ὅ γε Κάλχας ἐστί (13. 70), and the blow from the staff does not constitute such an element.

Poseidon has thus spoken and acted in every particular as Calchas himself could have up to the point of his departure. It is the manner of his exit—primarily its swiftness, as the simile shows—that allows the Ajaxes to see through the disguise,[66] and not some flimsiness in the disguise itself.

Iris' appearance in the Trojan assembly disguised as Polites, a son of Priam, has been discussed at some length above (p. 23 ff.). In order to establish that a disguise is indeed involved in that passage, we had to anticipate the present discussion and assert, along with Erbse, that the speech delivered by Iris is suited to the character of Polites. We may now address this issue in more detail.

Iris appears before the full assembly, old and young alike (2. 789), but addresses first Priam and then Hector. The word μιν (2. 795) evidently refers back to Πριάμοιο (2. 788; see Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.*). Although this may seem strained, it is immediately clarified by the address ὦ γέρον (2. 796). We have noted already that Erbse explains the imperious tone of the speech as corresponding to the urgency of the situation. I believe that we ought to go even further in insisting that this speech is consonant with the goddess' assumed identity. Coming from a son, the rebuke of Priam has a certain shock-value that it would not have in the mouth of a deity, and this is indicative of the emergency at hand. However, this manner of addressing the

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[66]Cf. Michel, *Erläuterungen*, p. 37, "Der schlichten Deutung bei Ameis-Hentze — "An der durch den Vergleich veranschaulichten Art des schnelien Enteilens erkennt Aias den Gott" — ist der Vorzug zu geben."

Trojan king would be sheer insubordination coming from any mortal but a close relative. The same is true of the urgent command directed to Hector (2. 802 ff.). Although leaders of the various allied contingents, being more or less on an equal footing with Hector, may chide him from time to time (cf. Sarpedon's speech, 5. 472), the Trojan Poulydamas must preface his advice with a kind of defence of his right to offer it (cf. 13. 726 ff.). It is only in the guise of a brother, then, that Iris can speak to Hector in this way without causing excessive offense, assuming—as we must—that undisguised epiphany before the entire assembly was out of the question.

In the five passages just discussed, gods in disguise address groups of from two to perhaps hundreds of mortals. None of the mortals accosted makes a reply to the intervening deity, but this common feature does not imply a deeper similarity between the passages. As we saw, both Hera and Ares shout encouragement to large groups, a circumstance which creates no expectation that anyone will reply. If any particular explanation for this feature is to be offered in connection with Poseidon's speech to the seven κοῦροι νέοι, it is probably again that no one individual is directly addressed. Of course the god speeds off at such an astonishing tempo that the two Ajaxes have no opportunity to reply to his speech to them. In the last passage examined, the urgent situation reported by "Polites" precludes discussion of any kind. One is left with the impression of an assembly that has been proceeding rather normally but is suddenly interrupted with the news of an all-out Greek offensive. This news is of such overriding importance that the assembly is immediately adjourned (αἶψα δ' ἔλυσ' ἀγορήν· 2. 808) and the Trojans take the extraordinary step of exiting the town. We now turn to those passages in which the god accosts a single mortal only.

At the opening of the τειχοσκοπία section of Book 3, Agamemnon has sent Talthybius to the ships, and Hector has sent two heralds to the city to fetch Priam and the sacrificial animals so that oaths can be taken concerning the outcome of the duel between Paris and Menelaus. Iris goes to Helen as a messenger as well (3. 121). Although, unlike her mortal counterparts, Talthybius and the Trojan heralds, she is not explicitly sent by anyone, Erbse has correctly remarked, "ἄγγελος ist ein Verhältniswort, das zwischen zwei Größen (dem Entsendenden und dem Empfänger) vermittelt." Erbse consequently states that we can agree with the scholion on 3. 121: ἄγγελος ἦλθε·...δηλονότι παρὰ Διός· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάγγελος.[67]

The human form Iris assumes is that of Laodice, daughter of Priam and wife of Helicaon (she is not to be confused with the daughter of Agamemnon offered in marriage to Achilles at 9. 145 and 9. 287). The real Laodice appears at 6. 252, where she is being escorted within by Hecabe as Hector enters the palace. The latter passage provides no detail which would permit us to compare the personality of the real Laodice with that of Iris' imitation in Book 3. The appropriateness of this disguise is, as noted above, simply that expressed by γαλόῳ (122). In other words, Iris appears as someone familiar to Helen.

Commentators have pointed out the suitability of "Laodice" addressing Helen as νύμφα φίλη. According to Leaf and Bayfield this form of address is still used in Greece by women when speaking to their brothers' wives (*ad* 3. 131).[68] The goddess seeks first to arouse Helen's curiosity by describing the strange events on the field. We can easily imagine from the description offered by "Laodice" the surprise of those looking on from the city's walls:

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[67]Erbse, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 61 f.

[68]My own inquiries confirm that this is still the case.

"Those who a moment ago were bringing tearful Ares against one another on the plain, eager for destructive war: these are now seated in silence—for the battle has ceased—leaning on their shields, and their long spears are stuck in the earth beside them!" (3. 132-135). This much the narrator has described, and these events could presumably be observed from the wall. The tone of surprise in Iris' speech (cf. θέσκελα ἔργα, 3. 130) can also reasonably be imputed to a Trojan woman such as Laodice who might have observed these occurrences.

An attentive listener (or reader) might, however, be disturbed by what "Laodice" says next:

> αὐτὰρ Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ἀρηΐφιλος Μενέλαος
> μακρῆς ἐγχείῃσι μαχήσονται περὶ σεῖο·
> τῷ δέ κε νικήσαντι φίλη κεκλήσῃ ἄκοιτις. (3. 136-138)

As commentators have realized,[69] the View from the Wall takes place before Hector's heralds arrive in the city to inform Priam of the duel and attendant oaths. This is perfectly clear since Idaeus does not inform Priam of the situation and ask him to come out of the city until line 3. 250. The reaction of the Trojan king (ῥίγησεν δ' ὁ γέρων, 3. 259) scarcely encourages us to imagine that he had already known what was about to happen. Thus, while it is entirely plausible that the real Laodice might observe the strange behavior she describes—that the two armies who were eager to fight are now sitting down (3. 130-135)—she would not know what Priam does not know until 3. 250 ff: that Paris and Menelaus are going to fight over Helen.[70] However,

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[69]Cf. Willcock, *Iliad*, 1: 218 (*ad* 121-244).

[70]In an interesting article, "The Teichoskopia Cannot Belong in the Beginning of the Trojan War" (*QUCC* 41 [1982]: 61-72), Odysseus Tsagarakis argues that the μονομαχία, in the context of the Trojan War as a whole, makes more sense as a last resort than as an opening to the hostilities. In the same article he suggests that Priam knows who the Greek leaders are before he asks Helen. Even if this is accepted as the poet's intention, there is nothing to

while the audience might notice this, Helen has a more limited perspective sitting in her room weaving, and she does not recognize that a goddess has visited her. Nor does Helen deduce this from the nostalgia she suddenly feels after the supposed Laodice has spoken. The question of whether ἔμβαλε is simultaneous with εἰποῦσα (3. 139) or represents a separate, subsequent action will have to be discussed below. Since there is in any case no accompanying gesture, as far as Helen is concerned—though, as we have seen, the audience has a broader perspective—Iris has done and said nothing that could not reasonably be attributed to Laodice.

The passage in which Athena, disguised as Laodocus, appears to the archer Pandarus (4. 86 ff.) differs from those we have so far examined in this section in that the intention of the masked deity is hostile to the mortal she confronts. We have seen that "Laodocus," as a disguise, is well chosen. Not only does Pandarus probably know him, but, as a son of Antenor, he is an impressive source of advice.

Of course the advice offered here is foolish, and Homer has depicted the situation clearly enough for his audience to realize this. The murder of Menelaus would cause an immediate resumption of hostilities, and the Trojans clearly do not want this. But if this is not clear enough, Homer labels Pandarus foolish (ἄφρων, 4. 104) for taking the advice that Athena gives him. Bad though the suggestion to shoot Menelaus is, it is perfectly comprehensible in human terms provided that we allow for the element of foolishness. "Laodocus" presents the proposed action as an act of daring (τλαίης, 4. 94) and holds out the prospect of glory and wealth (4. 95 ff.) as rewards for success. What proposition could be more attractive to a Homeric

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suggest that Priam knows that a μονομαχία is about to take place. As we have seen, his reaction strongly suggests that he did not know.

hero? The supposititious Antenorid even admonishes Pandarus to petition Apollo for success, a feature of the speech which we may take as particularly human. Athena, then, has left no hole in her disguise. Her Laodocus convinces.

We now turn to four short speeches of Apollo—all between five and seven lines in length—that occur in Books 16 and 17. The general context is the end of the Patrocleia and subsequent fighting over Patroclus' corpse. The overarching purpose of Apollo's activity in this and subsequent battle scenes is to foster the Trojan cause in accordance with Zeus' will. At 15. 218-235 Zeus has instructed Apollo to attend Hector so that the latter may drive the Achaeans back to their ships.

When Apollo addresses Hector disguised as Asius (16. 721-725), Patroclus has just sealed his fate (16. 684 ff.) by pursuing the Trojans all the way to the city and thrice attempting to storm the wall. Apollo, having driven Patroclus from the wall, finds Hector hesitating over whether to fight or to order his troops into the city (16. 712-714) and urges him to attack Patroclus. As often, the poet has chosen an older character, and one who is familiar to the hero, through whose likeness the god may approach a mortal. This Asius is not mentioned elsewhere, hence it is not possible to determine whether what the god says is appropriate to this individual character, but there is certainly nothing in the speech that is alien to a "vigorous and powerful" warrior of Hecabe's generation. In fact Apollo's portrayal of himself as a "worse" man than Hector (13. 722) is perhaps best understood as a reference to his age, a factor which would keep Asius from rivaling Hector in battle, even though he is "in full bodily strength" (αἰζηῷ, 16. 716). It is certainly not without irony that the poet has finished off the speech: "but come, drive your hard-hooved horses at Patroclus and see if you somehow

take him and Apollo grants you a vaunt" (16. 722 f.). Irony notwithstanding, it is entirely plausible for one mortal to make this remark to another. Apollo's speech is well suited to the poetic situation and to the character of a vigorous older warrior in particular. Apollo goes his way, leaving no opportunity for Hector to reply, and continues fostering the Trojan cause (16. 729 f.).

Apollo appears again in disguise after the death of Patroclus. Menelaus has killed Euphorbus and is about to despoil his corpse when Apollo goes to Hector in the shape of Mentes, ruler of the Cicones. Apollo's speech contains two essential pieces of information. First, Hector is pursuing Achilles' horses in vain because they can scarcely be controlled by anyone but Achilles himself, "whom an immortal mother bore" (17. 75-78). Second, he informs Hector that Menelaus has control of Patroclus' corpse (i.e., has the upper hand in the fighting) and has killed Euphorbus (17. 79-81). There is nothing remarkably appropriate to Mentes or a Ciconian in this speech, but the information it contains is plausible in the mouth of a mortal.

Only a few hundred lines later (17. 327-332) Apollo accosts Aeneas. In this passage the god has taken on the shape of Periphas, the son of Epys, an aging herald in the service of Anchises. The exact content of Apollo's speech is problematic and the text disputed. I believe that Willcock's paraphrase is essentially correct, however: "How could you emulate famous heroes, who have fought to the bitter end to defend their city even when a god was against them, when you do not try particularly hard when Zeus is on your side?"[71] It is of interest to us here that "Periphas" speaks of the exploits of previous heroes in terms that imply his own acquaintance with them (ὡς δὴ ἴδον, 17.

[71]Willcock, vol. 2, p. 259 (*ad* 327-32).

328). The tone is reminiscent of Nestor (though of course the conciseness is not). The reason for this is the considerable age and experience imputed to Periphas. These remarks of Apollo are thus nicely suited to his disguise-identity. What about the last two lines (17. 331 f.)? Doesn't Apollo dispense information that Periphas could not have had? How could the aging herald know the will of Zeus? And doesn't he exclude himself suddenly when he uses the second person plural, "but you are unspeakably afraid and cease to fight" (literally, 'do not go on fighting')? The reason for this last is probably, again, the age of the supposed herald, which exempts him from active fighting,[72] so that he addresses his criticism to those who should be in the thick of things. He has, after all, included himself in line 331 (ἡμῖν). As for his assertion that Zeus prefers to grant the Trojans victory, it is certainly not unusual for a mortal to declare the will of a god in the *Iliad*. In the case of a real mortal, of course, there is a large margin for error even when the hero in question has had a genuine meeting with a divine being. This is the case with Agamemnon's dream and with Hector's misinterpretation of Iris' message from Zeus. But it is nevertheless not unheard of for a mortal to *claim* that he knows the will of Zeus. Of course Aeneas recognizes that "Periphas" is a god, and what would otherwise be an assertion from Aeneas' point of view takes on the characteristics of information. We will have more to say on this subject below. In the present context we may anticipate a little in remarking that, even though the god is recognized as a god here, he is not diguised "thinly."[73] On the contrary, the poet has composed Apollo's speech to fit the character of Periphas, i.e., to fit those characteristics of which he has

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[72]As a herald he may also have a kind of exempt status. A herald may be sent with a message even to the enemy (7. 381) and may spontaneously propose an end to a duel (7. 279).
[73]H. J. Rose, "Divine Disguisings," p. 71.

made his audience aware, since they would presumably know nothing of Anchises' herald from other sources. If Aeneas is aware of the god's presence, it is not because of some divine failure.

The final passage that belongs in this section, that in which Apollo incites Hector disguised as the latter's ξεῖνος, is not remarkable. "Phaenops" reminds Hector of what everyone on the battlefield presumably knows, namely, that Menelaus is not one of the more formidable Greek heroes. That he is no match for Hector is demonstrated amply in Book 7, when the Atreid has to be dissuaded by his concerned brother Agamemnon from accepting Hector's challenge to single combat. The information that Menelaus has just killed Podes, a companion of Hector's, is not disturbing. A mortal could have spoken this speech. Overcome with grief (17. 591), Hector makes no reply but charges off through the forefighters.

As with the first five passages examined in this section, there are various reasons that might be put forward to explain the silence of the various mortal addressees. Occasionally the mortal is emotionally overwhelmed as in the last passage above: Hector grieves at the loss of his companion and sets out (we assume from the context) to avenge him. Similarly, Helen is filled with nostalgia on hearing Iris' news about the duel of Paris and Menelaus and complies wordlessly with the supposed Laodice's command, δεῦρ' ἴθι, νύμφα φίλη, ἵνα θέσκελα ἔργα ἴδηαι (3. 130). It may be that Pandarus' foolishness is illustrated intentionally by his unquestioning acceptance of the suggestion of "Laodocus" to shoot Menelaus. Twice the god seems to leave before the mortal has a chance to reply. After Apollo finishes his speeches as Asius and as Mentes, he goes his way immediately: ὡς εἰπὼν ὁ μὲν αὖτις ἔβη θεὸς ἅμ πόνον ἀνδρῶν (16. 726 = 17. 82). The mortal (in both cases, Hector) responds to the advice offered through the speeches after the

god has departed. A good deal more will have to be said about the effect the gods have on the mortals whom they approach.

C. Category 2: The God is Answered.

In the following passages each of the mortals whom a god addresses makes answer in some fashion. The passages will be discussed in order from the least to the most elaborate, beginning with Athena as Phoenix, who is answered once by Menelaus, and ending with Hermes as the son of Polyctor, who has a lengthy exchange with Priam. We will concentrate on the divine side of each exchange, asking in each instance how and to what extent the god's speech is in tune with his disguise. The mortals' responses will be dealt with more fully in the next section; here they are of interest primarily in respect to their relation to the disguise-identity of the god.

Receiving at last the go-ahead from Zeus, Athena has descended to encourage the Achaeans (17. 544). The battle has been raging this way and that over the corpse of Patroclus until Hector has at last been drawn off by the prospect of capturing Achilles' horses. This venture fails and the brunt of the fighting shifts back to the corpse (17. 543 f.), where Menelaus is now the lone defender.[74] Athena assumes the shape of Phoenix and encourages Menelaus to stand his ground. Probably any man on the field could have pointed out that "it will be a cause of shame and a reproach for you indeed, Menelaus, if swift dogs tear at glorious Achilles' trusted companion beneath the walls of the Trojans" (17. 556-559). But this sentiment has a much greater force

[74]Apollo, disguised as Phaenops, points out this state of affairs to Hector just after our passage (17. 588).

coming—as it does as far as Menelaus is concerned—from Achilles' friend and mentor. Having pointed out the shameful consequences of failure, Athena urges Menelaus to succeed by holding his ground and encouraging the entire host to do likewise. Menelaus' reply is proof enough that he is taken in by the disguise: he addresses Athena, Φοῖνιξ, ἄττα γεραιὲ παλαιγενές (17. 561).

Apollo's first intervention in Book 20 follows immediately upon an introduction which explains that, if Achilles had been left alone, he might have taken the walls of Troy before the fated time (20. 30). For this reason Zeus sends the other gods to help whomever they may choose. After the various gods line up, the pro-Trojans opposite the pro-Achaeans, Apollo visits Aeneas in the guise of Lycaon, son of Priam. Apollo's speech contains nothing that the mortal Lycaon could not have said. Mortals spur each other on with the phrase ποῦ τοι ἀπειλαί many times in the *Iliad*. Here, as elsewhere, it implies that the speaker was present when the boasting was taking place. The imperfect, ὑπίσχεο, suggests that Lycaon was in the company of Aeneas on several such occasions and thus reinforces the impression that it is Lycaon himself who is speaking here. Likewise the argument "Lycaon" uses to overcome Aeneas' reluctance could easily have been used by a Trojan prince: "they say[75] that you were born of Zeus' daughter, Aphrodite, but he [i.e., Achilles] is [the son] of a lowlier goddess." As in the previous passage, the mortal's reply begins with an address that shows he has been fooled by the god's disguise: Πριαμίδη (20. 87). As noted above (p. 33 ff.), the poet may intend his audience to feel that this exchange is somewhat barbed because of the uneasy relations between Aeneas and Priam. Aeneas is said to feel

[75]This may be taken as particularly mortal in tone: Apollo knows very well who Aeneas' mother is.

slighted by the Trojan king (13. 460 f.), and from his point of view he is being urged by a son of Priam to go against his own better judgment in attacking Achilles. However this may be, there is nothing in Apollo's speech that could not have been said by Lycaon.

When Poseidon, in the guise of Thoas, accosts Idomeneus (13. 219 ff.), he also opens with the phrase ποῦ τοι ἀπειλαί (13. 219), but this time the threats or boasts are not those of the addressee, Idomeneus, but of the Achaeans in general. For this reason these two lines are not a rebuking exhortation directed at Idomeneus, but more an expression of bewilderment or disappointment or alarm at the way the situation is developing. We have seen above that Thoas, as a younger warrior, would not be likely to chide Idomeneus or order him about. The tone of his first two-line speech is accordingly respectful. His position as ruler of the Aetolians, however, gives him the right to speak to Idomeneus on more or less equal terms, and that is what we observe here. "Thoas" has suggested that the Achaeans have not fulfilled their threats against the Trojans. Idomeneus counters, without denying the truth of Poseidon's assertion, that no man he knows is at fault and calls upon Thoas to live up to his past excellence. This is of course proof positive that Idomeneus believes he is speaking with Thoas (13. 228-230, cf. also 222). Poseidon answers (13. 232-238) by encouraging Idomeneus in turn to take arms and make haste, thus preserving the impression of their similarity in rank. If the poet did not inform his audience that "Thoas" is really Poseidon, they would undoubtedly have experienced this passage as an exchange between two mortal warriors of more or less equal rank, each encouraging the other in the face of danger.

Little need be said in this context about Aphrodite's speeches in Book 3. The second (3. 414-417) is, for all practical purposes, delivered *in propria persona*

because Helen has recognized the goddess by that point.[76] The first of her speeches is plausible, I think, as a message brought by a maidservant. Her praise of Paris makes the speech more than a message, it is true, but there is nothing in it that requires a divine speaker. If Helen sees through the disguise, it is not because of anything the goddess says.

Particularly convincing is Athena's masquerade as Hector's brother Deiphobus. Because her intention is hostile the passage has disturbed a good many scholars for moral reasons. We will leave such misgivings aside and investigate the poet's thoroughness. First, Athena, having assumed the appearance of Deiphobus, addresses Hector as ἠθεῖ' (22. 229). As Willcock points out, this word is used by men calling on their elder brothers in the *Iliad*.[77] Athena notes that Achilles is pressing Hector hard and suggests the two of them make a stand together (22. 231). Hector reacts with obvious relief, "recognizing" Deiphobus as his favorite brother and praising him for daring "to come outside the wall for [his] sake...while the others remain within" (22. 235 f.). Athena picks up this idea and, reiterating "elder brother," freely invents a scene which she describes as follows: "father and mother and our friends round about kept begging me one after another, clasping my knees, to stay there, for that is how terrified they all are" (22. 239 f.). But "Deiphobus" was adamant, his soul overcome by a terrible sorrow (22. 241). Now the goddess, speaking in the first person dual (νῶι, μεμαῶτε), comes to the point: they must fight; Achilles will either despoil both their bodies (mortal terms if ever there were any) or Hector will kill Achilles (22. 244-246). Though the

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[76]Actually, we must assume that she retains the appearance of the maidservant—insofar as her Olympian beauty permits, that is—as she leads the way to Paris' bedroom. In taking a stool and placing it near the bed for Helen, she continues to act very much in the role of the maidservant until we lose sight of Helen and Paris at 3. 448.

[77]Specifically, Paris to Hector (6. 518), Menelaus to Agamemnon (10. 37).

audience is only too aware of the deceit, the goddess' speeches are entirely appropriate to her assumed identity; from Hector's point of view she plays Deiphobus to a deadly tee. He will shortly deduce as much (22. 297 ff.), for the poet allows him a clear realization of his situation once it is too late for him to alter it.

We now turn to the final passage in this category, Hermes' interaction with Priam in Book 24. For a fuller treatment of the scene the reader may consult the excellent remarks of Hartmut Erbse;[78] we must, for the time being, concentrate on but one aspect of this extremely rich section of the poem: Hermes' performance as a human being. Macleod[79] (and before him Reinhardt) has pointed out what in any case becomes clear in the course of the exchange, namely, that Hermes' appearance is a disguise, not a manifestation, of Hermes' divinity. In pretending ignorance of Priam's destination (24. 362) and purpose (24. 380), Hermes has taken on the semblance of limited mortal perception. He similarly masks his first-hand knowledge of the gods' intentions when in 24. 422 f. he pretends to deduce that Hector must have been dear to the gods from the miraculously fresh condition of his corpse after twelve days of abuse from Achilles. Similarly, his phrase, *ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες* (24. 379), must be understood by Priam as one mortal's approval of the pious sentiments of another, though it has quite a different meaning for the audience (see below, p. 129 f.). There are many other indications that Hermes is playing the part of a mortal quite convincingly. Acting the young man, he adopts a respectful tone vis à vis Priam, not only addressing him as *πάτερ* (24. 362) but comparing him to his own supposed mortal father (24. 371) in order to reassure Priam.

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[78]Erbse, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 65-69.

[79]*ad* 24. 348 (p. 116).

Twice the masked divinity says to Priam, "You are testing me, aged sir!" Hermes uses this phrase once when he has to explain how he knows Hector ("I saw him often indeed with my own eyes in battle..."),[80] and once when he pretends to be afraid of Achilles as his commander ("you will not convince me, you who tell me to receive a gift from you behind Achilles' back. I fear him and am restrained by respect from wronging him, lest some ill befall me later on." 24. 434-436). By emulating so carefully the piety, manners, and limited perception of a human being, Hermes keeps Priam in the dark as regards his true identity.

It is also worth noting that all the persuasive power that otherwise proceeds from the disguise itself must here be acquired by inspiring trust in Priam verbally. The plausibility that is characteristic of divine disguise is achieved in the same way: Hermes, when speaking to Priam, explains how he happens to be there and to know what he knows. This plausibility is inherent in the identity assumed by the god in each case, but only here is it revealed in conversation with a mortal rather than in the narrative introduction.

D. Summary.

We are now in a position to draw some conclusions about divine disguise in the *Iliad*. In the first chapter we saw that the identity of each disguise-persona was perfectly fitted to the mortal situation in which Homer wished the god to intervene. We have now made the further observation

[80]Hermes never explains how he knows Priam. Leaf and Bayfield (*ad* 384) suggest, "Priam has no reason to be surprised at this, for he had visited the Greek army but a little while ago to swear to the truce in Γ." However, the oaths in Book 3 are taken on the field, not in the Greek camp (3. 264-266), and the Myrmidons had by that time been withdrawn from the action. Nevertheless Priam is prominent enough that he could expect to be recognized and in any case expresses no surprise when the "Polyctorid" does so. This indicates that the poet felt Priam had no reason to be surprised.

that the speeches and actions of the gods are similarly tailored to their assumed identities. Regardless of whether the god gives specific advice or merely encouragement, whether his intention towards the mortal he confronts is friendly or hostile, regardless even whether the mortal is taken in or penetrates the disguise to some degree, the god's disguise is perfectly adapted to the mortal reality of each passage.

In some cases the god's remarks are adapted to the age or station of the character whose identity he assumes. The poet either assumes the audience's recognition of a well-known character, such as Deiphobus, or introduces an obscure character, such as Periphas, and composes the speech to suit the characteristics of that mortal. Often, we observed, a remark that might have been made by any number of mortals has a special force coming from the character whose identity the god assumes. We see this, e.g., when Poseidon disguises himself as Calchas, and Athena assumes the shape of Phoenix.[81]

[81] A similar kind of adaptation of a character's remarks has been pointed out in Odysseus' lying tales by C. R. Trahman, "Odysseus' Lies (*Odyssey*, Books 13-19)," *Phoenix* 6 (1952): 31-43. Trahman has shown that Odysseus, while disguised as a beggar, adjusts the details of his lying tales to appeal to his addressee. Thus, he presents the Phoenicians in a negative way when speaking to Eumaeus, who was abducted by Phoenicians as a baby, but as kindly towards himself when attempting to impress the shepherd, who is really Athena in disguise. See also Adele J. Haft, "Odysseus, Idomeneus and Meriones: the Cretan Lies of *Odyssey* 13-19," *CJ* 79 (1984): 289-306, who contends that the lies reveal "Odysseus' own preoccupations and growth on Ithaca" (p. 291). And Edward A. Schmoll, "The First Cretan Lie of Odysseus," *CB* 66 (1990): 67-71, who finds, "from [the Cretan lie] we learn of the incipient changes happening within the hero,...the revision of the heroic ethic" (p. 71).

III. THE EFFECTS OF DIVINE DISGUISE ON MORTAL CHARACTERS

A. The Significance of Divine Intervention.

A discussion of the effects of divine disguise on the mortals accosted necessarily involves a broadening of our perspective. We are no longer dealing exclusively with the phenomenon of disguise, but also with the larger question of divine intervention in the *Iliad*. It is at this point that we run the greatest risk of incurring the charge of having over-isolated the topic of divine disguise, for it must be acknowledged that disguise is not a prerequisite for divine intervention. The gods may communicate with mortals in such a way that they are recognized by those mortals, or they may intervene entirely unperceived. By the same token, to give the impression that disguised intervention is entirely different from the other varieties of divine intervention would be to ignore a great many important similarities.

In order to avoid the artificial isolation of our topic, we must view it in the larger context of which it is a part. For this reason the question of how Homer represents the motivation of action must be addressed at some length, because it has been claimed that divine intervention in Homer replaces spontaneous human motivation altogether.[82] A thorough history of the scholarly discussion called forth by this question is beyond the scope of this study and could easily fill several hundred pages. The following summary pretends to no such thoroughness. I intend rather to point out the

[82]Bruno Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes: Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen*. 4th ed. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975. Erbse, *Untersuchungen*.

main issues and the positions taken on those issues by certain scholars, to provide a context, in other words, for the discussion to follow.

To begin with Bruno Snell is certainly not to begin at the beginning. The question to what extent the gods control or motivate human action in Homeric epic is at least older than Plutarch.[83] It is nevertheless from Snell (or Dodds[84]) that most recent writers begin their argumentation. Bruno Snell asserts that Homer needed the gods in order to depict the feeling, thought, and will of his human characters: "Es fehlt bei Homer das Bewußtsein von der Spontaneität des menschlichen Geistes, d.h. das Bewußtsein davon, daß im Menschen selbst Willensentscheidungen oder überhaupt irgendwelche Regungen und Gefühle ihren Ursprung haben."[85] This conclusion is based on a study of the language of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in which several groups of words, each expressing some related idea, are examined. Most words for seeing, e.g., have a particular emotional connotation, as παπταίνειν (to look about anxiously), δέρκεσθαι (to gaze with a certain expression), ὄσσεσθαι (to look upon with unease or dread), θεᾶσθαι (to look at something in amazement, to gape). Declining to demonstrate that the verbs ὁρᾶν, ἰδεῖν, and ὄψεσθαι have retained similar connotations for Homer's audience ("da sich das so kurz nicht abmachen läßt"[86]), Snell concludes that the objective idea of seeing did not exist for "die homerischen Menschen." Other words investigated by Snell are ψυχή, θυμός, νόος, and words for parts of the human body. The study reveals that awareness of the body-soul dichotomy cannot be deduced from the Homeric definitions of these words.

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[83]*Coriolanus* 229 B.
[84]*The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951).
[85]*Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, p. 36.
[86]Ibid., p. 36.

E. R. Dodds, without denying Homer the awareness of human consciousness, also argues that the gods were necessary as explanations. Dodds argues not so much from individual words as from phrases or figures of speech. For instance, a character in the epic or an actual human being of Homer's time was likely to attribute almost any occurrence, even an act of remembering, forgetting, or noticing, to the influence of a δαίμων. The poet, in order to paint a vivid scene, had to specify the δαίμων. That is, he had to make the god a character in his narrative, and in so doing (Dodds refers us to Herodotus) Homer largely gave the Greek gods their personalities. The result is that Homer represents what we consider to be internal processes as external events, namely, divine interventions.

It was nevertheless Snell's work that elicited the more voluminous scholarly reaction, no doubt because of his radical assertion that Homer, his audience, and his characters had no awareness of their own individual unity. Many writers on the subject have noted the deficiencies of Snell's lexicographical method. Hans Schwabl[87] has pointed out that the vocabulary evidence adduced by Snell demonstrates adequately the low level of abstraction in the epic language; however, it does not permit conclusions on the order of Snell's negative definition of "Homeric man." Schwabl cites many instances, most drawn from the *Odyssey*, of the clear and deliberate juxtaposition of mortal inclination with divine advice. Schwabl himself perceives little enough room for free decision-making by Homer's mortal characters, but insists that it is present and that this implies a consciousness of self.

> Er [der Mensch] ist nicht nur ein Nichts, das sich auflöst, nur einfach zerfällt, wenn die göttliche Komponente abgerechnet, abgezogen erscheint,

[87]Hans Schwabl, "Zur Selbständigkeit des Menschen bei Homer," *WS* 67 (1954): 46-64.

> sondern er hat im kleinen Bereich seiner Existenz durchaus den ihm zugemessenen Bestand. Freilich ist diese Existenz so machtlos, gering und eintägig, daß es in allen Fällen besser ist, den Göttern zu gehorchen, weil eben die Götter das machtvollere, weitere und daher auch bessere Element dieser Welt sind. Gehorsam den Göttern gegenüber ist zwar angebracht, weise und erhaltend, aber nicht unumgänglich.[88]

> Der Götterzwang erscheint also...als kein absoluter; viel eher als das Eingreifen einer Macht, der gegenüber der Mensch Stellung zu beziehen hat und der er durchaus als ein eigenes Wesen, als ein "Selbst" gegenübersteht.[89]

Ernst Wüst,[90] attempting to reconstruct a history of the awareness of the problem of free will, which is of course a problem still unsolved, raises a very important consideration: the fact that the Greeks had not yet arrived at a succinct theoretical statement of the question does not mean that they had made no observations which might eventually lead to such a statement.[91] He concludes, "Daß der Dichter also mindestens eine Ahnung von dem Problem der Willensfreiheit hatte, dürfen wir...nicht mehr bestreiten."

Albin Lesky, in his monograph *Göttliche und menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos*,[92] has tried to solve the problem in another way. He does not believe that what he considered the conventional Homeric (i.e., externalizing) way of representing psychological events called into question the unity of Homeric persons.

> So wenig homerische Menschen imstande waren, über die Einheit der Person zu reflektieren, so sehr manifestiert sich in ihrer Weise zu sprechen und zu handeln diese Einheit, für die das Hervortreten von Teilen weit mehr eine Bestätigung als eine Widerlegung ist.[93]

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[88]Ibid., p. 50.
[89]Ibid., p. 52.
[90]Ernst Wüst, "Von den Anfängen des Problems der Willensfreiheit," *RM* 101 (1958): 75-91.
[91]Ibid., p. 76.
[92]Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1961.
[93]*op. cit.* p. 9

Lesky points to a number of passages in which a mortal character adopts a course of action quite independent of any (mentioned) divine influence. Among these passages are Odysseus' decision to stand his ground (11. 404), Menelaus' decision to retreat (17. 90), and Agamemnon's dishonoring of Apollo's priest in Book 1. With respect to those instances when divine influence is explicitly mentioned, Lesky recommends the solution adumbrated—in uncharacteristically Stoic terms—by Plutarch (*Coriolanus* Ch. 32). Lesky shows that the theory of action hinted at by Plutarch is that outlined succinctly by Seneca in epist. 113, 18: *Omne rationale animal nihil agit, nisi primum specie alicuius rei inritatum est* (φαντασία), *deinde impetum cepit* (ὁρμή), *deinde adsensio confirmavit hunc impetum.*[94] That is, the gods may offer a stimulus, but the mortal must actually assent to the undertaking before it can be accomplished. There are thus, according to Lesky, instances of purely human and of partly divine motivation in Homeric epic. More puzzling, because they defy logical analysis, are those actions which the poet describes as the work of a god *and* as the work of a mortal. In these cases, Lesky believes that the poet has not tried to offer two *explanations* of the same act but has shown two *aspects* of the action. Examples of this are Agamemnon's ἄτη and the death of Patroclus.

Hartmut Erbse has recently undertaken a detailed investigation of numerous passages involving divine intervention in both *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In general I agree with Rutherford's positive assessment of this impressive work. That scholar has summarized Erbse's two main thrusts as follows.

> First, the gods are real and awesome powers in the poems, not just psychological or allegorical figures; and second, the poets have freely

[94] *op. cit.* p. 21.

> innovated and invented in their treatment of the deities, so that a wide gulf may exist between poetic and 'real' religion.[95]

We will often refer to Erbse's work in this section, but it will be useful to quote his conclusion on the question of motivation here: "Der epische Dichter benötigte die Götter, weil er von Menschen, die noch keine Freiheit des Handelns kannten, nur mit ihrer Hilfe sinnvoll erzählen konnte."[96] A student of Snell, Erbse is at once the most recent and the most thorough representative of Snell's view of "Homeric man." It is unfortunate that he dismisses the scholarly opposition to this view in so off-hand a fashion: "Zweifel an der Richtigkeit von Snells Beobachtungen sind hin und wieder geäußert, aber überzeugende Gegenargumente sind nicht vorgebracht worden."[97] This attitude leads him at times to answer only the objections of a kind of "strawman" rather than the reasonable considerations of other Homerists.

Alfred Heubeck devotes a large portion of his lengthy review of Erbse's *Untersuchungen* to a discussion of the question of human mental independence.[98] Though he is in most respects positive towards Erbse's book, he is diametrically opposed to him in the question of motivation, asserting, "es ist in ihnen [i.e., the events the poet describes] nichts, was nicht ohne göttliches Eingreifen verständlich wäre."[99] Heubeck examines in some detail the motivations of both Agamemnon and Achilles and concludes that they are both capable of making significant decisions independently of divine intervention. Attacking Erbse's view that Homer's own idea of ἄτη coincides

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[95]Review of Erbse's *Untersuchungen* in *G & R* 34 (1987): 214.
[96]*Untersuchungen*, p. 299.
[97]Ibid.
[98]*GGA* 239 (1987): 13-24.
[99]Ibid., p. 24.

entirely with that presented by Agamemnon (19. 78-144), Heubeck compares Hector's realization that his own ἀτασθαλίαι have led to the destruction of his army (22. 99-130).

> Der Dichter stellt hier ganz bewußt zwei verschiedene Schweisen einander gegenüber, zwei von extremer Einseitigkeit geprägte Beurteilungen eigenen Handelns, das in beiden Fällen fast bis zur Vernichtung der eigenen Heere geführt hat, und es ist kein Zweifel, daß er diese divergierende Einschätzung der individuellen 'Verantwortlichkeit' in der verschiedenen inneren Haltung und Wesensart beider Heroen begründet sein läßt.[100]

Erbse has subsequently found it necessary to respond to the objections that Heubeck and others have leveled at his and his teacher's work.[101] In response to the kind of consideration raised by Wüst, Erbse wishes to distinguish between a "dumpf empfundene Einheit...wie sie sich in der Sprache kundtut"—and is thus common to all human beings—and the "Vorstellung einer Gesamtseele," which is strictly post-Homeric. The former refers to the self-consciousness implied linguistically by the existence of names and pronouns. Exactly what Erbse means by "Gesamtseele" is scarcely to be discovered in his article, and one is inclined to agree with Gaskin's assertion that Snell (and by extension Erbse) has imputed to modern humanity too clear a concept of the unity of the soul. Wüst, by quoting Schopenhauer,[102] had long ago shown that for some modern philosophers the self is no more than what could be described as a "dumpf empfundene Einheit."

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[100]Ibid., p. 21.

[101]Hartmut Erbse, "Nachlese zur homerischen Psychologie," *Hermes* 118 (1990): 1-17.

[102]*op. cit.* p. 80.

Erbse further insists that no concept of "soul" or "self" can have existed unless there was a word for it. He has, however, not answered the arguments of Sullivan, Schwabl, and others to the effect that a concept may exist prior to the term coined for it. We may add to these considerations the observation that the poet of the *Iliad*, who may have been an innovator in his manipulation of traditional language, was, apart from numerous compounds, probably not a coiner of many new words. Traditional forms of diction are predominant in Homeric poetry. The *Iliad* is in any case not a kind of philosophical tract discussing the question of human free will vs. divine guidance. The epic poet deals with characters and situations rather than concise conceptual formulations. Erbse has not, in my opinion, effectively countered the argument that he summarizes (paraphrasing Gundert), "das wirkliche Bild des homerischen Menschen mitsamt seiner Fähigkeit, Entscheidungen zu fällen, gehe ohne Rücksicht auf die vom Dichter gebrauchten Wörter aus der Handlung hervor."[103]

Richard Gaskin is perhaps the most convincing recent advocate of the opposing point of view.[104] He points out that Snell may have "read too much into the modern concept of selfhood," causing him "to approach Homer with inappropriate expectations.... There is...no more to a self than that which is referred to using a personal pronoun or proper name, both of which linguistic devices are of course to be found in Homer."[105] Gaskin further states that J. Böhme had long ago noted that certain words, such as νόος and θυμός, can be used in place of "ich."[106] Thirdly,

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[103]Erbse, "Nachlese," p. 9.

[104]Richard Gaskin, "Do Homeric Heroes Make Real Decisions?" *CQ* 40 (1990): 1-15.

[105]Ibid., p. 2.

[106]J. Böhme, *Die Seele und das Ich im homerischen Epos*, (Göttingen, 1929).

> It would be a corollary of the assumption behind the lexical method that a society could never *discover* that it had all along been working, implicitly, with some concept and proceed to baptise it; rather, whenever a society coined a new term, the concept which that term denoted would simultaneously spring into existence as an *invention* of the linguistic advance.[107]

Perhaps the most convincing of Gaskin's considerations is that Homeric characters are capable of ἀκρασία, because, "To be able to observe the conflict of its desires is integral to the ability of a self to think of itself as a unitary item, forced to choose among—and hence not constituted by—the array of disparate desires clamouring for its attention."[108] As examples he offers Helen's succumbing to Aphrodite's command to go to Paris in Book 3, Achilles' refusal to accept Agamemnon's offer of reconciliation in Book 9, and Hector's flight before Achilles in Book 22.[109]

B. Group Interventions.

It is against the background of these contending notions of the significance of divine intervention in Homeric epic that we must investigate the phenomenon of divine disguise. Without attempting an actual solution to the questions of free will and the unity of the self as they arise in the discussion of Homer, we will keep in mind, as we proceed through our investigation, this controversial aspect of the passages we are examining. It

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[107]Gaskin, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[108]Ibid., p. 11.

[109]Even if Hector and Achilles are characters that one may view as breaking or altering the tradition, this would nevertheless indicate the Homer has transcended the earlier, traditional way of looking at human behavior. We might accordingly expect to find traces of this attitude elsewhere in the *Iliad*.

may be that evidence will present itself that lends support to one or the other view.

Issues of particular importance that arise are: 1) What is meant by motivation? 2) Given that the gods do influence human beings, how do they accomplish this? That is, how often do disguised deities perform actions that only gods could perform as opposed to acting virtually as human beings? The answers to these questions can be attempted only after a thorough analysis of the passages has been undertaken. The answers we arrive at will help us to assess the nature of the effects that the disguised gods have on the mortals they confront.

Because the god may exercise more than one kind of influence in any given passage, it is impossible to categorize the passages in terms of the effect the god has on the action. Apollo/Asius, e.g., both suggests to Hector a course of action and imparts information to him. Thus, for organizational purposes the categorization applied in the previous chapter will be retained here, although the order in which the individual passages are treated may be varied. Once all the passages have been discussed in terms of the effect produced by the god, we can discuss each kind of effect separately.

We return first to Hera's impersonation of Stentor (5. 785 ff.). The reader will recall that the Achaeans, massed about Diomedes, are on the defensive, and that this state of affairs was represented as unusual but not disastrous. In fact, the simile at 5. 782 f., comparing the Argives to lions and boars "whose strength is not feeble," paints anything but a desperate picture of them. They are retreating, surprised at Hector's success (cf. 5. 601), because Diomedes has informed them that standing beside Hector is "that one, Ares, looking like a mortal man" (5. 604). At 5. 702 the poet reminds his audience that the Argives are yielding ground "because they had found out that Ares

was among the Trojans." They are, in short, making a tactical withdrawal, their strength (σθένος, 5. 783) intact. What, then, is the effect of Hera's paraenesis on the men? The poet says only, ὡς εἰποῦσ' ὤτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου (5. 792).

If we may take the poet at his word, this is a sufficient description of the effect of Hera's speech. The word σθένος indicates physical strength, and this is what the Argives still display even as they give ground. The words μένος and θυμός, on the other hand, denote courage and fighting spirit in this context[110] (θυμός in particular tends to have a slightly different significance in other contexts, but it is never equivalent to σθένος). To judge by the way this is expressed, each of the men possessed both μένος and θυμός as well as σθένος. What Hera does by addressing them (εἰποῦσ', 792) is to stimulate their innate courage and fighting spirit.

One must proceed with caution. Both the lines 5. 783 and 5. 792 may be called formulaic. Line 5. 783 occurs also at 7. 257, and 5. 792 (allowing for the gender of the participle εἰπών/εἰποῦσ') recurs often. It may reasonably be objected that the poet did not select the precise wording of the formulas he used, but was bound to repeat them more or less (i.e., with slight variations such as that mentioned above) as tradition dictated. Thus, if an epic poet wished to compare warriors to lions and boars and had a little over a line and a half to fill, σθένος was bound to be the point of comparison. Similarly, line 5. 792 occurs after so many speeches of gods and mortals in the *Iliad* that it is difficult to imagine a paraenesis whose effects could not be described in this way. To my mind this way of looking at epic poetry fails to account for the possibility that a poet might master the formulaic language instead of

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[110]Cf. Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.*

becoming a slave to it. Accepting that both of the phrases examined above are not original *compositions* of the poet of the *Iliad*, we may justifiably assert that they represent conscious *choices* on his part. Using accepted convention in this way, Homer can to a large extent say what he wants to say. Here this means that the poet chose the simile at 5. 783 precisely because he wanted to emphasize physical strength and chose the formula used at 5. 792 because it describes the arousal of courage.

Hera has thus stimulated the courage of men whose physical strength is unimpaired. As we have seen, she does this precisely as a human, Stentor, might have done. It now appears that the effect of her intervention is also on a human scale. To term it "gewaltig" with Erbse[111] is to term the effects of, say, Nestor's exhortation at 6. 67-71 to kill rather than take spoils—not to mention innumerable other speeches followed by this formulaic line—"gewaltig" as well.

When Ares addresses the sons of Priam (5.464 ff.), they too are suffering a reversal. It can be argued that from the beginning of Book 5 the Trojans are being driven back. At the moment when Athena leads Ares from the field and seats him beside the Scamander, "the Danaans gained the upper hand over the Trojans" (5. 35-37). All the Achaean leaders have a part in this success, but of course Diomedes is vigorously to the fore. When Apollo at last forces the Tydeid to "withdraw a little" (5. 443), the tide is beginning to turn and we hear for the first time since the opening of Book 5 of successful Trojan resistance. This takes the form of fighting over the supposed body of Aeneas.

ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' εἰδώλῳ Τρῶες καὶ δῖοι Ἀχαιοὶ
δῄουν ἀλλήλων ἀμφὶ στήθεσσι βοείας

[111] *Untersuchungen*, p. 197.

ἀσπίδας εὐκύκλους λαισήϊά τε πτερόεντα. (5. 451-453)

From this description it is clear that, when Ares "incite[s] the Trojan ranks, going among them resembling swift Acamas" (5. 461 f.), they are no longer in full retreat. Although the Trojans will not achieve an organized rally until Hector takes action to bring this about (cf. 5. 497, οἱ δ' ἐλελίχθησαν καὶ ἐναντίοι ἔσταν Ἀχαιῶν), some of them are thus described as already doing what Ares urges in his speech: σαώσομεν ἐσθλὸν ἑταῖρον (5. 469).

Of course Ares' speech is addressed to the sons of Priam, not the Trojans at large. "Sons of Priam" stands nowhere that I can find for the Trojans in general, and in any case the addressees are viewed as separate from "the host" at 5. 465 (ἐς τί ἔτι κτείνεσθαι ἐάσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιοῖς;). But the effect of the speech is general. This is clearly shown by the introductory lines (cf. 5. 461). It would seem most logical to assume that fighting immediately ensues where Aeneas falls, that is, over the εἴδωλον. Only after Apollo has completed his arrangements for healing Aeneas does that god visit Ares (δὴ τότε, 5. 454). Ares' lengthy intervention on the side of the Trojans is then introduced with the general remark that he "incited the Trojan ranks" in the shape of Acamas the Thracian.[112] His first specific undertaking is then to bring to the attention of the Priamids the situation near the fallen "Aeneas." The god encourages them to join the struggle and, as in the passage just reviewed, the mortals are encouraged by the god's speech (5. 470-792).

Ares' advice is of course more specific than Hera's. In fact, Hera offers not the slightest hint of a real course of action, whereas Ares has pointed to a critical area on the field and appealed to the Priamids' sense of loyalty to their comrade and to their obligation to protect the host. As we have seen, his

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112 This implies that Ares retains the shape of Acamas (cf. Ἄρηϊ βροτῷ ἀνδρὶ ἐοικώς, 5. 604) until he is wounded and leaves the field.

entire speech is composed from a human perspective, including the reference to the εἴδωλον as if it were really Aeneas.[113] The Trojans thus rally much as they would if the real Acamas were encouraging them. Their attention has been directed to a good place for taking a stand and we should assume that they do so.

Poseidon's speech to the κοῦροι νέοι (13. 95-124) is, I think, an impressive example of Homeric "psychology." Thanks to Michel's thorough analysis of this speech in terms of structure and content, we can now discuss it with confidence as a unified composition rather than a "doppelte recension."[114] As discussed above (p. 49), the effect of the speech is very clearly to boost the morale of the seven listeners. Michel points out that the main theme of the paraenesis is μεθημοσύνη. This is Poseidon's charge against the young warriors and corresponds in polemical fashion to their behavior: he finds them behind the lines (ὄπιθεν, 13. 83), exhausted and resting. Michel attributes the success of the speech in arousing the addressees to the fact that "Calchas" repeatedly brings to the fore their position and the higher expections he has of them because of their higher standing.[115] "I am confident that if you fight you will save our ships" (13. 95 f.). "I would not quarrel with any man who left (μεθείη!) the battle if he were useless, but with *you* I remonstrate vigorously" (13. 117 ff.). In addition to emphasizing their ability and responsibility to save the day, "Calchas" stresses the extremity of

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[113]I cannot follow Erbse in his assertion, "Vom Schicksal des echten Aineias hat Ares während seiner Siesta nichts erfahren" (*Untersuchungen*, p. 161). Ares has not been asleep, but observing the battle from the "left" near the Scamander (5. 355 f.). Ares is no match for Athena in matters of strategy but he need not be made out to be entirely stupid. A disguised god would be unlikely to betray knowledge that no mortal could have had. On the contrary, Ares has every reason consciously to perpetuate Apollo's ruse, and the fact that he does so suggests at least some degree of intelligence.

[114]"Doppelte recension" is Friedländer's designation. See Michel, *Erläuterungen*, p. 38, n. 89. For Michel's discussion of this speech, see pp. 38-47 of this same work.

[115]*Erläuterungen*, p. 39.

the danger involved: "...but if you leave off (μεθήσετε!) from the grievous fighting, the day now appears when we are conquered at the hands of the Trojans" (13. 97 f.). Michel's analysis of the speech takes us this far.

The central part of the speech, however, also contains elements both subtle and effective in raising the young warriors' spirits. This is the section from 13. 99-115. Here "Calchas" expresses his surprise that the Trojans have come so close to the ships when they had previously been too frightened to come far from the city.[116] "Calchas" can only explain this as a result of

ἡγεμόνος κακότητι μεθημοσύνῃσί τε λαῶν (13. 109).

We have seen that this remark is particularly appropriate to the character of the unjustly wronged Calchas, but what is the effect of such talk on the mortals here involved?

First we must try to unravel what the rather confusing lines 13. 107-115 mean. Clearly the speaker is explaining the Trojan success as a result of the failings of the *Achaean* leader and army. This implies to the κοῦροι νέοι that the Trojans are not to be feared on their own merits. The slackness of those "who, because they are quarreling with him [Agamemnon], are not willing to defend the ships" (13. 109 f.) cannot refer to Achilles as Leaf and Bayfield seem to suppose *ad loc.* The plural makes this unlikely (ἐρίσαντες, ἐθέλουσι, 13. 109), and the description of what the slackers-off are doing (κτείνονται, "getting themselves killed," 13. 110) makes it impossible. Rather, from the point of view of the addressees, "Calchas" is referring to a general group of which they themselves are a part, namely, those who, unlike Achilles, have recently been taking part in the fighting. That λαοί can include the leaders (i.e., the κοῦροι

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[116]This surprise at the Trojan success is expressed also by Hera/Stentor and by Diomedes in Book 5. It is an indication that all the battle action in the *Iliad* is to be viewed as exceptional in the context of the Trojan War as a whole.

νέοι) as well as the common soldiers is clear from passages such as 9. 521. Perhaps the most important reason for connecting the λαοί here mentioned with the addressees is that it is their slackness that is blamed for the Achaean reversal. As noted above, Michel has pointed out that "Calchas" accuses the younger warriors of μεθημοσύνη throughout the speech. Ameis-Hentze's assertion that ἡμέας γ' (114) contrasts the leaders with the λαοί must accordingly be rejected.

Poseidon goes on to explain how the incompetence (κακότητι, 13. 108) of the leader might have resulted in the egregious Trojan success: quite simply because he dishonored Achilles (13. 113). This explanation is expressed in the form of a condition: "But even if the hero, widely ruling Agamemnon son of Atreus, is indeed entirely to blame because he dishonored swift-footed Achilles, *we* can't slack off from fighting" (13. 111-114). Poseidon is thus suggesting elliptically to the κοῦροι νέοι that the reason for their slackness is anger with Agamemnon for his mistreatment of Achilles. He suggests that to mend their ways is the noblest thing to do. Thus the contrast marked by ἡμέας γ' is not a simple one: even if Agamemnon *is* wrong, *we* cannot be slack. This antithesis contrasts the implied reaction of the κοῦροι νέοι to Agamemnon's dishonoring of Achilles with the behavior called for by the present danger: under other circumstances they might withdraw from the fighting out of anger (ἐρίσαντες, 13, 109) with Agamemnon (as "Calchas" implies they are actually doing), but the situation does not permit that reaction now.

The effect on the seven men of this explanation for the sorry state of Achaean military affairs is to be sought in the contrast between Poseidon's explanation of the men's condition and the poet's description of it. At 13. 83 ff. we find the men behind the lines exhausted, grieving at the sight of the Trojans pouring over the wall, and weeping in the belief that they have no

escape from destruction.[117] They are exhausted and desperate, in short, but there is no mention of hostility towards Agamemnon. Why then would Poseidon impute to them this motive for their inactivity? I believe it is by way of reassuring the men that they *can* still save the day. Wishing to make the Trojans seem vincible, he has compared them to deer. His surprise at their success also belittles them, and he makes the real cause of the Achaean setback the Achaeans themselves. He deliberately refuses to countenance the possibility that the κοῦροι νέοι are afraid or even hard-pressed by a worthy adversary. They must be angry at Agamemnon for offending their best fighter; and who could blame them for that, "Calchas" implies, but on the other hand the situation makes it imperative that "we" give up this anger-inspired μεθημοσύνη (13. 115; "Calchas" has every reason to include himself among those who might have a grudge against Agamemnon). Thus Poseidon, without minimizing the danger presented by the Trojans, maximizes the ability of the κοῦροι νέοι to recover and in so doing raises their spirits.

We may now briefly summarize the effects of divine intervention as evident in the three passages we have discussed so far. In all three passages the morale of a group of men suffering a reversal on the battlefield is improved by a god. The element of disguise is peculiarly important because it means that the intervention proceeds, from the point of view of the mortals in each passage, exactly as if no god were present at all. A mortal on the scene would not have been surprised that Stentor scolded into stiffer resistance those Achaeans who were within his formidable range. Similarly, the Priamids can easily accept that Acamas points to the struggle over the fallen

[117]Poseidon's κτείνονται thus captures quite well their feelings concerning what is about to happen.

Aeneas and encourages them to join it. An observer of the last interview discussed above would not be astonished to see and hear Calchas skilfully bolstering the sagging resolve of the exhausted younger warriors. Their courage restored by what they must assume is a human agent, they naturally take up a tight defensive formation around the nearest major heroes, the two Ajaxes.

These instances of divine intervention are thoroughly composed on the model of natural human interaction: the god looks and sounds like a familiar comrade, his words are in character for that comrade, and the effects of his words are not supernatural. For this reason it is difficult to accept the validity of the assertion that Homer at all times needed the gods to explain human action. It is clear that Homer chose for some reason to bring a god into the picture—we will turn to this question below—but since the god is involved (to whatever extent) in motivating human actions in a manner in all respects human, the reason for mentioning the god's presence in these passages cannot be merely that some essentially divine act was called for.

The question of motivation must also be dealt with here. There is a sense in which Hera, Ares, and Poseidon do motivate their mortal addressees. To encourage someone is, to some degree, to motivate him. However, it is particularly clear in the case of Poseidon and the κοῦροι νέοι that the action which they take after he encourages them (ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' Αἴαντας δοιοὺς ἵσταντο φάλαγγες/καρτεραί, 13. 126 f.) is their own. Poseidon—but from their point of view Calchas—has given them the courage to fight again, but he nowhere orders them to assume a defensive posture round the Ajaxes. Even Ares, who does suggest the specific action of joining the fighting over Aeneas' supposed corpse, only tells the Priamids to do what other men are already

doing. If we are to generalize these observations, however, further evidence must be sought in the remaining disguise passages.

Poseidon/Calchas' encounter with the two Ajaxes differs at least in part from the passages examined so far. It is of primary interest to us in this section because the mortals discuss their reaction to and the effects of the god's intervention. These effects and the god's swift departure are what lead them to conclude that τις θεῶν and not Calchas has spoken to them.

Oilean Ajax finds that his fighting spirit (θυμός, 13. 73) has been increased and that his very limbs are eager (μαιμώωσι, 13. 75) for action. Similarly, Telamonian Ajax notices an increased courage (μένος, 13. 78) and a kind of physical eagerness (13. 77 ff.); he is even itching to take on Hector all by himself (13. 79 f.). This is how the characters themselves perceive the effects of Poseidon's action as reported by the poet at 13. 59-61:

> Ἦ, καὶ σκηπανίῳ γαιήοχος ἐννοσίγαιος
> ἀμφοτέρω κεκόπων πλῆσεν μένεος κρατεροῖο,
> γυῖα δὲ θῆκεν ἐλαφρά, πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὕπερθεν.

It is not only the Ajaxes' morale that has been affected, but their legs and arms as well. Poseidon has intervened physically in the action. But there is not an exact correspondence between what the narrator reports and what the Ajaxes perceive. The god has made the limbs of the two men "nimble." They themselves perceive this nimbleness as an eagerness to fight. In a sense, then, they specify the general quality of nimbleness by endowing it with a purpose of their own. This is doubtless entirely in keeping with Poseidon's intention, but the fact that the two men and the god have a common intention does not mean that it has been supplied by the god. That kind of motivation is demonstrably absent here. The Ajaxes were in fact already eager to fight (μεμαῶτε καὶ αὐτώ, 13. 46) before they set eyes on "Calchas" or

sensed the presence of "some god." Oilean Ajax refers to this previous state when he describes the result of his encounter with the god, "my spirit is more stirred (μᾶλλον ἐφορμᾶται, 13. 74) to fight and do battle."

In my mind at least the question arises whether this kind of intervention can reasonably be termed motivation at all. Poseidon very clearly has a great deal to do with the impending Achaean success, and it is significant that the poet summarizes the effects of this encounter in the following way: ὡς οἱ μὲν τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγόρευον / χάρμῃ γηθόσυνοι, τήν σφιν θεὸς ἔμβαλε θυμῷ· 13. 81 f.). However, there was no need for motivation in the sense of supplying a purpose or incentive. Rather Poseidon has enabled the Ajaxes to do what they were already, as Homeric heroes, eager to do.[118] As we have seen, gods and mortals can effectively encourage with words alone. Only a god, however, can restore or increase physical prowess. But this ability is not the only element in the poetic situation which requires a divinity. The poet wanted the Ajaxes to recognize that a god had visited them, and this adds a special dimension to their courage.

Iris' speech before the Trojan assembly at 2. 796 ff. has quite a different effect on her addressees. Far from merely encouraging them or strengthening their limbs, she informs them of the massive Achaean assault, brusquely making it clear that the time for words is past. She commands Hector to go out to meet the attack with all his forces. The effect of this speech is indeed "gewaltig." Hector recognizes that the source of the speech is divine,[119]

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[118]Cf. Heubeck, *op. cit.*, p. 22: "...es ist eben...typisch für die Sicht des Dichters, das Wirken der Götter dort anzusetzen, wo er die Bereitschaft des Menschen, ihnen zu folgen, voraussetzen zu können glaubt; sie würden einen Sterblichen nie zu einem Handeln verführen, zu dem er nicht die innere Disposition besäße."

[119]Whether 2. 807 means that he recognized that it was specifically Iris' voice is very doubtful.

dissolves the assembly, throws wide the town gates, and marches out in full force to meet the Achaeans.

There can be little doubt about motivation here. It is clear that the kind of all-out sortie ordered by Iris/Polites was not under discussion before she arrived on the scene. As I have remarked above, there is good reason to think that full-scale battles of the type described in the *Iliad* are represented as fairly rare, the normal Trojan strategy being a defensive one.[120] It must accordingly be admitted that the idea—the motivation—to risk a full-scale battle does not come from within Hector, but from Zeus through the intermediary of Iris disguised as Polites.

We may class those effects of divine intervention that have emerged from our examination so far into three categories. First, a god can encourage mortals by speaking to them. We may call this a kind of emotional enabling in contrast to the second category, which involves physical enabling. In the instances discussed so far the deities give strength and courage to men in battle, that is, men who already have a purpose or motivation. It is, we may reasonably assert, precisely because of their intention to fight that Poseidon chooses to strengthen and encourage the two Ajaxes. In the third category belong those cases in which a god suggests a specific course of action, as Iris does in Book 2.

C. The Gods Address Individuals.

Iris, in her disguise as Laodice (3. 121 ff.), once again brings information and suggests a course of action based on that information. The command is simply δεῦρ' ἴθι (3. 130), and it is her first utterance to Helen when she finds

[120]Of course this does not mean we should not expect the Epic Cycle to have been full of battle narrative.

the woman weaving. The information that the goddess supplies is calculated to persuade Helen to "come hither": the two armies have stopped in mid-charge and taken seats; Paris and Menelaus are about to fight over Helen. Helen wraps herself in white garments, takes two attendants, and goes out to see. In short, she complies with the goddess' intention, and this is the effect of the intervention in concrete terms.

What is not quite certain is how this effect is achieved. Does "Laodice" make Helen homesick by speaking to her, or does the goddess "cast into her spirit sweet longing for her first husband, her city, and her parents" (3. 131 f.) by a separate and subsequent divine act? This question centers about the interpretation of the participle εἰποῦσα (3. 139). Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.* comment "εἰποῦσα hier gleichzeitig mit ἔμβαλε." I understand this to mean that we are to translate, "by speaking in this way, she cast sweet longing into her [Helen's] spirit..." rather than "having spoken in this way, she [then] cast sweet longing into her spirit...." Grammatically either is possible: cf. 5. 35 ("Ως εἰποῦσα μάχης ἐξήγαγε θοῦρον Ἄρηα·) and 8. 184 ("Ως εἰπὼν ἵπποισιν ἐκέκλετο φώνησέν τε·) where the action of the finite verb clearly follows that of the participle, and 11. 291 ("Ως εἰπὼν ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου, a line occurring ten times in the *Iliad*) where the action of the finite verb and participle are simultaneous. Further, there is nothing in the passage, e.g., a gesture such as Poseidon makes in striking the two Ajaxes with Calchas' staff, which would hint that some separate divine act beyond that of imparting information is indicated by the word ἔμβαλε. Certainly none is required here, and the poet has not thought it necessary to clarify this point. Is this because he expects his audience to have a pattern in their minds, i.e., because he need not fill in the details, or because the action of injecting longing simply is not important enough to require emphasis?

The importance of this issue lies in its implications for our understanding of Helen's motivation. If ἔμβαλε indicates a subsequent and separate act of Iris, then Iris herself is the motivating factor. Erbse has understood the passage in this way and summarizes, "*Nach* diesen ihren Worten erregt die Göttin in Helena süße Sehnsucht..." (my italics).[121] If, on the other hand, it is by her words alone that the goddess "excites sweet longing," then Helen, ignorant of the deity's presence, is moved by the information contained in Iris/Laodice's speech. As we saw above (p. 57) the goddess imparts knowledge that the real Laodice could not have had, and to this extent we are dealing with an essentially divine action. If, however, it is the content of Iris' speech that moves Helen, the longing, which is Helen's motivation for going out onto the wall, is a spontaneous human phenomenon, Helen's own reaction to the situation. The fact that the information concerning that situation is and must be delivered by a god should not lead us to conclude that the goddess is what motivates Helen. Information from any source, human or divine, would not be sufficient motivation without Helen's spontaneous reaction.

Kullmann has discussed Homer's use of ἐμβάλλειν quite thoroughly.[122] There are many instances in which Kullmann concludes that the expression is to be taken literally, because, "Er dient wie 'μένος ἐμπνεῖν' nur zur Charakterisierung göttlichen Wirkens."[123] An example of this concrete meaning of the phrase is found at 21. 547, where Apollo, without speaking to Agenor, puts tenacity into him so that he can stand his ground against

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[121]Erbse, *Untersuchungen*, p. 60.
[122]*Das Wirken der Götter*, pp. 73-75.
[123]Ibid., p. 73.

Achilles. However, in the *Odyssey* Kullmann finds the expression applied to human action as at 2. 79, where Telemachus addresses the assembly:

νῦν δέ μοι ἀπρήκτους δδύνας ἐμβάλλετε θυμῷ.

Already in the *Iliad* there are formulaic expressions where the middle (never the active) is used of human beings:

ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσιν· (1. 297 etc.)

Kullmann comments on this use of ἐμβάλλειν, "Der Vorgang ist gewissermaßen formal noch Eingebung, faktisch aber schon Eigenüberlegung...."[124]

Between the denotation of this divine act of inducing mental states and the human action of considering lie many uses of ἐμβάλλειν in the *Iliad*. Discussing the passage in which Poseidon encourages Agamemnon (14. 139 ff.) and the other Achaeans (14. 147 ff.), Kullmann writes, "Die ausführliche Beschreibung der göttlichen Epiphanie und des göttlichen Rufens...legt die Vermutung nahe, daß das 'Stärke eingeben' hier schon übertragen gebraucht ist und lediglich die Wirkung der Götterparänese und des Götterrufes beschreiben soll."[125] Another such passage, according to Kullmann, is Iris' speech to Laodice. I believe that Kullmann has been too cautious in stating of this passage merely, "Auch hier ist nicht mehr anschaulich, ob Iris die Sehnsucht wirklich 'einflößt' oder nur in Helena durch ihre Worte erregt, so daß das 'Eingeben' nur ein formelhafter Ausdruck wäre."[126] The effects of a speech are very often described immediately after the speech by a phrase beginning ὡς εἰπών / εἰποῦσ' as, e.g., after the speeches of Ares and of Hera discussed above. Additionally, the speech itself easily admits of such a

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[124]Ibid., p. 75.
[125]Ibid., p. 74.
[126]Ibid.

description as I believe we have here. The mention of a duel between her present and former husbands might reasonably precipitate in Helen a longing to return to Sparta and her life as it was before the war. Indeed, the speech itself must be considered rather otiose if the goddess, after taking the trouble to persuade Helen to go out to the wall, has somehow physically to inject a feeling of nostalgia into her in order to achieve this same purpose. One-hundred-percent certainty is probably unattainable in this case, but I think the evidence strongly suggests that the interpretation of Ameis-Hentze (i.e., "by speaking in this way") is to be preferred over that of Erbse.

The effect of Athena's speech to Pandarus is stated at 4. 104:

ὣς φάτ' Ἀθηναίη, τῷ δὲ φρένας ἄφρονι πεῖθεν·

This is another instance in which a god suggests a course of action. To this extent we can certainly say that Athena motivates that action. I would contend, however, that the poet's characterization of Pandarus as ἄφρων indicates that more than the advice of "Laodocus" was required to bring about the action of Pandarus.

It is not difficult to see that the main reason for Homer's presenting the character Athena as choosing to appear in disguise is that she wants to mask her hostile intention from Pandarus; she wants to trick him. Perhaps more important for this scene is the goddess' deliberate choice (διζημένη, εἴ που ἐφεύροι, 88) of the silly (ἄφρονι, 104) Pandarus, to break the treaty.[127] Her specific advice is recognizably odd: Homer has portrayed both sides as favoring the cessation of hostilities (3. 111 f.) and the Trojan side as desiring a permanent cessation to the extent that they would not be willing to hide Paris

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[127] This general description of Pandarus is illustrated not only in what follows here, but in his conduct in Book 5, where he twice boasts prematurely of having fatally wounded Diomedes (5,102 ff. and 5.284 f.).

when he disappears after losing the duel with Menelaus (3. 451 ff.). By using the adjective ἄφρων in 4. 104, the poet intimates that the suggestion Athena makes would only be taken by someone like Pandarus as the *Iliad* portrays him.

The depiction of both the advice and the advisee as foolish tells us something about the poet's reasons for sending the goddess to Pandarus in disguise. Pandarus' bowshot is not understood by Homer, as Erbse asserts, "nur als Einwirkung eines dämonischen Wesens."[128] Pandarus is described as someone particularly susceptible to foolish suggestions because he is a fool; Athena does not reveal herself or use force of any kind. From Pandarus' point of view, the suggestion is one that he could accept or reject. That he accepts the advice of "Laodocus" and shoots Menelaus is an act of his own will. There is no doubt that the idea of shooting Menelaus comes from Athena; but there should also be no doubt that, because of the way the poet has arranged the situation, i.e., because Pandarus is persuaded, not forced, the mortal character is acting of his own free will.

We now turn to the four disguised interventions of Apollo occurring in Books 16 and 17. In this passage the god seems pretty clearly involved in motivating Hector's attack on Patroclus. We must ascertain to what extent this is the case. The Trojan is of two minds, and Apollo persuades him to follow one of the courses he has been pondering. The god specifies the objective as Patroclus although Hector had been considering only in general terms,

ἠὲ μάχοιτο κατὰ κλόνον αὖτις ἐλάσσας,
ἦ λαοὺς ἐς τεῖχος ὁμοκλήσειεν ἀλῆναι (16. 713 f.).

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[128]Erbse, *Untersuchungen*, p. 144.

However, Apollo does not put the idea of fighting into Hector's mind; he tips the balance in that direction. That he suggests attacking Patroclus is not startling, since Patroclus is leading the Achaean side. In fact, Hector's decision to fight rather than to withdraw is easily understandable in light of the fact that Patroclus, who seemed about to scale the walls of Troy, has somehow been driven far back (πολλὸν ὀπίσσω, 16. 710). Apollo's disguise is a particularly important factor to consider in this connection: because Hector believes his uncle is addressing him, we can conclude that, if Hector takes the advice of "Asius," he does so because it makes sense to do so in human terms. That is, Hector need not consider, as Achilles does, that it is best to take the advice of a god (1. 216 ff.). Because the source of the advice is from Hector's point of view human, we must assume that Hector is persuaded that it is advisable to attack Patroclus.

Another feature of this passage which serves to render Hector independent of Apollo is the fact that the god does not have to give him strength or courage. Nothing more than advice from a supposedly human source is required to make Hector choose to go on fighting rather than to lead his troops back into the city. There is, in short, nothing marvelous or startling about Hector's re-entering the fighting here, and Apollo performs no essentially divine act, nor does he give any information which a mortal could not have imparted.

The same conclusion must result from an analysis of Apollo/Mentes' advice to Hector (17. 75 ff.). Again it is the thoroughness and effectiveness of the disguise which make of Hector a free agent. Apollo relates certain information to Hector: 1) it is pointless to chase after Achilles' horses because they are virtually uncontrollable; 2) Euphorbus has been killed by Menelaus. He then leaves (17. 82) without giving Hector any specific instruction, and

without bestowing additional strength or courage on him. Hector proceeds in accordance with human convention in seeking to avenge Euphorbus' death. Instances of such behavior in the *Iliad* are too familiar and numerous to require citation here. Apollo functions in a manner similar to Iris in Book 3. In both passages, the god imparts information to a mortal, who acts in accordance with an internal emotional reaction to that information. In Helen's case, the reaction is longing for her former life; in Hector's case the reaction is grief (αἰνὸν ἄχος, 17. 83). While the god plays an important role in these scenes, I believe the human factor has been accorded too little significance in general by Erbse when he speaks of "Menschen, die noch keine Freiheit des Handelns kannten."[129]

It is worth noting that the poet describes Apollo's own motivation for this intervention. Of course he is following Zeus' instructions (15. 218-135) to assist Hector in driving the Achaeans back to their ships, but the immediate reason for Apollo's intervention is human action:

> ἔνθα κε ῥεῖα φέροι κλυτὰ τεύχεα Πανθοΐδαο
> Ἀτρεΐδης, εἰ μή οἱ ἀγάσσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων. (17. 70 f.)

Ameis-Hentze take ἀγάσσατο as referring only to φέροι. In view of the fact that Menelaus seems to get away with the weapons, it is probably advisable to take ῥεῖα φέροι as indicating that which Apollo begrudges Menelaus. This corresponds to the outcome as described: Menelaus has to withdraw in the face of Hector and the Trojans, and thus he takes the weapons away only with difficulty. Far from being a kind of prime mover, Apollo himself is capable of reacting as well as helping to motivate action.

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[129]Erbse, *Untersuchungen*, p. 299.

Disguised as Periphas Apollo achieves, though indirectly, a powerful effect indeed. His intervention is introduced by the frequently employed narrative device that threatens a violation of what is fated to happen. Here, "the Trojans would then have re-entered Troy, subdued by lack of warlike strength at the hands of the Achaeans..." (17. 319 f.). Apollo prevents this by encouraging the Trojans, as is shown by the outcome at 17. 343:

οἱ δ' ἐλελίχθησαν καὶ ἐναντίοι ἔσταν Ἀχαιῶν.

This passage marks the beginning of the Trojan rally that will leave Hector in control of the field at the end of the day. The question is once again to what extent the god is a motivating factor.

As we have seen, the content of the speech of Apollo is problematic (see above, p. 60). However, it is clear that Aeneas receives no specific orders from Apollo. The god merely informs Aeneas that Zeus prefers to give victory to the Trojans, but that they are not acting in such a way as to take advantage of the situation.

Scholarly opinion is divided as to whether Aeneas is specifically aware that Apollo has spoken to him or merely knows that "one of the gods" was standing beside him. The discrepancy between what the narrator says,

ὣς ἔφατ', Αἰνείας δ' ἑκατηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα
ἔγνω ἐσάντα ἰδών, (17. 333 f.)

and what Aeneas reports to Hector and the other Trojans

ἀλλ' ἔτι γάρ τίς φησι θεῶν, ἐμοὶ ἄγχι παραστάς,
Ζῆν', ὕπατον μήστωρα, μάχης ἐπιτάρροθον εἶναι· (17. 338 f.)

has long been noted and solved in one of two ways. H. J. Rose holds, "... the words ἑκατηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα / ἔγνω ἐσάντα ἰδών are not to be taken too literally; Aineias recognized that he was confronted by a god, but his own

words make it clear (338) that he did not know which god."[130] Kullmann expresses a similar opinion.[131] Erbse, however, finds that Aeneas recognizes Apollo but does not mention the god by name because it is not important to do so, the point of Aeneas' words being merely that his "source" is divine and not human.[132] In my view Erbse's is the only tenable position on this question. I do not see the necessity of taking the words "he recognized far-shooting Apollo, looking him in the face" in any but the most literal sense. It is very rare for a human being to penetrate a divine disguise so completely, but it is not unprecedented (cf. Helen and Aphrodite in Book 3). Also, even if Aeneas *need* not realize any more than that the supposed herald was really some otherwise unidentified god, it does not follow that he *must* not recognize Apollo.

It is, in any case, essential that Aeneas realize that the source of the "herald's" remarks is divine so that he can confidently pass the information along to his comrades-at-arms.[133] We have seen that a human being can claim to know a god's will (Calchas in Book 1 comes to mind, and of course Aeneas himself does so in this passage), but Aeneas could not have inspired a rally by crying out, "my father's herald, Periphas, declares that Zeus still takes our side." Aeneas needs a god in order to do what he does here.

Even so, Aeneas' intentions have not been in any way altered by Apollo. The import of Apollo's message to Aeneas is simply, "Zeus would grant you victory if only you would go on fighting." This gives Aeneas a certainty he could not have obtained from any but a divine source. It is

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[130] H. J. Rose, "Disguisings," p. 69, n. 26.

[131] *Das Wirken der Götter*, p. 123.

[132] *Untersuchungen*, p. 175.

[133] Cf. Kullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 123: "Dadurch, daß die Helden diese Erkenntnis zur Mitteilung bringen, erhält die Paränese eine Breitenwirkung." Also, Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.*

nevertheless in spontaneous reaction to receiving this information that he encourages the others and leaps into the foremost ranks. The Trojans wheel and face the Achaeans as a direct result of *Aeneas'* words and deeds.

Disguised as Hector's guest-friend Phaenops (17. 583), Apollo informs the Trojan prince that Menelaus has killed Podes. Hector's grief at this is his own spontaneous reaction to the news and is not attributable to any act of Apollo's beyond that of dispensing information. As we have seen, the content of Apollo's speech is plausible in the the mouth of the mortal Phaenops.

We will pause here briefly to summarize, having dealt now with all those passages in which the mortals make no reply to the disguised gods who confront them. To the three categories of intervention set forth above (p. 90) we can add a fourth. We have seen that the disguised gods enable human beings to carry out their intentions by giving them emotional encouragement and physical strength. They may also propose a course of action which the mortal then wordlessly follows. A fourth way in which a disguised god may intervene is by imparting information. Apollo in particular practises this variety of intervention, pointing out to Hector the death of a friend, the futility of chasing Achilles' horses, etc. Iris, too—if I am correct in my interpretation—does no more than inform Helen that Paris and Menelaus are about to fight for her. Of course the most potent knowledge that a mortal can have is the knowledge that a god is on his side. This information is vouchsafed only to a few mortals in the passages we have looked at so far. The Ajaxes and (probably) Hector realize only that *some* god has spoken to them; Aeneas recognizes Apollo.

Among these passages are examples in which the god is to a greater or lesser extent involved in motivating human action. Iris' detailed

instructions to Hector in Book 2 represent a strong motivating factor in Hector's subsequent action, because there is no indication that Hector had been contemplating a full-scale sortie before Iris/Polites suggested it, and because Hector realizes that the source of the instructions is divine. Of course in the passages we have examined occurring in battle sequences few real decisions have to be made. The choice can usually be summed up as "fight or flight," and the god in some way enables those whose intentions he supports to choose to fight. Every one of the mortal characters in these passages goes about his business without protest or reply as instructed, encouraged, or enabled by the god, whether the god is recognized or—as is much more common—not. The overarching reason for this is, I think, that none of them has been asked to do anything either against his better judgment (this is particularly telling in Pandarus' case) or out of character (heroes, in particular, need not be convinced to do battle, they need merely to decide where and how to do it).

D. The Mortals Respond.

When Menelaus is approached by Athena disguised as Phoenix (17. 553 ff.), he expresses strong misgivings about the course of action she suggests. He has remained near the body of Patroclus (17. 554), though the brunt of the fighting is about the chariot and horses of Achilles (17. 456-542). As the battle turns back toward Patroclus' corpse (17. 543), Athena goes to encourage the now isolated Menelaus to stand his ground.

As anyone knows who has read (or heard) Book 17 up to this point, Menelaus has been doing just this for hundreds of lines. The book ("Μενελάου ἀριστεία") opens with Menelaus taking up a stance over Patroclus' body, ὥς τις περὶ πόρτακι μήτηρ (17. 4). The Atreid manages to defend the

corpse by killing Euphorbus (17. 48 ff.) but is forced to retire as Hector, informed of these events by Apollo, approaches. Before withdrawing, however, Menelaus, without divine intervention, considers his situation. He is well aware that it could be a cause of shame for him if he abandons the body of Patroclus, "who lies dead for the sake of my honor" (17. 92). The main thrust of his thoughts is that there are extenuating circumstances: he cannot face Hector and all the Trojans alone, nor fight πρὸς δαίμονα. Finally he decides it would be best to go find Ajax and return. He has thus not considered abandoning the body altogether, but requires assistance if he is to bring the corpse back to Achilles. Though in the interim Hector is able to strip Achilles' armor from Patroclus' body, Menelaus returns with Telamonian Ajax and they force Hector to abandon his intention to mutilate the corpse. When Hector renews his assault, this time in Achilles' armor, Menelaus calls for help. Among those that respond are Oilean Ajax, Idomeneus, and Meriones, and they drive the Trojans back. When Hector, Aeneas, and two companions make an attempt on Achilles' horses, the Ajaxes are called away, leaving Menelaus in a much weakened position.[134]

The present imperatives in the goddess' speech (17. 599) are thus well chosen: ἀλλ' ἔχεο κρατερῶς, ὄτρυνε δὲ λαὸν ἅπαντα ("But go on holding out vigorously and keep encouraging all the host."). Menelaus' answer is also consistent with the situation as described so far: "in that case [i.e., if Athena would make it possible], I would be willing to stand beside (παρεστάμεναι) and keep defending (ἀμύνειν) Patroclus" (17. 563 f.). Menelaus also points out that he is moved by Patroclus' death. This seems to be a response to the point raised by "Phoenix" that it would be a source of shame for Menelaus if

[134]Apollo speaks of him as οἷος ἀείρας / νεκρόν (17. 588 f.), though Idomeneus (17. 605) and Meriones (17. 620) are apparently not far away.

Patroclus' body were captured by the Trojans. The exchange might thus be paraphrased as follows.

"Phoenix": Since it would cause you shame if the Trojans captured his body, you should continue your efforts on behalf of Patroclus.

Menelaus: If it were possible I would do so, because his death has touched my spirit; but Hector is irresistible.

In other words, Menelaus tells "Phoenix" that the course of action the latter has suggested is the one he himself prefers and that he has his own reasons (motivation) for wishing to carry it out. He objects, however, that it is a futile endeavor.

It is not motivation, then, that Athena supplies here, but strength (17. 569) and audacity (17. 570). As any reader of Book 17 knows, Menelaus is not without a certain tenacious boldness of his own, even though he is not usually reckoned among the best fighters in the *Iliad*. Driven off once, he has persisted in his defence of Patroclus' body in the face of formidable Trojan attempts to take it. Menelaus is thus clearly not completely lacking in "audacity" any more than in physical strength. We must accordingly conclude that Athena has given additional strength and audacity, not supplied Menelaus with something he simply did not have.[135] That he feels the effects of this supernatural infusion of might and courage is clear.[136]

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[135]Cf. Heubeck, *op. cit.*, p. 24: "Wenn [die Götter] die Menschen führen, verführen oder hemmen, dann tun sie das im inneren Einklang mit deren individuell je verschiedenem Denken, Fühlen und Wollen."

[136]Here the effects are not a result of the god's speech. As was shown above, Menelaus' speech makes it clear that he did not need to be *persuaded* to defend Patroclus' corpse, but rather *enabled* to do so. This interpretation, however, does not render Athena's speech otiose since by it the goddess elicits Menelaus' reply.

While he had previously been standing *near* the body, Menelaus now takes up his original stance *over* Patroclus: βῆ δ' ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ (17. 574).

At 20. 79 ff. Apollo appears as Lycaon to Aeneas. An unusual feature of this passage is that the eventual success often signaled by divine encouragement is missing. That is, Aeneas will face Achilles, but will not be able to defeat him. In fact Aeneas, entirely abandoned by Apollo, will have to be rescued by Poseidon, who is regularly on the Achaean side. Once he has rescued Aeneas, Poseidon gives him a scolding and a warning: "Which of the gods told you to fight the high-spirited son of Peleus, who is at once stronger than you and dearer to the gods?" (20. 332 ff.). This overturns the previous argument of Apollo, who gave Aeneas the confidence to face Achilles by reminding him that his mother had a higher status among the Olympians.[137] Apparently maternal rank is no match for strength and the patronage of the gods. Poseidon then informs Aeneas that, as soon as Achilles has been killed, he may "take courage and do battle among the fore-fighters, for no other Achaean will slay [him]" (20. 338).

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[137]Laura Slatkin, in "The Wrath of Thetis," (*TAPA* 116 (1986): 1-24), has suggested that Thetis was known to the audience of the *Iliad* as an extremely powerful goddess, "a figure of cosmic capacity" (p. 12). She bases this assertion on a number of mythological references from the *Iliad* and elsewhere, including Pindar's *Isthmian* 8, and a commentary on a fragment of Alcman. (But see Glenn Most, "Alcman's 'Cosmogonic' Fragment (Fr. 5 Page, 81 Calame)," *CQ* 37 (1987): 1-19.) Whatever alternate mythology may have been known to Homer's audience, however, the *Iliad* has presented Aphrodite as dwelling on Olympus and as a daughter of Zeus, but Thetis as, in Slatkin's words, "a subsidiary deity who is characterized by helplessness and by impotent grief" (*op. cit.*, p. 1). The point I wish to make is that, despite the difference in divine standing between the two goddesses, Thetis has obtained a promise from Zeus which, at least on the surface, determines the course of the war in the *Iliad*, while Aphrodite has not been shown helping her favorites (Paris and her son, Aeneas) to victory on the battlefield, but only removing them from danger when the battle is going badly for them. Apollo's argument, then, rests on the twofold assumption that Aeneas believes Aphrodite to be endowed with a higher status than Thetis and that he does not know that the relative status of the two goddesses is not the determining factor in the situation as it stands.

Since there is nothing in it that a mortal could not say (i.e. know or think), Apollo's speech does not constitute an essentially divine action. One thing is clear at least: Aeneas has to be persuaded by Apollo to face Achilles. The Trojan's own experience (20. 89-95) has convinced him that Achilles is virtually invincible. It is significant that Apollo, unlike Aphrodite in Book 3, does not resort to open threats in the face of resistance. Retaining his disguise, Apollo mentions for Aeneas' consideration the respective ranks of the two heroes' divine mothers. Evidently this convinces Aeneas, because he goes off towards Achilles, additionally strengthened by Apollo (20. 110). The fact that Apollo retains his disguise means that Aeneas is convinced by argument, not by force (as in the case of Helen when confronted by Aphrodite). That is, Aeneas faces Achilles because he is convinced—contrary to his own experience!—that his mother's high rank gives him a chance of success. Even with the μένος inspired by Apollo, however, Aeneas is no match for Achilles.

In summary, then, the only essentially divine act performed by Apollo here is that of implanting strength in Aeneas. The expression μένος ἐμπνεῖν is probably to be taken quite literally, as Kullmann asserts,[138] because it is used in the *Iliad* to describe divine action only. If this is the case, μένος must—as often—denote physical strength or else Apollo's preceding speech would prove unnecessary. Since, however, μένος, in the sense of courage, can be inspired (together with θυμός) by speech (cf. 2. 792, etc.), one is tempted to see in this passage a figurative use of the expression μένος ἐμπνεῖν to describe the effects of Apollo's second speech to Aeneas. However this may be, Apollo,

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[138] Kullmann, *Das Wirken der Götter*, p. 72.

disguised as Lycaon, convinces Aeneas to face Achilles by purely human means of persuasion.

Poseidon, disguised as the Aetolian Thoas, encounters no such resistance from Idomeneus. In fact, the poet mentions no effect of Poseidon's speech, nor does the god grant any additional physical strength to the aging Idomeneus before his ἀριστεία. Whatever strength and courage Idomeneus displays in the few hundred lines following his interview with "Thoas" must be considered his own entirely.

That Idomeneus, who has escorted a comrade from the battle, intends to return is made clear before Poseidon addresses him: ἔτι γὰρ πολέμοιο μενοίνα / ἀντιάαν (13. 214 f.). Throughout his speech, Idomeneus himself insists that the Greeks are faring ill not because of a lack of courage (δέος, 13. 224) or skill (πάντες γὰρ ἐπιστάμεθα πτολεμίζειν, 13. 223), but because it is Zeus' will. Thus Idomeneus does not seem to need encouragement. Idomeneus further responds to "Thoas" by telling him, "But Thoas, [I call on you] for you have proven steadfast in the past and you spur on anyone whom you see slacking off; therefore do not leave off [fighting] this time either, and go on calling to each man" (13. 228-30). Idomeneus is so little in need of encouragement that he, unwittingly, congratulates Poseidon and encourages him to keep up the good work.

As for action, "Thoas" exhorts Idomeneus to take his weapons and go to battle, which, as we have seen, was Idomeneus' intention in the first place. Reminding him that even the two of them may make a difference since they are good fighters, Poseidon leaves (13. 239).

We have seen that there is a particular appropriateness to Aphrodite's disguise as an elderly maidservant in Book 3. Ameis-Hentze (*ad* 3. 396) hold that the disguise "nur darauf berechnet war, die die Helena umgebenden

Troerinnen zu täuschen," basing their remark on the essentially correct assumption that the gods never appear to everyone present at once. But we know from Book 1 that disguise is not the only option open to a god who wishes to intervene without being recognized by everyone present. There (1. 197 f.) Athena simply appears exclusively to Achilles. Hence Ameis-Hentze's comment leaves open the question of why Aphrodite attempts to conceal her identity from Helen in this passage.

To answer this question it will be worth looking at Helen's reply in some detail. The first line tells us that Helen sees Aphrodite's actions as a deception aimed at herself (δαιμονίη, τί με ταῦτα λιλαίεαι ἠπεροπεύειν; 3. 399). The precise purpose behind the deception is then revealed in lines 3. 400-405. We can paraphrase 3. 400-404 thus: "will you take me even *further away* now that Menelaus is in a position (νικήσας, 3. 404) to take me *home* ?" Then 3. 405: "It is surely for this reason that you have come here now planning trickery." The sense of δολοφρονέουσα cannot be, as Ameis-Hentze interpret, "indem du vorgiebst, daß Paris mich rufe." Whether Paris has called for Helen or not is immaterial. Putting words in Paris' mouth—words to which he himself would not, in any case, object (cf. 3. 441: ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ φιλότητι τραπείομεν εὐνηθέντε)–pales as a deception when set beside the assumption of another's shape in the hope of convincing Helen to do something against her will. Equally unacceptable is the explanation of H. J. Rose that "the servile disguise is assumed rather for the benefit of Paris, who may if he likes flatter himself that Helen accepts his advances because of his personal charm . . . ."[139] We can assume that Paris knows who saved him from Menelaus in the first place and that for this reason Aphrodite need not disguise herself for his benefit.

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[139]H. J. Rose, "Divine Disguisings," p. 68.

Besides, Paris is elsewhere well aware that his "personal charm" is a gift from Aphrodite (cf. 3. 64: μή μοι δῶρ' ἐρατὰ πρόφερε χρυσέης 'Αφροδίτης, where Paris defends himself against Hector's reproaches in lines 3. 54 f.). Aphrodite assumes this disguise in order to trick Helen into going to Paris.

The trick fails, however. After four lines in which Helen abuses the goddess ("go to him yourself"), she flatly and openly refuses to go (3. 410) because the Trojan women would reproach her later if she did (Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.* correctly interpret, "wenn ich nach der Entscheidung durch den Zweikampf dem leichtsinnigen Feigling mich wieder hingebe.") This calls forth another attempt on Aphrodite's part, the blunt four-line speech of lines 3. 414-417. Without pretence of deceitful persuasion, Aphrodite reminds Helen of her ambiguous position between the two warring peoples: it would be easy for Aphrodite to devise her destruction. Realizing the truth of this, the terrified Helen silently concedes and is led, without the Trojan women noticing, to Paris. Thus, in the end the divinity has her way.

The difference in the tone of Aphrodite's two speeches is highly significant for our understanding of this scene. Pretending to be Helen's favorite maidservant, the goddess paints what she intends to be the alluring picture of Paris sitting resplendent on their bed: "you would not think he had just come from fighting a man, but was on his way to a dance or was taking a seat just having ceased from the dance" (3. 392-94). This five-line speech is as clear as it is economical: the first line relates Paris' supposed request; the second specifies his whereabouts and, no doubt, his (and Aphrodite's) intentions; the last three lines are an attempt to arouse Helen's desire for Paris by describing his good looks. In her second speech, the goddess, recognized, rebuffed, and enraged, takes a very different approach. Addressing Helen as σχετλίη (3. 414), Aphrodite threatens to deal as hatefully

with her mortal protégée as she has heretofore dealt lovingly. This would bring about Helen's destruction.

That Helen rejects furiously and at length the erotic invitation of the disguised goddess indicates that the woman's preference for her former husband and home—described in her exchange with the disguised Iris—has not been canceled by Aphrodite. She bows to the goddess' will out of fear, not out of a backsliding desire for Paris (ἔδεισεν, 3. 418). I think it is a mistake to see in Helen's subsequent words to Paris (3. 428-36) a turning from "resistance to desire."[140] The words ὡς ὄφελες αὐτόθ' ὀλέσθαι (3. 428) are perfectly clear (to describe them as indicative merely of "resistance" is, to my mind, an understatement). Lines 3. 433-436 seem to me to be spoken contemptuously, given the context. Helen's thought process is as follows: "I wish you had been killed by Menelaus, who is the better man. You used to claim to be his superior, so challenge him again now. But I don't advise *that* foolish course: you would swiftly be killed." This kind of contemptuous advice is found elsewhere in the *Iliad* (17. 30 ff.). Perhaps the clearest indication that Helen's words do not express a desire for Paris is to be taken from the latter's reply. Paris refers to Helen's words as "harsh reproaches" (χαλεποῖσιν ὀνείδεσι, 3. 438).

Throughout this passage the representation of Aphrodite, while she remains in the fullest sense a character in her own right, is deliberately tailored to highlight certain aspects of Helen's character and situation. From her reaction to Aphrodite's first speech we see that Helen is no longer moved by desire for Paris but instead longs for her former life. It is only fear of her

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[140]Erbse, *Untersuchungen*, p. 95: "An den erst verächtlichen, dann bewegten Worten, die sie an ihn [sc. Paris] richtet..., erkennt man, wie ihr Widerstand in Begehren umzuschlagen beginnt."

situation that brings her to go to Paris. Helen's state of mind is complex because she is convinced that she must act in a manner that clashes with her inner desire. The two levels are present as shown above: the goddess imposes her will, but Helen very clearly has one of her own. The human will is thus bent to that of the god, but not denied existence altogether.

The importance of the disguise itself is primarily contrastive. The description of the beloved old "servant" and her praise of Paris' charms do not lead the hearer to expect Helen's desperate outburst. It did not concern the poet to mention whether Aphrodite retains the old woman's appearance for her second speech, but it is clear from the tone of the goddess' words that she no longer seeks to conceal her identity and that, in this important sense at least, the disguise has been dropped. In this way the concealment and subsequent revelation of Aphrodite's identity accompany and emphasize the content of the two speeches. Helen is not moved by Paris' physical attractiveness; she is moved by fear of the divinity confronting her, whose threats bear upon Helen's precarious position. The speech delivered in disguise, presenting an argument that does not persuade Helen, serves as a foil to the threats made by the goddess *in propria persona*—and these do persuade Helen.

The passage in which Athena, disguised as Deiphobus, appears to Hector is a particularly clear instance of a god's reliance on the emotional response of a human being in order to accomplish his purpose. Here Athena wants Hector to stand and fight—and of course be killed. She uses no arguments when addressing Hector. There is no ποῦ τοι ἀπειλαί, no rehearsal of the "heroic code," no reminder that it is shameful to flee. What causes Hector to stand his ground is the belief that he has a stout companion in his brother, Deiphobus. This is shown by the elaborate insistance on the disguise-

identity in the invented (but plausible) description of Deïphobus' leaving the city. That the outcome of the duel is in doubt is something that Hector has considered before on his own (22. 129 f.). At that time it did not keep Hector from bolting when he actually saw (ἐνόησεν, 22. 136) Achilles. This same consideration, coming now from the supposed Deiphobus, restores Hector's confidence. That is, in order to fight, Hector must believe he has a chance of winning; that belief, discarded at Achilles' approach, has been restored by Athena primarily by means of her disguise. The poet makes sure his audience is aware of this by having Athena speak four lines of pure falsehood, four lines, that is, that emphasize the *persona* of Deiphobus. One could add to this the address, ἠθεῖ' (22. 229, 239) and the use of the first person plural and dual (στέωμεν καὶ ἀλεξώμεσθα μένοντες, 22. 231; εἴδομεν, 244; νῶι, 245). This degree of emphasis on a disguise-persona is paralleled only in Book 24, where Hermes appears to Priam as a young Myrmidon.

Of course Athena's intervention proper continues after she has dropped the disguise, and she interferes physically by returning Achilles' spear to him during the actual fight. As far as the disguised portion of her intervention is concerned, however, it is clear that the poet shows her in some sense motivating Hector to stand and face Achilles. It is important to realize, however, that Hector has already decided, free from divine influence, that this is the best course of action but has been unable to carry out his decision because he is overcome by fear (an instance of ἀκρασία). By causing him to believe that his brother is present, Athena deceitfully enables Hector to carry out his previous intention. In the end of course Hector, abandoned by *all* the gods, in full knowledge of the inevitability of his own death, will draw his sword and charge Achilles.

We turn now to Hermes' lengthy exchange with Priam in Book 24. Hermes intervenes here at the behest of Zeus. Zeus is carrying out a decision by sending his operatives to the persons concerned on both the Achaean and the Trojan sides. As in Book 2, Zeus' decision is a reaction to occurrences in the mortal sphere. In Book 2 Zeus is granting Thetis' request on behalf of her son, Achilles; here it is Achilles' unrelenting abuse of Hector's corpse and Hector's former piety that move Zeus to devise the return of the body to Priam for funeral rites.[141] Hermes' instructions are to escort Priam into the Achaean camp "so that none of the other Danaans sees or notices [him] before he reaches the son of Peleus" (24. 338).[142] As elsewhere, Zeus leaves the manner of the execution of his orders to the deity commissioned (cf. Athena as Laodocus: Zeus, at 4. 71 f., instructs the goddess to see to it that the Trojans break their oaths; Athena herself then hits upon Pandarus and her disguise). The tact and cordiality with which Hermes accomplishes his task have been pointed out in detail by Erbse.[143]

Hermes' purpose is not to motivate Priam, but to give him safe conduct to Achilles. To what extent Priam is motivated by Iris' activity on Zeus' orders is a question that cannot be discussed in full here. Briefly, however, it seems reasonable that Priam would want his son's body in order to perform the requisite funeral rites and that, in general terms, the gods enable rather than motivate him to accomplish this task.

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[141]See Erbse, *Untersuchungen*, p. 69 f., for a more detailed analysis along similar lines, which, however, does not take into account the fact that Zeus is in each case reacting to human events.

[142]These instructions are followed to the letter. Even when Priam enters the κλισίη, Automedon and Alcimus do not notice him (24. 477) until he has taken Achilles by the knees and kissed his hands (24. 486).

[143]*Untersuchungen*, p. 66 ff.

One important effect of Hermes' intervention is simply the physical transportation of Priam to Achilles' tent. In addition to driving the wagon, this involves a number of minor miracles, i.e., actions that a young Myrmidon could not have performed. In order to get Priam to his destination, Hermes must put the Achaean watchmen to sleep (24. 445), open the gates to the camp (24. 446), and then single-handedly release the latch to Achilles' compound (24. 457). This last is particularly highlighted as being, if not a super-human feat (opening this latch was normally the work of three Achaeans, or of Achilles by himself, 24. 454-456), certainly beyond Priam's powers even with the help of the aged Idaeus.

Hermes also has a pronounced emotional effect on Priam. Priam's reaction to the approach of the supposed young Myrmidon is abject terror (24. 358), but Hermes wins the old man's trust in the manner described above (p. 67 f.), and in the end Priam has the confidence to enter Achilles' tent.

An important question for this scene is why Hermes goes to such lengths to preserve his disguise, only to reveal himself in the end. It may be that the purpose of this revelation is to reassure Priam once again that the gods are watching over him in his highly dangerous situation. Also, it comes at a point where Priam is about to take the final step of entering Achilles' hut. It is then *in propria persona* that Hermes advises Priam on how to supplicate Achilles.

As observed by many commentators, Priam does not follow Hermes' instructions to the letter, because he omits the supplication by Achilles' mother and son. Kissing Achilles' hands is of course a spontaneous action of Priam's, and that the irascible Achilles must still be supplicated despite Zeus' command is brought out at 24. 560-570, where Achilles threatens Priam with violence in spite of all indications of divine will. Homer seems thus to have

depicted a kind of cooperation between god and man in this passage. The gods give Priam the opportunity to retrieve Hector's corpse, but they do not retrieve it for him. Priam relies on the gods' help, but he does not fully comprehend, let alone control, them; moreover he must undertake the journey under what he perceives to be perilous circumstances and bring himself (ἔτλην, 24. 505) to kiss the hands of his son's slayer. Human beings that are this active in their cooperative ventures with their gods cannot, I think, be described as "Menschen, die noch keine Freiheit des Handelns kannten."[144]

E. Summary.

When in disguise, the gods affect the mortal action of the *Iliad* in four ways: emotional, advisory, physical, and informative. Because it is rare that only one way of affecting the mortals is evident in a single disguise passage, it has not been expedient to categorize the passages themselves according to effect. For this reason the passages have been discussed in detail in the order imposed in the previous section of this study. Now, by way of summary, the various ways of affecting the action can be dealt with separately.

The emotional effect seems by far the most prevalent when we consider that each disguise is chosen to elicit a false recognition from the mortal who is confronted. In this way the god immediately gains the mortal's trust. It is in a slightly different sense, however, that the gods are said by the poet to alter the course of events by playing on the emotions of human characters. Poseidon/Calchas, e.g., in a particularly impressive display of paraenetic skill, bolsters the sagging spirits of the young Achaeans

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[144]Erbse, *Untersuchungen*, p. 299.

behind the lines. As Stentor, Hera stimulates the courage of the best of the Achaeans who are clustered about Diomedes making an orderly withdrawal. Examples could be multiplied.

Nearly as often as the disguised gods inspire courage, nostalgia, confidence, etc., they dispense information. Thus Iris, disguised as Polites, informs the Trojans of the massive Achaean advance. Apollo points out to Hector the death of his friend Euphorbus, later of Podes. Hermes tells Priam all he needs to know about the condition and location of Hector's corpse.

Somewhat less often than they inform or affect, the gods in disguise advise (or order) a specific course of action. Once again Iris as Polites provides a clear example. Not only does she inform the Trojans of the Achaean attack, she gives Hector rather precise instructions to muster all his multi-lingual forces and go out to meet the Greeks. Disguised as the Priamid Lycaon, Apollo persuades a reluctant Aeneas to stand and face Achilles. With less luck in her attempt to persuade, Aphrodite eventually has to force Helen to go in to Paris.

Only four times does a disguised god affect a mortal physically.[145] Disguised as Calchas, Poseidon strikes physical strength and nimbleness into the Ajaxes' limbs. Athena performs a similar service for Menelaus as does Apollo for Aeneas. Rather differently, Hermes himself opens the massive gates of Achilles' compound for Priam rather than giving the old man the strength to do it himself.

Just as important as the effects themselves is the manner in which they are achieved. Here the question that we must ask in each instance is whether the action that produces the effect is somehow essentially divine or not.

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[145]Of course the gods are often said to intervene physically when *not* in disguise. The transportation of Paris and of Aeneas from the battlefield may serve as examples.

Obviously, the injection of physical strength is an example of what I have termed an essentially divine action: a human being cannot do this, therefore every time this effect results from divine intervention we are dealing with an effect that only a god could have produced.

By contrast, emotional effects are achieved almost exclusively by a means available to humans as well as gods, namely, speech. This is especially evident in battle-paraeneses. Both Hera and Ares in Book 5 perform in a thoroughly human manner and arouse emotions in a way in which mortals themselves do elsewhere in the *Iliad*.

The information communicated by a god may have quite different effects depending on whether or not the god is recognized as such by the mortal he confronts. Because Aeneas recognizes Apollo, though the god is disguised as Periphas, what would otherwise be a mere assertion (that Zeus prefers to grant the Trojans victory) is recognized as factual information. In every passage, however, in which a disguised god dispenses information, that information could be as easily supplied by a mortal.[146] The effect of the information is then—since the god is not usually recognized—no more than what it would have been if, say, Hector's uncle Asius had told him of Euphorbus' death instead of Apollo, *disguised* as Asius.

When a course of action is proposed, obviously the identity of the proposer figures greatly in determining whether the advisee adopts that course of action. The Homeric gods (that is to say, Homer) know this and they choose their disguises accordingly. Even more persuasive than a well chosen mortal disguise is a recognized divine source of advice. Thus when Hector recognizes a divine voice in the words of "Polites," there is no

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[146]As we have seen, even Apollo/Periphas' "assertion" is plausible as mortal conversation.

question of his treating the course of action she proposes with the freedom with which he treats Poulydamas' advice in Book 17. Yet Aeneas, unaware that it is Apollo and not really Lycaon who is addressing him, can resist the suggestion that he face Achilles, allowing himself to be persuaded in the end by considerations which could have been raised by the real Lycaon.

What does all this mean for our assessment of the extent to which the gods actually motivate human actions in the story of the *Iliad*? It is undeniable that the gods are virtually ubiquitous in the poem. The fact that we are studying exclusively passages in which the gods more or less directly interact with mortals makes it impossible for us to overlook the importance of the Homeric deities for the action of the epic. We have been able to ascertain four ways in which the gods influence human beings in the passages we have examined.[147] In any given disguised intervention a combination of these effects is likely to be present, as, e.g., when Iris/Polites brings information as well as ordering a course of action. Thus the divine influence evident in these passages is formidable. Our evidence supports the statement with which Hartmut Erbse opens his book, *Untersuchungen zur Funktion der Götter im homerischen Epos*, "Die Welt Homers is voll von Göttern, die sich an irdischen Vorgängen lebhaft beteiligen."[148] The immediately following assertion, however, is more problematic: "Der moderne Leser der Epen erkennt sehr rasch, daß Götter überall dort am Werke sind, wo menschlicher Einfluß zur Motivation der Ereignisse nicht ausreichen würde."[149] I believe that the evidence collected here suggests that Homer very often portrays the

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[147]The reader must always bear in mind that this list is not exhaustive for divine activity in the *Iliad* in its entirety. Omens, dreams, undisguised epiphanies, etc. have not been taken into account here.

[148]p. 1.

[149]Ibid.

gods as wielding precisely the kind of influence that human beings do. If this is so, then we cannot assert that Homer chooses to use the gods in these passages because he requires a specifically divine action in order to steer the plot as he wishes. In other words, the god is not present because human means of motivation would have been insufficient.

Let us begin by summarizing those instances in which the disguised god gives information. A young Myrmidon could plausibly tell Priam what he needs to know in Book 24. Hermes' statement that the gods love Hector is understandable as a conclusion based on the evidence of the condition of the corpse and is doubtless so understood by Priam. It takes no divine insight to point out various conditions on the battlefield as Apollo does for Hector when disguised as Asius and as Mentes in Book 17. The real Polites, too, could have informed the Trojan assembly of the Achaean advance. Modern perplexity about why he does not has, as we have seen, caused misunderstanding of the text. Sometimes the "information" dispensed by a god is deceitful. This is the case especially when a god wants a mortal to do something not in his best interests. Thus Athena's Laodocus, as a young Trojan nobleman, "informs" Pandarus that everyone, especially Paris, will be grateful to him if he shoots Menelaus. Aphrodite, as far as we know, has no orders from Paris to fetch Helen when the ineffectively disguised goddess delivers her "message" at the Scaean gate. In these passages the content of the gods' speeches is nevertheless quite plausible coming from the disguise-persona. Ares, as Acamas, speaks of Aeneas as fallen in Book 5, thus perpetuating Apollo's ruse by tailoring his words of encouragement to the perception of the mortals around him. We have seen that Iris' Laodice knows more than the mortal Laodice ought to have known when she tells Helen about the duel between Paris and Menelaus. This subtle reason for the

necessity of a divine messenger might have been noticed by the audience, but is certainly intended to be imperceptible to Helen. In only one other passage did we find information that had to come from a divine source, namely that in which Apollo tells Aeneas of Zeus' preference for the Trojans (but see pp. 99 f. above).

The emotional effect is also achieved almost exclusively by means available to mortals. Battle-paraenesis is a common form here. One hero encourages, chides, or convinces another to stand his ground, turn and fight, or charge many times in the *Iliad*. The detailed analysis above shows that the gods achieve their ends precisely as if they were human themselves. They are nearly always perceived as human by the other characters and thus have no more extraordinary effect on the action than the mortals in these cases. Hera/Stentor, Ares/Acamas, and Poseidon/Calchas to the κοῦροι νέοι all fit this description. Likewise Athena gives Hector the courage to stand and face Achilles by behaving exactly as his brother Deiphobus, not by physically inserting strength or courage into him. The poet is at great pains to show Hermes subtly winning Priam's confidence. When Iris makes Helen nostalgic, as we have seen, it is likely that we are to view her speech, rather than a separate and essentially divine act, as the means by which she does so. The Ajaxes, we are told, were already eager to fight when Poseidon inspired them to go on fighting.

The courses of action suggested by the gods are not often very startling. Ares suggests to the "sons of Priam" that they should do what other mortals are already doing, namely, trying to rescue Aeneas' "corpse." Disguised as Asius, Apollo only speaks common sense to Hector in maintaining he should pursue the attainable. "Deiphobus" really only suggests a course of action Hector had already decided was best and which he will again choose without

Athena's aid after she abandons him. Similarly, Poseidon encourages Idomeneus to do what the poet informs us he was about to do anyway. Athena/Phoenix' advice to Menelaus is really to go on doing what he *is* doing and what he says he would like to continue doing.

Without wishing to deny that there is a basic difference between gods and men in Homer or that the gods wield a great deal of influence throughout the *Iliad,* I venture to assert that when the gods assume disguises, they tend to disguise a good deal more than their appearances and voices. We have seen that the god's actions are nearly always "human" when in disguise, so much so that Poseidon, even at the moment of performing the essentially divine act of striking nimbleness into the Ajaxes' limbs, does so with a gesture that is in tune with his Calchas-disguise. I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter that when the poet has, as it were, trimmed the gods down to human scale in their appearance and actions, he has also largely depicted their influence as rather unmiraculous. Clearly the poet of the *Iliad* is not willing to dispense with the miraculous altogether. Achilles' battle with the river Scamander is proof enough of this. Still less is he willing to dispense with the gods in the interest of concentrating completely on the human action. However, when Homer disguises a god as a human being, he does so thorough a job of it that the claim of some scholars that the poet needed a god because only a god could produce the desired effect does not hold true for most of these passages.

I have pointed out that there are exceptions. The clearest of these is Iris' intervention in disguise as Polites. She proposes a course of action which was not in Hector's mind previously; he recognizes at least that the source of the orders is divine, and complies. Iris, acting on Zeus' instructions, has thus affected the action in an important way. She is partially recognized,

even though she is disguised, and for this reason she influences Hector *as a god*. It is, I believe, indicative of Homer's tendency to limit divine influence, especially in the disguise passages, that Iris' disguise is so thorough. Hector "recognizes the word of the goddess" not because the disguise itself is ineffective, but because the poet wants him to. Apollo/Periphas' speech to Aeneas is a similar case. It is only because the mortal recognizes the god that he can pass along the information that Zeus prefers the Trojans. In both of these passages the mortal sees through precisely that feature of the disguise that the poet has singled out for mention: Iris' φωνή, Apollo's δέμας. If Aeneas had recognized Apollo's voice, we could ascertain a weakness in his disguise. As it is, there is no weakness. Aeneas recognizes Apollo solely because the poet wants him to do so, i.e., to be influenced by the god as a god, even though that god is in disguise.[150] Additionally, when a god intervenes physically by giving strength or opening gates, he is clearly acting as the mortal in question could not. These actions, however, serve to enable mortal characters to carry out actions that the god in question has not inspired. Thus the most consistently and essentially divine action in these passages is found in the service of human intentions, not as a device for supplying those intentions.

Disguises that are as thorough and convincing as most of those we have examined are clearly in and of themselves acts no less essentially divine in nature than the instilling of physical strength. However, the specific effect of the disguise in the great majority of these passages is to make the mortal believe he is dealing with another mortal. This serves to show the mortal

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[150]There is, it must be admitted, one disguise in the *Iliad* which is truly ineffective, and that is Aphrodite's attempt to conceal her immortal charms in the garb of an old maidservant.

characters as mentally independent from the gods. The passages we have investigated lead us to the assertion that the gods function neither as puppeteers nor as concretized, externalized psychological events. The interventions of the variously disguised gods are to be taken quite literally. They influence the action to such an extent that they may truly be called "indispensable"; however, they do not usually, when disguised, do so in such a way as to deprive mortal characters of their free will.

IV. IRONY AND THE PURPOSE OF DIVINE DISGUISE

Up to now we have been examining divine disguise in the *Iliad* chiefly on the level of the story and the characters involved in it, both gods and mortals. That is, we have asked what the god looks, sounds, and acts like from the point of view of the characters in the various passages. Before we shift our focus to the question of how the audience is to interpret these passages, it will be useful to summarize.

Divine disguise, i.e., the act, on the part of a god, of assuming the shape, voice, and manner of a mortal character, is by nature an essentially divine act, since a mortal could not do likewise.[151] However, precisely because of this supernatural thoroughness, the gods, once disguised, rarely carry out any other essentially divine actions. When they do so, the action we recognize as essentially divine usually amounts to some kind of physical intervention such as Hermes' opening the gate to Achilles' compound for Priam in Book 24. Occasionally the disguised god literally pours strength into a hero's limbs. Most of the time, however, the disguised gods affect the action just as the real mortals themselves do, namely, by persuading, advising, and informing other mortal characters. We have already seen that the lack of any essentially divine action in these passages prevents our concluding that the

[151] Mortal disguise in Homer is quite different. Odysseus, with Athena's help, is able to resemble a beggar in the eyes of those he meets, but he does not assume the shape of someone familiar to each character he confronts. In the *Iliad*, Patroclus may be taken for Achilles briefly because he is wearing the Peleid's armor, but he does not sound like Achilles, nor does he fight as well (i.e., act like Achilles), and he is soon recognized. The disguise here consists of nothing more than the armor.

gods' presence is the only way Homer could speak of human motivation. The question that now must arise is as follows: if the god was not needed in order to perform some superhuman task, why has the poet brought a god into the picture at all? In other words, since Asius could presumably have informed his nephew, Hector, that Achilles' horses were hard to manage and could certainly have mentioned Euphorbus' death and have made the suggestion to attack Patroclus, why did the poet make Apollo do all this *disguised* as Asius? A similar question, but one whose implications are perhaps more far-reaching for our understanding of the divine presence in the *Iliad,* is this: when Calchas could have encouraged the two Ajaxes in Book 13, are we to assume that the poet has brought in Poseidon merely so that he could make their limbs more supple?

In the following section, I will argue that the answer to these questions is identical to the underlying poetic reason for divine disguise in the *Iliad,* which is the poet's desire to create two levels of perception: that of the characters in the story and that shared by the poet with his audience. The mortal character who is confronted by a god usually believes himself addressed by a friend, servant, rival, or even enemy, whose intentions are known to him. The audience, on the other hand, knows that a character is present whose intentions and connections to the overall structure of the story are (again, usually) entirely unperceived by the mortal character. This is most evident in Athena's deceitful impersonation of Deiphobus and in other passages in which the god's intention is hostile to the mortal he confronts. However, a similar disparity in perception is observable in passages in which the god's intentions are essentially benevolent and he has not concealed his identity with the intention of harming the mortal he addresses. Thus in Books 17 and 18 there is a series of events which must be interpreted as

something as vague as "Zeus' will" by the mortal characters, but which the audience knows is partly Apollo's doing.[152] We saw in the previous section of this study that Apollo doesn't have to supply the motivation, or even much concrete advice, in order to bring about the Trojan rally. Apollo is perhaps not so much an explanation for these events as a means of unifying them as events which ultimately further the Trojan cause.[153]

A feature which clearly demonstrates the poet's intent to create two levels of perception is the presence of deliberate irony in the passages under discussion. This irony plays on the identity of the disguised god and highlights for the audience their superior perspective on the events described by the poet. The potential for this kind of irony exists in all the passages in which the mortals do not penetrate the disguise, and, though it is not demonstrable in every passage, ironic language is very frequent. We will begin with those passages in which the poet has used irony most extensively.

I am using the word irony to denote phrases, spoken by one character or the other in a conversation, which may be understood in two ways. Such phrases will have one meaning for the mortal characters in our passages and another for the audience listening to (or reading) the *Iliad*. [154]

This sort of irony pervades the lengthy exchange between Priam and Hermes, disguised as the son of Polyctor, in Book 24. This is an aspect of the passage which, to my knowledge, has not been adequately studied, though it

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[152]The difference in the concept of the divine between the characters and the poet was long ago noticed by Erik Hedén in his *Homerische Götterstudien* (Dissertation, Uppsala, 1912), although his contention that the view of the gods presented in the direct speeches is equal to contemporary "Volksglauben" (cf. p. 16) may not find many advocates nowadays.

[153]Cf. Hedén's remark, "...was durch das Eingreifen der Götter erklärt wird, ist wohl am öftesten etwas Auffallendes, aber an sich nichts Übernatürliches." (*Op. cit.*, p. 39)

[154]This kind of irony in connection with divine activity is also found in the *Odyssey*. Cf. 1. 384, 13. 231.

is duly noted in several places by Macleod[155] and others. Hermes' opening speech (24. 362-371) contains the first hint of irony in the passage. In the dark beside the river, Idaeus descries the approaching Hermes and begs Priam either to flee or to supplicate the stranger. Priam is so confused and terrified (his hair stands on end) that he freezes (στῆ δὲ ταφών, 24. 360). Hermes, coming upon Priam in this condition, calls attention to the darkness and danger and asks,

οὐδὲ σύ γ' ἔδεισας μένεα πνείοντας Ἀχαιούς...; (24. 364).

The irony here is subtle, but I think it is unmistakable. One need only think of the effect this question would have on the audience if the speaker really were a young Myrmidon. As it is, the audience knows that the very character who draws attention to Priam's fear is the one who has come to make sure he has nothing to fear during his journey.[156]

Another instance of irony is found at the end of Hermes' first address to Priam: φίλῳ δέ σε πατρὶ ἐΐσκω (24. 371). The establishment of a kind of father-son relationship between Hermes and Priam by this phrase in conjunction with the vocative, πάτερ (24. 362), and Priam's response, φίλον τέκος (24. 373), has been pointed out by several scholars.[157] But of course Hermes' father is Zeus, as the audience is well aware.

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[155]C. W. Macleod, *Homer: Iliad Book XXIV* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Cf. especially his note on line 430 (p. 122) which I quote below, p. 129.

[156]Erbse (*Untersuchungen*, p. 66) seems to miss the irony here when he interprets, "Hermes macht also auf mögliche Folgen des Unternehmens aufmerksam, die Priamos nicht sorgfältig genug bedacht zu haben scheint." Hermes does of course point out these "potential consequences," but at a moment when they had just become terrifyingly obvious to Priam, who in any case is relying not on his own plans but on Iris' instructions and a bird oracle.

[157]See especially Erbse, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 65 ff., for a full and sensitive treatment of this aspect of the passage; also Macleod, *op. cit.*, p. 117 (*ad* 362).

Priam's reply (24. 373 ff.) has not been fully understood, I think, but upon close inspection it, too, proves rich in irony. He begins by agreeing with the supposed young man's assessment of the situation:

οὕτω πῃ τάδε γ' ἐστί, φίλον τέκος, ὡς ἀγορεύεις· (24. 373).

It is the next line, however, which I think has not been properly understood:

ἀλλ' ἔτι τις καὶ ἐμεῖο θεῶν ὑπερέσχεθε χεῖρα (24. 374).

Macleod takes ἀλλά to be a form of "lively assent," and translates "why, then...."[158] Unfortunately, one is rather at a loss to know exactly what it is to which Priam is supposed to be expressing assent. I prefer a simple adversative translation for ἀλλά here because I believe it secures greater coherence of thought. I translate 24. 373 f. as follows: "These things are more or less as you say, dear child [i.e., I *am* old and defenseless, as you say]; but one of the gods has still [after all my sufferings; cf. Ameis-Hentze *ad loc.*] stretched out his hand over even me [old and defenseless as I am]." In philological terms, then, I believe that the force of καί has not been properly understood as independent of ἔτι in this instance. Both Ameis-Hentze and Macleod have taken ἔτι...καὶ ἐμεῖο as referring only to Priam's past and present sufferings. However, if καί is accorded its proper force, the reference is not only to the more general issue of the old king's misfortunes, but also to the immediate context of his conversation with the disguised Hermes.

Priam's first speech to the disguised god is thus more firmly rooted in its environment than commentators have realized. However, there is another context in which these remarks of Priam belong, and this, too, has gone unnoticed. This is the broader context of Priam's interaction with the

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[158]Ibid., p. 118, *ad* 374.

gods in general in Book 24. At 24. 171 ff., Iris brings Priam news of the gods' intention to help him retrieve Hector's body and promises,

τοῖος γάρ τοι πομπὸς ἅμ' ἕψεται ἀργεϊφόντης (24. 182).

Ameis-Hentze have succinctly expressed the general objection to these lines: "Die Ankündigung des sicheren Geleits durch Hermes...bleibt im Verlauf der Erzählung ohne alle Wirkung."[159] Macleod seems in general to concur, though he does not follow Ameis-Hentze in excising 24. 181-187. He retains these lines because, if they are removed, Zeus has failed "to show the pity and understanding which characterize him in this book and in this speech (174)." Priam, according to Macleod, seems to forget Iris' words partly because "what the gods say can always mislead; hence men easily discount or forget divine promises."[160] The "artistic" reason is that "We and the characters are to experience Priam's journey as a great and dangerous enterprise...."[161] I believe that Macleod is correct in defending the text and that he has pointed the way toward a convincing solution to this crux. But it would be very curious if Priam were to risk his life on the basis of Iris' instructions and yet seem not to believe her assurances on the grounds that the gods can be deceitful. This interpretation ignores the different perceptions of the divine on the part of character and poet. It does not seem to me, first of all, that mortals actually forget divine promises in the *Iliad*. Rather, divine utterances, as well as omens, may be interpreted in various ways. Zeus does mislead Agamemnon in Book 2, but the god is able to mislead him precisely because Agamemnon does *not* discount Zeus' promise. Odysseus, also in Book 2, reminds the Achaeans that the gods foretold, through Calchas, the

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[159] *ad* 24. 152-158.

[160] Macleod, *op. cit.*, p. 104, *ad* 181-7.

[161] Ibid.

eventual sack of Troy. Thus, Priam is not likely to forget Iris' promise nor to discount it entirely, but he *is* free to interpret it, or rather to interpret subsequent events as a fulfillment of the promise.

An important element that seems to have gone largely unnoticed is the part played by Hermes' assumption of a disguise for his interaction with Priam. On the basis of Iris' promise, the Trojan king might have expected Hermes to accompany him in person; however, what he sees before him is not Hermes, but a young Myrmidon. As Priam sees it, some god (τις...θεῶν, 24. 374) has sent "a guide such as you, fated, to meet me." Far from ignoring 24. 181-187, the poet shows his audience that Priam has interpreted Iris' assurance as being fulfilled by the supposed young man standing before him. That is, he interprets her words in the light of what actually happens; and from his limited point of view, the being before him is a man, not a god. In other words, I believe that lines 24. 375-377 represent the "Wirkung" that Ameis-Hentze thought requisite.

As for the poet's artistic reason for keeping Priam in the dark, I cannot agree with Macleod's assertion that "We and the characters" are to experience the scene in the same way. We know, i.e., the audience knows, that Hermes himself is present. The anxiety or fear that *we* experience is similar to that experienced by millions of movie-goers when Luke Skywalker or Indiana Jones turns up in yet another tight spot: as excited as they may become, they know (or ought to) that the hero will survive. But the irony of Priam's words serves to highlight the limited nature of his perception. There is irony in Priam's saying "some god has placed his hand over me." The audience knows that that god was Zeus, and that Hermes himself is standing near, literally as promised by Iris, not as interpreted by Priam due to the misperception caused by Hermes' disguise. Priam admires the "young man"

for his intelligent assessment of the situation (cf. 24. 373 and πέπνυσαί τε νόῳ, 24. 377) and concludes μακάρων δ' ἔξεσσι τοκήων (24. 377). Macleod observes (*ad loc.*) "μακάρων: dramatic irony, since the word is a typical epithet of the gods." An attentive member of the audience would doubtless also feel that Hermes' reply (24. 379) meant something like Willcock's paraphrase (*ad loc.*), "you do not know how right you are."

The final two lines of Hermes' next speech are also subtly ironic:

> ὥς τοι κήδονται μάκαρες θεοὶ υἷος ἑοῖο
> καὶ νέκυός περ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ σφι φίλος περὶ κῆρι (24. 422 f.).

To Priam this must sound like a conclusion drawn from the evidence of the condition of Hector's body, but of course Hermes is one of the gods to whom Hector was dear. His statement is thus based on first-hand knowledge, and he is himself carrying out a plan that is the expression of the gods' regard for Hector. The poet has used irony to highlight this element in the passage.

Another instance of irony is Priam's offering the "son of Polyctor" a cup, after declaring,

> ἦ ῥ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐναίσιμα δῶρα διδοῦναι
> ἀθανάτοις... (24. 425 f.)

In the same speech, σύν γε θεοῖσιν (24. 430) is also ironic. Macleod's note is worth quoting in its entirety here.

> σύν γε θεοῖσιν 'if, that is, the gods will it' : again dramatic irony (cf. 377 n.). The whole situation is ironic too. Priam, who has just concluded that men should offer gifts to the gods, offers a gift to someone he does not know is a god. But in fact in this case the gift would be improper, to Hermes

> the god as it is to Hermes the man (cf. 433-6); for the gods are now themselves *repaying* a favour.[162]

Priam's piety seems the more sincere because he practices it in ignorance of the fact that he is speaking to a god. This may be considered evidence that Homer took his gods seriously as objects of religious veneration,[163] but it is also, and I think *primarily*, a masterful use of "dramatic" irony to illustrate the limited nature of human perception.

None of the other passages involving divine disguise makes such extensive use of irony, but irony, always inherent in the situation because of the element of disguise, is frequent.

Polites, for example, as a (presumably) younger brother of Hector, cannot have been very old. Still, as a Trojan in the ninth year of the Trojan War, he could reasonably say,

> ἦ μὲν δὴ μάλα πολλὰ μάχας εἰσήλυθον ἀνδρῶν
> ἀλλ' οὔ πω τοιόνδε τοσόνδε τε λαὸν ὄπωπα (2. 798 f.).

"Polites" wants to impress upon the Trojans, especially Priam and Hector, the size of the impending Achaean assault, and he claims never to have seen one larger. Obviously the more battles he can claim to have witnessed, the more impressive his statement that this is the largest, most formidable host he has ever seen. Priam himself will later comment in much the same fashion upon the enormous size of the Achaean host (3. 182-190). But of course the audience would experience 2. 798 f. as Iris' statement as well. Polites may have seen a great many battles, but hardly as many as the immortal Iris. This makes of the Achaean army advancing to the attack, while the Trojans stand

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[162]Ibid., p. 122 *ad* 430.

[163]The case is, to my mind, rather overstated by B. C. Dietrich: "...[the gods] intervened in the action as beings of religious belief more often than as the instruments of the poet." "Views of Homeric Gods and Religion," *Numen* 26 (1979): 142.

about listening to the ἄκριτοι μῦθοι of their king, a truly monstrous threat and highlights the Trojans' unawareness: the situation is even graver than they can gather from the report of "Polites." Only Hector does not "fail to recognize the word of the goddess" (2. 807). The irony inherent in the situation thus comes to the fore at lines 2. 798 f. This line must be understood as making two different impressions: one on those who perceive the speaker to be Polites; another on those who realize that a goddess is speaking. This irony or discrepancy between the two levels of perception may be compared to a dissonance in music. The poet then resolves the dissonance, as it were, when he informs the audience that Hector is aware that a deity has spoken, i.e., that he, at least to some degree, perceives the reality of the situation as the poet describes it.

The same goddess, disguised this time as Laodice (3. 121), once again makes a statement that has different effects on audience and addressee. This is admittedly a subtle point, but I think it is one that the audience could notice. Iris describes the unusual occurrences on the battlefield in terms that, as we have seen, the real Laodice could have used (3. 130-135). However, she goes on to say, "Alexander and Menelaus, dear to Ares, will fight over you with their long spears; and you will be called dear wife to which ever one wins" (3. 136-138). Laodice could not have known this, as we saw above (p. 57), but Helen, sitting isolated in her room, has no way of catching Iris out on this point, and so only the audience can realize that a goddess was necessary here; Iris, coming as a messenger (3. 121), has performed an essentially divine action which only the audience, because of its bird's-eye view of the situation, is in a position to recognize. Helen is not aware that she is in possession of privileged information; unbeknownst to herself, she is the only person

standing above the Scaean Gate who knows exactly what is about to happen on the field until Idaeus arrives to fetch Priam after the τειχοσκοπία (3. 248).

Disguised as Laodocus, Athena masks her intentions completely. The stark contrast between her Achaean sympathies and the Trojan disguise-persona is thrown into high relief by two ironic statements in particular. The first is the suggestion that Pandarus shoot Menelaus (4. 94, 4. 100), who often enough receives the goddess' personal protection. She will, for instance, deflect the arrow that she persuades Pandarus to let fly (4. 128), so that it wounds Menelaus only slightly. At 5. 714 ff. Hera reminds Athena of their promise to give Menelaus victory and a safe return. But the audience need not know these passages (indeed they cannot since both follow the Laodocus disguise). It is enough that Athena, as one of the two goddesses offended by the Judgment of Paris, naturally takes the side of Menelaus, whose wife Paris abducted. Also ironic is the exhortation,

> εὔχεο δ''Απόλλωνι Λυκηγενέϊ κλυτοτόξῳ
> ἀρνῶν πρωτογόνοων ῥέξειν κλειτὴν ἑκατόμβην
> οἴκαδε νοστήσας ἱερῆς εἰς ἄστυ Ζελείης. (4. 101-103)

Pandarus follows "Laodocus'" instructions to the letter (cf. 4. 119-121). We have already seen that these instructions would appeal only to a fool (see above, p. 58), but by using irony in this way the poet has also let the goddess' intentions shimmer through to the audience. Athena intends that Menelaus be shot (had Pandarus missed, the *casus belli* would not have been nearly as impressive), and the pro-Trojan Apollo, to whom Pandarus prays, has nothing to do with Pandarus' disastrous success. The irony set up in the speech of the disguised Athena is sustained into the subsequent narrative. Pandarus is convinced that it is a good idea to shoot Menelaus; he utters his vow to Apollo, shoots, and wounds the Atreid, not knowing that his action

serves the side favored by Athena rather than that favored by Apollo. The audience can view the passage in this way because it is privy to the true identity of the supposed Laodocus.

Ares, disguised as Acamas (5. 460), speaks in such a way that the audience must understand him differently from the sons of Priam whom the god addresses:

> κεῖται ἀνήρ, ὃν τ' ἶσον ἐτίομεν Ἕκτορι δίῳ,
> Αἰνείας υἱὸς μεγαλήτορος Ἀγχίσαο· (5. 467 f.).

For the time being at least, the Trojans believe that Aeneas is dead. As we have seen, Ares makes use of the image of Aeneas, fashioned by Apollo, to inspire a Trojan rally. This is an element of the situation perceived only by the audience (and of course the gods themselves), and Ares' direct reference to the εἴδωλον reminds the audience of the ignorance of the mortal characters in the story.

When Poseidon addresses the Ajaxes in the guise of the prophet Calchas, he makes some clearly ironic remarks. Among them is the "prayer" that some god may inspire them to hold their ground and encourage the others:

> σφῶιν δ' ὧδε θεῶν τις ἐνὶ φρεσὶ ποιήσειεν,
> αὐτώ θ' ἑστάμεναι κρατερῶς καὶ ἀνωγέμεν ἄλλους (13. 55 f.).

If this happens, "Calchas" adds, Hector will be driven back, εἰ καί μιν Ὀλύμπιος αὐτὸς ἐγείρει (13. 58). As we have seen, these lines are quite appropriate to the character of the prophet Calchas, and that is how the Ajaxes must understand them at this point. But the audience is aware that Poseidon is fulfilling his own prayer and that "the Olympian himself" *is* spurring Hector on. The poet thus keeps alive to his audience's mind the limited perception of his mortal characters. If I have correctly interpreted the

significance of the staff Poseidon carries (see above, p. 52 f.), then the gesture of striking the two men may also be ironic in the sense that the audience has a different understanding of it from the Ajaxes. That is, Calchas might strike them with this staff as a gesture of encouragement, and, from their point of view, this is what happens. The audience knows, however, that Poseidon uses the blow of the staff to "fill each of them with vigorous strength." As in the case of Hector listening to Iris/Polites, the poet resolves what I have called the ironic dissonance, and the Ajaxes recognize that a god has visited them. The effect of their recognition of the god is primarily to encourage them further[164] and this recognition does not eliminate the discrepancy between their perception of the situation and that of the audience. The Ajaxes know that some god has given them the strength to do what they want to do, namely, go on fighting the Trojans. But the knowledge that the god in question is Poseidon gives the audience the opportunity to reflect on the whole situation on the divine level: Zeus, they must assume, will not look away from the events at Troy forever, and the rally that Poseidon makes possible here will not last very long. This knowledge is denied the mortal characters in the poetic situation.

The exchange between Idomeneus and Poseidon/Thoas is particularly rich in irony. In answer to the challenge of "Thoas,"—"What has become of the threats of the Achaeans?"—Idomeneus delivers a speech which is perfectly reasonable under the circumstances as he perceives them. First he declares his inability to find fault with the Achaean warriors themselves (13. 222-225); it must be Zeus' will "that the Achaeans perish inglorious here, far

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[164]For the importance to the Homeric hero of the belief that a god is on his side, see R. M. Frazer, "The Crisis of Leadership Among the Greeks and Poseidon's Intervention in *Iliad* 14," *Hermes* 113 (1985): p. 3.

from Argos" (13. 227). Of course the audience can see the scene as it is: Idomeneus in his ignorance is explaining the will of Zeus to Poseidon, who is only too aware of his brother's current intentions towards the Achaeans. The fact that Zeus does not mean for the Achaeans to suffer a final defeat does not detract from the irony of Idomeneus' words.[165]

Second, having assured "Thoas" that the men themselves are not to blame, Idomeneus comments on the younger chief's earlier bravery and encourages him to go on fighting and encouraging others:

> ἀλλά, Θόαν, καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάρος μενεδήϊος ἦσθα,
> ὀτρύνεις δὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅθι μεθιέντα ἴδηαι·
> τῷ νῦν μήτ' ἀπόλεγε κέλευέ τε φωτὶ ἑκάστῳ (13. 228-230).

This, too, is typical of the content of speeches from one warrior to another in the *Iliad*. But the audience knows that Idomeneus is encouraging a god by commending him on his past performance and urging him to keep up the good work. "Thoas" responds rather humbly to this. He encourages Idomeneus to hurry and argues that the two of them may yet do some good.

This exchange may seem, out of context, to border on the humorous. However, I think that Idomeneus' very ignorance of the identity of the being he is addressing emphasizes in the audiences' eyes his heroic qualities. What he says is essentially that they must keep fighting even though Zeus evidently favors the other side. Fulfilling the duties of a chief, he encourages "Thoas." The irony in this passage, which results from the disguise that Poseidon has assumed, places Idomeneus' heroism within the context of his limited perception of the situation.

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[165]It is, I think, no accident that Idomeneus is only partly right about Zeus' hostility to the Achaeans. Idomeneus does not *know* what Zeus intends. Rather, he makes this deduction on the basis of what he perceives.

Whether the poet disguises Poseidon as Phoenix or, for once, as a character without a specified relationship to the mortal he confronts, there are pointed ironies in his speech. At 14. 142 Poseidon utters the wish, θεὸς δέ ἑ σιφλώσειε, "May a god bring him [i.e., Achilles] to harm!" In addition, because the audience knows that the "old man" is a god and specifically that he is Poseidon, they understand the last four lines of the speech differently from Agamemnon:

> σοὶ δ' οὔ πω μάλα πάγχυ θεοὶ μάκαρες κοτέουσιν,
> ἀλλ' ἔτι που Τρώων ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες
> εὐρὺ κονίσουσιν πεδίον, σὺ δ' ἐπόψεαι αὐτὸς
> φεύγοντας προτὶ ἄστυ νεῶν ἄπο καὶ κλισιάων (14. 143-146).

From Agamemnon's point of view, line 14. 143 is an expression of confidence by the old man in Agamemnon's fortunes. The audience realizes that Poseidon is right and that the line could be viewed as information but for Agamemnon's ignorance of the old man's true identity. The subsequent prediction that Agamemnon will witness the Trojans fleeing from the Achaean camp is a more complex utterance than it at first appears. Agamemnon must view it as a continued expression of confidence coming from the παλαιὸς φώς. Again, the audience is in a position to know that the events described will in fact take place. More than this, however, the audience, if it reflects for a moment, knows that this is not the last word on the events of the day. Poseidon's intervention takes place only because Zeus is attending to other matters, and the audience can assume that this state of affairs is temporary. As a consequence, Poseidon's aid to the Achaeans will not last long. Though he may help the Achaeans to drive the Trojans from the ships, then, the audience can well imagine that his brother Zeus will see to it that they return. Throughout this speech the irony is much sharper if we

think of Poseidon disguised as Phoenix. The remarks about Achilles, coming from Phoenix, would be a much greater source of encouragement from Agamemnon's point of view (see Appendix I).

Apollo's assumption of the form of Hector's uncle, Asius, lends significant irony to Apollo's words. Lines 16. 722 f. assume a state of affairs that is precisely opposite to reality:

αἴθ' ὅσον ἥσσων εἰμί, τόσον σέο φέρτερος εἴην·
τῷ κε τάχα στυγερῶς πολέμου ἀπερωήσειας.

Apollo is as least as much "better" than Hector as he pretends to be "worse" and yet he does not make the mortal suffer for holding back. This kind of threat is probably intended here to inspire Hector's confidence by asserting his superior prowess. The supposed source lends emphasis to the complimentary nature of this remark: not only is Asius Hector's uncle, and thus a trusted older figure, he is described as αἰζηῷ τε κρατερῷ τε (16. 716). The irony of the final words of Apollo's speech would certainly not have been lost on an audience:

αἴ κέν πώς μιν ἕλῃς, δώῃ δέ τοι εὖχος Ἀπόλλων (16. 725).

Because they know Apollo's intention is to grant Hector the vaunt, this line presages the success of the venture.

In his speech as Mentes Apollo says of Achilles' horses,

...οἱ δ' ἀλεγεινοὶ
ἀνδράσι γε θνητοῖσι δαμήμεναι ἠδ' ὀχέεσθαι (17. 76 f.).

From Hector's point of view "Mentes" speaks as one mortal to another, but the audience is reminded by this mention of "mortal men" that Apollo has a different perspective on the situation: he is a god. This brief and subtle example of irony keeps alive the hearer's awareness that Hector is involved in events whose direction and significance he does not fully comprehend.

Because the audience knows Apollo as a character in his own right, i.e., understands his intentions towards and connections with other characters, both divine and mortal, they do have an overview of the events the poet describes. Disguise is the element in the passage which enables the poet to sustain these two levels of meaning.

The irony in Apollo's speech to Aeneas, delivered in the guise of the aging herald Periphas, is resolved when Aeneas recognizes the god (17. 333 f.). The passage is similar in this way to those involving Iris/Polites (2. 786) and Poseidon/Calchas (addressing the Ajaxes, 13. 39). As is the case in those passages, the irony created by the disguise here should not be ignored simply because Aeneas recognizes Apollo. Until he does so, the speech can be understood on two levels. This, indeed, is why the poet has disguised the god only to make Aeneas see through the disguise and tell those nearby that "one of the gods" had just come to him: the Periphas-disguise makes the speech, which is "in character" for Periphas, ironic; and the irony reminds the audience of Aeneas' typically mortal limitations. If he recognizes Apollo, thereby resolving the irony, and understands Apollo's information for what it is, it is only because the god wants it so. The phrase ὑπὲρ θεόν may not mean much more than "against fortune" when a mortal says it, but in the mouth of a θεός it has an ironic ring. The assertion that Zeus prefers the Trojans is plausible in the mouth of Periphas,[166] as we have seen, but it has a rather different character coming from Apollo.

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[166]Cf. Hedén, *Götterstudien*, p. 50: "Wenn der homerische Mensch den Zeus nannte, dachte er natürlich an einen individuellen Gott. Nichts desto weniger wird Zeus, der Götterkönig, der—wenigstens prinzipiell—absolute Herrscher über Götter und Menschen, oft als eine allgemeine Bezeichnung, der göttlichen Macht gebraucht." The expressions Ζεύς and θεός may thus have an almost colloquial usage among Homer's listeners. Like the real Periphas, they may have used such words in a very general way out of necessity: they couldn't say with any certainty specifically which god was involved in a given situation and so they said "Zeus" or "a god." The same expressions in the mouth of a character who has a god's

Menelaus addresses Athena, disguised as Phoenix, in a way that the audience must perceive as ironic. When she encourages him to stand his ground, he replies,

...εἰ γὰρ Ἀθήνη
δοίη κάρτος ἐμοί, βελέων δ' ἀπερύκοι ἐρωήν· (17. 561 f.).

The poet draws attention to this when he describes the disguised Athena's reaction:

...γήθησεν δὲ θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,
ὅττι ῥά οἱ πάμπρωτα θεῶν ἠρήσατο πάντων (17. 567 f.).[167]

Aeneas' reply to Apollo/Lycaon's chiding exhortation to face Achilles takes the form of a complaint about the divine support accorded the Peleid. Aeneas protests that he is unwilling to face Achilles because he faced him once before and had to flee ("Zeus rescued me," 20. 92 f.). He goes on to explain to the disguised Apollo that on that previous occasion it was Athena who assisted Achilles (20. 94-96) and that one cannot fight with Achilles because some god or other is always looking after him (20. 97 f.). Aeneas admits that Achilles is a formidable warrior on his own, "but if a god would pull equal the issue of battle [i.e., make it a fair fight], he [Achilles] would not defeat [me] very easily, not even if he claims to be made of bronze" (20. 100-102). The irony of Aeneas' complaining to a god about the gods highlights the mortal's unawareness of his interlocutor's identity. Because the audience does know that Apollo is present and that his intention is to delay the fall of Troy, they see Aeneas' fighting Achilles as one in a series of actions that

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perspective take on a specificity alien to the expressions when used, in the usual sense, by mortals. Cf. 24. 422 f.

[167]Cf. Laertes' prayer to Athena, who—disguised as Mentor—has just been speaking with him, *Odyssey* 24. 520 ff.

postpones the city's destruction. Aeneas has correctly assessed the situation: he believes he cannot defeat Achilles. In fact he will have to be rescued again, this time by Poseidon (20. 290 ff.). But Aeneas also states that he could face Achilles if he had a chance at a fair fight. Apollo seizes the opportunity afforded by Aeneas' expression of this belief and convinces him that he *does* have a chance, because his divine mother has a more powerful father than does Achilles' divine mother. Of course the audience has seen that Aphrodite, Aeneas' mother, was not very effective in rescuing her son before (he was unconscious at the time, 5. 310). Homer makes it clear to his audience that she is not much help in a stand-up fight. Achilles' mother Thetis, on the other hand, has a promise from Zeus himself which determines the course of the events of the *Iliad*. Because Aeneas has not got a god's view of the events in the *Iliad*, Apollo can persuade him with this argument to stand and face Achilles.

Achilles' limited view of his situation is demonstrated when Apollo, disguised as Agenor, leads him away from the city. Achilles believes at each moment that he is about to overtake "Agenor"; i.e., Achilles believes he is engaging the enemy when he is in fact allowing the enemy to escape to the safety of the walls (21. 606 ff.). The poet does not leave this irony unresolved. Apollo sardonically points out to Achilles the futility of his behavior (cf. 22. 8-13, especially αὐτὸς θνητὸς ἐὼν θεὸν ἄμβροτον, line 9), and Achilles acknowledges that Apollo has deprived him of "great glory" (μέγα κῦδος, 22. 18).

Summary.

By way of summary we will now state briefly the implications of our investigation for the interpretation of each of the passages investigated above.

1. Athena as herald, 2. 279. This passage has been included for the sake of completeness. It is atypical in that the herald is not named, but this is in keeping with the extremely minor role played by Athena in this disguise. Otherwise the passage presents no interpretive difficulties. While in disguise, the goddess enables Odysseus to speak—he is no longer merely carrying out her instructions (cf. 2. 173-181)—precisely as a mortal herald would have, by quieting the crowd. Because of her pronounced preference for the Achaeans, her presence indicates to the audience that what is transpiring is in the best interests of the Achaeans.

2. Iris comes to the Trojan assembly directly from Zeus (2. 787). She thus connects the events in Troy, as the "lying dream" connects events in the Achaean camp, to Zeus' plan. Hector recognizes Iris' voice at least as that of a divinity (as Agamemnon recognized a dream behind the shape of Nestor) and reacts to her words as to the words of a god, not of his brother, Polites. For this reason we must see Iris as motivating (at Zeus' behest) Hector to assemble his forces outside the city, since this was the content of her address to him. Her disguise functions as a means of selective revelation. Hector senses a divine voice but the others present do not. The disguise itself is quite thorough: though the poet mentions only that Iris likens herself to Polites in voice (φθογγήν, 2. 791) it is clear both from the immediate context and from comparison with other disguise descriptions that Iris also takes Polites' shape. Following Hartmut Erbse, we found the speech appropriate to Polites and even went a step further in suggesting that it is uniquely suited to the Priamid. Doubts raised since antiquity concerning the authenticity of 2. 791-795 are thus removed. The question raised by Willcock concerning the location of the real Polites is the result of a misinterpretation of the word ἶζε (2. 792). Comparison of similar passages suggests that the imperfect denotes a

habitual, characteristic activity of the watchman Polites rather than specifying his location. The goddess in disguise produces three different perceptions of the events that the poet describes: 1) the assembled Trojans see and hear Polites, except for 2) Hector, who recognizes "the word of the goddess"; 3) poet and audience are aware of the goddess' precise identity and reason for coming.

3. When Iris takes the form and voice of Laodice (3. 121), her disguise-persona is fully introduced. We have seen that the full introduction of a disguise-persona is necessary when a character's relationship to the mortal addressee is not previously known to the audience. Homer thus informs the audience that Laodice is also the kind of character who would easily enter Helen's chambers without causing a stir. We saw that interpreting the word ἔμβαλε (3. 139) as denoting an action subsequent to that of speaking (εἰποῦσ', 3. 139) renders the speech that Iris makes (3. 130-138) otiose. It is thus more likely that ἔμβαλε indicates the effect of that speech, as Ameis-Hentze assert. Iris nevertheless performs as only a god could when she informs Helen of the impending duel, so that there is an essentially divine element involved in motivating Helen to go to the Scaean gate. Only poet and audience, however, perceive the situation in this way. From Helen's point of view "Laodice" acts in an unremarkably mortal fashion.

4. As we have seen, Aphrodite is introduced in her maidservant-disguise in the same general terms as most of the other disguises assumed by the gods: the disguise-persona is well known to the mortal addressee and appropriate to the poetic situation. The "maidservant's" speech is very much what we would expect from a maidservant, and Helen recognizes the goddess by visual means. Perhaps we are to conclude that the goddess of love is simply too beautiful to be convincing as a crone. However that may be, the

question of motivation is very much to the fore in this passage, and the element of disguise plays an important role in clarifying Helen's reasons for going to Paris. The speech that the goddess gives in disguise is deceptive and erotic, and Helen rejects it vehemently. The second speech of Aphrodite is given *in propria persona* (though she apparently still looks like the maidservant till the end of Book 3) and is threatening in tone. Helen thus acquiesces out of fear of Aphrodite; she does not succumb to an erotic desire to go to Paris. Because she is recognized as a goddess, Aphrodite influences the actions as only a divinity could. It is important to realize, however, that Aphrodite has terrified Helen, not changed her feelings about Paris.

5. Athena's impersonation of Laodocus (4. 86) is one of the clearest examples of the poet's intentional creation of two levels of perception. Because the goddess is vehemently pro-Achaean, the audience realizes that, if Pandarus acts on her suggestion, the result will further the Greek rather than the Trojan cause. The exhortation to shoot Menelaus is ironic coming from Athena, as is the idea of praying to Apollo, but the latter suggestion is a particularly "human" element of her speech and thus demonstrates the thoroughness with which the poet disguises the goddess. The description of Laodocus as a "spearman" is appropriate to the poetic situation because the suggestion to shoot Menelaus would not be natural coming from another archer. Because the advice "Laodocus" offers is foolish, and because Pandarus acts upon it unquestioningly, we conclude that the poet is here characterizing Pandarus as a fool and not merely labeling him as one (4. 104). Athena has, then, motivated Pandarus' action, but in precisely the way that a mortal might have done: she performs no essentially divine act, hence the poet has not introduced her because he could not have explained Pandarus' bowshot in purely human terms. Rather, the disguised Athena serves to provide the

audience with a clearer perspective on that bowshot: Pandarus' intention is to perform a heroic deed which will win him glory and thanks from all the Trojans, especially Paris. Homer uses Athena to show beforehand that this is foolish and will have quite a different result.

6. Ares' Acamas-disguise (5. 460) is unremarkable in terms of the poetic situation in which it occurs, but there is nothing that makes Acamas uniquely suited to approach the sons of Priam. It seems rather that Ares has assumed the guise of the Thracian commander because of his own characteristic affinity with the Thracians. When exhorting the Priamids to rescue the body of Aeneas, Ares is perpetuating Apollo's ruse involving the εἴδωλον of Aeneas. Because of the difference in perspective between the audience and the sons of Priam—typified by the disguised god—Ares' exhortation to rescue Aeneas is intentionally ironic. This irony highlights for the audience the limited perspective of the characters in the story: what they perceive as essentially a sortie for the purpose of retrieving Aeneas' corpse is actually, as Ares' presence makes clear for the the audience, the beginning of a general Trojan rally.

7. Hera's appearance as Stentor (5. 784) is an excellent example of a god acting in a human manner. What makes Stentor uniquely appropriate to this passage is of course his (perhaps already proverbially) powerful voice,[168] and Hera can thus address the maximum number of Argives without acting in a manner inconsistent with her disguise. "Stentor" practices the rhetoric of exaggeration in order to encourage the Argives. This is a feature of battle-

[168]As noted above (n. 39) it has sometimes been the practice of scholars not to distinguish properly between characteristics attributed to the mortal whose shape is taken by the goddess and the goddess herself.

paraenesis occurring throughout the *Iliad*. Similarly, the line that describes the effects of Hera's exhortation is a very frequently-employed formula:

ὡς εἰποῦσ' ὤτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου (5. 792).

Because this expression describes at various places the effects of both mortal and divine encouragement, it does not seem that the poet needed Hera in order to compose this speech or describe its effects. Rather, Homer uses the disguised Hera in this passage to create two perspectives on the scene he describes. The Argives are in tactical withdrawal before Hector and the Trojans; they have not lost strength or courage. "Stentor" is, from their point of view, telling them to *keep* fighting, and he is successful. Because the audience has a clear view of the so-called divine apparatus—that is, they see behind Hera's mask and know her identity, her sympathies, and her intentions—they know that the continued confidence of the Argives happens to be well founded for the time being.

8a. A similar double perspective is the purpose for Poseidon's disguise as Calchas when he approaches the two Ajaxes (13. 45). As we have seen, the audience's awareness of Poseidon's presence and intention is in contrast to the Ajaxes' belief that Calchas is addressing them. The presence of ironic language (and perhaps gesture) in Poseidon's speech supports our assertion that the split perspective is deliberate and that it is the reason for the presence of the disguised Poseidon. Though Poseidon clearly encourages and physically strengthens the two mortal heroes, he cannot be shown to motivate their decision to stand their ground. Rather, the god helps them to carry out their intention, which exists prior to his arrival, to go on fighting. If the Ajaxes realize that a god has spoken to them and strengthened them, it is the swiftness of his departure which tips them off, not an inherent thinness of disguise. Poseidon's speech and gesture are consonant with those that the

real Calchas might have made. The poet has introduced Poseidon disguised as Calchas so that the audience will remain aware of the temporary nature of the Achaean rally.

8b. This same awareness is kept alive for the audience when Poseidon, retaining his Calchas disguise, moves back to encourage the younger Achaean warriors. This speech in particular is well-suited to Calchas as the audience remembers him from Book 1. There Agamemnon wronged the prophet; here Poseidon, impersonating Calchas, displays a rather hostile attitude toward Agamemnon while addressing the younger warriors. As appropriate to Calchas as this speech is, the attitude expressed in it toward Agamemnon—at least to the extent of finding Agamemnon in the wrong—is probably also consonant with Poseidon's own views. So long as Agamemnon's mistreatment of Achilles keeps the Achaeans, whom Poseidon supports, from making any headway against the Trojans, the god is bound to disapprove of Agamemnon's' leadership. The words of this speech may thus be understood as expressing the view both of Calchas (from the point of view of the κοῦροι νέοι) and of Poseidon (from the audience's perspective).

9. Because Idomeneus is one of the oldest active warriors in the *Iliad*, it is almost inevitable that the poet disguise Poseidon as a younger warrior when the sea god visits the Cretan king (13. 219). We have seen that this disparity in age is balanced by the poet's emphasis on Thoas' position as lord of the Aetolians. Disguised in this manner, Poseidon can speak to Idomeneus as one on more or less equal terms with him. Since the god merely suggests a course of action that, as the poet has informed his audience, is Idomeneus' pre-existing intention, he cannot be said to motivate the mortal's action here. In this instance Poseidon does not even inject strength into the warrior he confronts, nor is any effect of Poseidon's intervention explicitly mentioned.

The main significance of this exchange lies in the irony produced by Poseidon's disguise. We know from the narrator that Idomeneus has not lost his fighting spirit, but his speech adds to the picture his sense of futility. The resolution to fight even in the face of overwhelming odds, πρὸς δαίμονα, is a well-known feature of the heroic mentality. But Idomeneus expresses his feeling that the Achaeans are fighting against divine will to Poseidon, to the god, that is, who is actually fostering the Achaean effort. Of course this irony serves partly to highlight Idomeneus' courage by showing that its exercise is not as futile as Idomeneus thinks it is. The main significance of Poseidon's presence, however, is that it reminds the audience that Idomeneus' actions (his impending ἀριστεία) are in accord with Poseidon's intention. That is, the success of Idomeneus' actions will have only a temporary effect on the action.

10. Poseidon as παλαιὸς φώς (14. 136). Disguised as an old man, perhaps as Phoenix (see Appendix I), Poseidon encourages Agamemnon. Since the Achaean chiefs have already decided to re-enter the battle and are moving in that direction when Poseidon accosts Agamemnon, Poseidon clearly does not motivate this action. Rather, he gives Agamemnon additional confidence by asserting that the gods have not wholly abandoned him (irony) and by disapproving of Achilles' actions—a feature of the speech which is rendered much more effective if Poseidon is impersonating Phoenix and not merely a nameless old man.

11. Apollo's Asius-disguise is well chosen both for appropriateness to the situation and as a persuasive source of advice. There is nothing Apollo says that Asius could not have said, and the disguise thus allows Hector to react as he would to advice from his real uncle Asius. As we have seen, those features of the speech which make it uniquely suited to Asius as an older, trusted advisor are ironic in tone. Apollo speaks as if he were a "worse"

warrior than Hector and suggests to the hero that Apollo may grant him a vaunt. These features vivify the limited perspective of the mortal Hector in the eyes of the audience who, because they know that the character Apollo is directly involved, can reflect that Hector's action, though taken freely, is consonant with Apollo's intention; and the audience knows that the god intends (only) to delay Troy's fall.

12. The second in the series of disguised interventions by which Apollo undertakes to delay the fall of Troy is quite similar to the first. In the shape of Mentes this time (17. 73), Apollo is once again disguised in a way that makes him unremarkable in the situation into which Homer introduces him. As we have seen, he dispenses information which a mortal might just as easily have passed along to Hector: it is foolish to attempt to take Achilles' horses, and Menelaus has just slain Euphorbus. Hector is overcome with grief and, unbidden and unstrengthened by Apollo, he sets out to avenge the death of his friend. Hector thus reacts to information that a mortal could have given him and which he believes to have been relayed by Mentes, the Ciconian. His action arises from his own spontaneous emotional response to the news of Euphorbus' death, not from any motivation miraculously deposited in his bosom by a god. Apollo is present once again to mark a group of essentially human actions as a series of occurrences contributing to a specific result, namely, the delay of Troy's destruction. Homer expresses this series of events as the will of a god, here specifically Apollo's intention—sanctioned of course by Zeus—not to let Troy fall before the appointed day. As often, the speech of the divinity in question contains a phrase which somehow highlights the fact that the mortal interlocutor is unaware that he is being addressed by a god. In this way the audience is invited to consider the events from what I can only term a tragic perspective.

13. Apollo's Periphas-disguise (17. 323) is described with the same attention to detail that can be seen in the other disguise-passages. Periphas is an older member of Aeneas' father's household, hence familiar to him; as a herald, Periphas is at home on the battlefield; further, Apollo's speech is composed to fit these characteristics, in particular the age of the supposed Periphas (cf. 17. 328). Nevertheless, the poet makes Aeneas recognize Apollo. The reason for this is not that Homer conceived of divine disguise as inherently flimsy and penetrable. Rather, the recognition is necessary if Aeneas is to announce to his fellow Trojans that "some god" has declared to him Zeus' pro-Trojan attitude. This explanation, given long ago by Ameis-Hentze and put forward again by Kullmann (see above, n. 133) leaves open the question of the poet's motive for having Apollo appear to Aeneas in disguise in the first place, assuming that the option of allowing the god to appear to Aeneas alone (as Athena to Achilles in Book 1) was open to him. The use of ironic language in Apollo's speech points the way to an answer. "Periphas" uses the phrase ὑπὲρ θεόν and discusses Zeus' will as any mortal in the *Iliad* may do. The knowledge that it is really Apollo using these phrases gives first the audience and then Aeneas himself a different understanding of those phrases. Still, Aeneas' perspective on the situation remains more limited than that of the audience because he knows no more than what Apollo has told him: Zeus favors a Trojan victory today. The audience knows that the victory Apollo helps to bring about will only delay the fall of Troy till the appointed day.

14. The exchange between Menelaus and Athena/Phoenix (17. 555) is marked by both pathos and irony. The pathos derives from the false identity assumed by the goddess. As we have seen, Phoenix' concern for the Argives and their cause motivated him to take part in the embassy to reconcile

Achilles to Agamemnon in Book 9. For this reason, though when we last encountered the real Phoenix he was residing in Achilles' hut, it would be quite in character for him to be on the battlefield at least encouraging the younger men. The supposed Phoenix' admonition that Menelaus protect the corpse of Patroclus has a special emotional emphasis because Menelaus believes that he is speaking to Achilles' older friend and mentor. The reply that this admonition elicits from Menelaus sustains the pathos created by Athena's speech. We learn that Menelaus is moved by the death of Achilles' friend, who perished in Menelaus' own cause, and that he would willingly go on defending his body, if only Athena would deflect the enemy's missiles and give him strength. Here the irony is unmistakable, and the poet draws attention to it himself: Athena is gladdened by Menelaus' mention of her first of all the immortals and gives him the strength and tenacity he needs to carry out his intention.

15. Disguised as Phaenops (17. 582), Apollo once again approaches Hector. Phaenops, the poet tells us, is quite familiar to Hector, being his favorite ξεῖνος. In remarking that Menelaus should not pose much of a threat to the Trojan commander-in-chief, "Phaenops" is only expressing what seems to be a common assessment of the relative martial prowess of the two warriors. The news of Podes' death, also delivered by "Phaenops," elicits grief from Hector, who subsequently acts upon that grief. Though there is no deliberately ironic language here, the different perspectives of audience and mortal characters is highlighted by the disguise, which functions as a kind of two-way mirror, diaphanous to the audience, but reflecting a false image to Hector.

16. Apollo's Lycaon-disguise (20. 79) lends a certain tinge of rivalry to his exchange with Aeneas. Because of Aeneas' standing dissatisfaction with

Priam's treatment of him, he feels particularly stung here thinking that the exhortation to face Achilles comes from a Priamid. Irony plays a large role in our understanding of this passage. Aeneas claims he could defeat Achilles if the gods were not always on his side. "Lycaon" convinces Aeneas that the hero whose mother is more closely related to Zeus may have the better chance of winning. Because the audience knows the various dealings of Aphrodite and Thetis, they can reflect that this is not cogent reasoning. Further, the audience might also realize that Apollo's intention cannot be to have Achilles killed before his time. Rather, he wants to delay Troy's inevitable fall and only in the service of this intention will Aeneas' action be successful.

17. When Apollo, disguised as Agenor (21. 600), faces Achilles, it is not clear whether Achilles knows precisely who Agenor is. The real Agenor, however, by standing out to meet Achilles, has established an inimical relationship between himself and the Peleid. By taking Agenor's shape, Apollo uses Achilles' mistaken recognition of his intended victim to achieve his own purpose, which is once again to delay the fall of Troy until the fated day. Apollo does not speak to Achilles until he reveals himself (22. 8 ff.), but simply flees, keeping nearly within Achilles' grasp. As always the audience has an overview denied to the mortal character: Achilles believes he is pursuing his enemy, but the audience knows that the result of his action will be that the Trojans escape, for the time being, to the safety of their walls. This interpretation is supported by the exchange between Achilles and Apollo, in which Achilles realizes what has happened.

18. Because Athena, in taking the shape of Deiphobus, disguises her hostile intentions toward Hector, every word of encouragement she speaks to him is ironic. The speech is well suited to the character of Deiphobus, and

Hector reacts as he would have reacted were Deiphobus actually present. In addition, Athena proposes only that the two of them stand their ground, a course of action which Hector himself tried once before to follow and which he will adopt again on his own later on. It is therefore not the case that Athena puts into Hector's mind the notion of facing Achilles here, nor that the poet needed her to encourage Hector to stand his ground. The real Deiphobus would have sufficed for that, and the poet might have devised some means for him to escape the fate that overtakes Hector (he must, in any case, survive the *Iliad*). But only the disguised Athena, by encouraging Hector to bring on his own destruction, could have created the irony that makes this passage one of the most disturbing in the *Iliad*.

19. Disguised as the son of Polyctor the Myrmidon (24. 346), Hermes helps Priam to reach Achilles' hut. The irony that pervades this passage is of a gentle sort since Priam is unaware, until Hermes introduces himself, that a god is looking after him. Once the god has gained the Trojan king's trust, he performs several small miracles in order to bring Priam to his destination. In this passage, then, the god clearly performs as a god, though Priam apparently is not aware that these miracles[169] are occurring. This passage is particularly instructive in terms of divine disguise because 1) the god has to attain verbally the trust of a mortal, something he would normally achieve by virtue of his chosen disguise-persona; 2) the god is at pains to make his presence "on the scene" plausible.

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[169]That the guards are asleep, e.g., need not strike Priam as miraculous, and he can hardly know what the poet tells the audience about the enormous weight of the bolt of Achilles' gate.

Conclusion.

In conclusion, divine disguise, while a phenomenon characterized by great variety, is a feature of the *Iliad* which bears witness to a unified poetic intention. The disguises that the poet chooses for his divine characters share certain features which make it profitable to isolate divine disguise as a topic for detailed investigation. The gods take on both the shape and the voice of the mortal whom they impersonate. Without exception they impersonate mortals who might reasonably have been introduced into the situation themselves, but who are in fact absent. In nearly every case the character whose shape the god assumes is well known to the god's mortal interlocutor(s); this causes a false recognition which seems usually to inspire trust in the mortal and induces him unwittingly to comply with the deity's intentions. Beyond the mere physical and vocal adaptation, the disguised gods nearly always speak and act in a manner appropriate to the disguises they have assumed. Because the gods act in a manner so essentially human when in disguise, we have concluded that the poet did not introduce them because he required, for most situations, a character who could act in an essentially divine way. Thus, though the disguised gods do occasionally in some sense motivate human actions in the *Iliad*, we cannot support the claim of Snell, Erbse, and others that Homer was unable to conceive of human motivation without recourse to the notion of divine intervention. Taking our cue from the extensive use of ironic language in the passages involving divine disguise, we have asserted that the poet introduces his gods in disguise in order to create a double perspective. One is the limited point of view of the mortal characters in the epic situation. On the second level, the audience is invited to witness the actions of the mortal characters, carried out in an

ignorance which the poet and his audience do not share. In this way divine disguise serves to enhance the tragic quality that we recognize in the *Iliad.*

APPENDIX A: SOME PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF POSEIDON'S INTERVENTIONS IN BOOK 14

A. Poseidon as παλαιὸς φώς. Before any discussion of the reason for and effects of Poseidon's disguise, we must establish exactly what that disguise is. The text, as printed in Monro and Allen's OCT, as well as by such commentators as Willcock, Leaf and Bayfield, and Ameis-Hentze, describes Poseidon simply as "an aged[170] man." Disturbed by this sparse indication, Leaf and Bayfield comment, "It is un-Homeric to make him appear merely as 'an ancient man'; elsewhere the person whose likeness is assumed is always named."[171] Strictly speaking, this is not true. At 24. 397 Hermes' "cover" reveals only his father's name; and at 3. 87 Aphrodite assumes the shape of an old maidservant of Helen's who is not named by the poet. What is true of nearly all the other disguises, including the son of Polyctor and Helen's maidservant, is that a specific individual is described, whether named or not.[172] That is, Polyctor's youngest son could not be confused with another

[170]Cf. scholion *ad* 136: παλαιὸς δέ ἐστιν ὁ λίαν γέρων, evidently a man too old to carry arms.

[171]Walter Leaf and M. A. Bayfield, *The Iliad of Homer*, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1898), 2: 335-336.

[172]But see Appendix on *Odyssey*. It woud be better to say that the lack of a name is un-Iliadic.

Myrmidon, nor the maidservant—because she is particularly beloved—with any other maidservant. This "aged man," however, is given no characteristic which would distinguish him from other aged men and, more importantly, specify his relationship to Agamemnon.

At 2. 279 and 21. 285 we find gods in less specific mortal forms, but neither of these passages constitutes a precise parallel to the παλαιὸς φώς of Book 14. At 2. 279 Athena appears disguised as an unnamed herald, assisting Odysseus to calm the host. The lack of specification in this passage is, however, not disturbing, because of the relatively minor role played by the goddess; she is not even given a speech. At 21. 285 Poseidon and Athena appear to Achilles as "men." However, even though this involves a gender-change in Athena's appearance, Poseidon introduces himself and Athena by name. This passage seems to present the clearest evidence that the assumption of mortal shape is partly for the sake of realism. It is as if the poet says, "What you would have seen, had you been there, was two men talking with Achilles." But this divine transformation is not parallel to the παλαιὸς φώς: Achilles knows who is speaking to him, Agamemnon does not.

It should be clear by now that this disguise, though not entirely unprecedented in being without a name, is unique in the *Iliad* inasmuch as the god gives a speech through an unspecified disguise-persona. The Alexandrian critic Zenodotus may also have felt this lack of closer identification to be somehow irregular and have composed (as Wolf thought), or perhaps found already in existence, the line we refer to as 136a:

ἀντιθέῳ Φοίνικι ὀπάονι Πηλείωνος.

Despite the desire for some closer specification of the "aged man's" identity, however, Zenodotus' line is universally rejected as inappropriate[173] and tasteless[174]. In order to evaluate the *communis opinio,* we will have to draw on the context of Poseidon's intervention as a whole and place the issue in the light of what we consider the poet's intention to be in this passage.

In deciding whether this passage is indeed an anomaly in featuring an anonymous disguise, we must first address the question, to what extent Poseidon's speech in this passage is inappropriate to the character Phoenix as we know him from Book 9. What probably elicited the scholiast's remark is the harsh difference between the fatherly aspect of Phoenix' speech to Achilles in Book 9 and the blatant vilification of the Peleid in this passage (14. 139-142). It hardly seems likely that Phoenix would honestly wish destruction on Achilles (14. 142). On the other hand, in Book 9, Phoenix went to Achilles to persuade him to accept Agamemnon's offer of reconciliation. Though his attitude toward Achilles is affectionate throughout, therefore, his position is not merely pro-Achillean. In addition, before he speaks he bursts into tears because he is afraid for the Achaean ships (9. 433), and in his speech he is at pains to convince Achilles that reconciliation with Agamemnon is honorable, profitable, and reasonable(9. 602-605). Thus it would not surprise us if Phoenix later expressed disapproval of Achilles because of his refusal to be reconciled in Book 9. Phoenix is also among the Achaean chiefs at the opening of Book 9, a fact which has confused scholars. But Reinhardt has shown that this is consonant with Phoenix' character, which is that of a go-

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[173]Scholion A: οὐχ ἁρμόζουσι δὲ Φοίνικι οἱ ἐπιφερόμενοι λόγοι.

[174]M. van der Valk, *Researches on the Text and Scholia of the Iliad,* 2 vols. (Leiden, 1964), 2: 36.

between.[175] In order to be convincing, Phoenix must be sincere both in his loyalty to the Achaeans as a group and to his friend Achilles. He would thus be a plausible speaker of the lines under discussion to the extent that they express support for the leader of the Achaeans and disapproval of Achilles' continued absence from the fighting. What would disturb us coming from Phoenix is the blatant condemnation of the man to whose contingent he belongs and towards whom he has expressed paternal affection. We need not look far, however, for a character to whom such utterances would be entirely appropriate. That character is the addressee, Agamemnon.

That his quarrel with Achilles is still very much on his mind is clear from 14. 50: he suspects that the rest of the Achaeans are not willing to fight because they are angry with him just as Achilles is. Of course if Achilles would rejoin the fighting, Agamemnon's troubles would be over. No philological argument is necessary, I think, to show that this situation must engender in Agamemnon feelings of frustration and hostility towards Achilles. Poseidon, then, through his disguise, is expressing a kind of solidarity with Agamemnon in lines 14. 139-142 which is intended to reassure him and raise his spirits. These lines may also be thought of as a kind of reply to 14. 48 ff. How much more effective would such an expression of solidarity be, from Agamemnon's point of view, coming from one of Achilles' closest associates?

A similar capsulization of the thoughts of the addressee is found in Poseidon's exhortation to the younger Achaeans (13. 95-124). At lines 111 ff. we read, "But even if the hero, son of Atreus, wide-ruling Agamemnon is truly entirely at fault, *we* cannot withdraw from the fighting." Of course this

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[175]See *Die Ilias und ihr Dichter*, pp. 235 ff. for a full consideration of the complexities of Phoenix' character in the *Iliad*.

is formulated much more carefully than Poseidon's remarks to Agamemnon on the subject of Achilles. The reason for this is that the god encourages the κοῦροι νέοι to act *despite* the fact that they may think Agamemnon is at fault, whereas he raises Agamemnon's spirits precisely by finding Achilles at fault and thus exonerating Agamemnon himself. I cannot agree with Michel, who believes that Poseidon is accentuating Agamemnon's guilt when speaking to the κοῦροι νέοι and then taking the Atreïd's side when addressing him.[176] Such an impression can arise only if one fails to take into account the element of disguise in the two scenes. As Calchas, Poseidon may very well seem to the younger warriors to share their alleged feeling that Agamemnon is at fault, though, as Poseidon, he is trying to persuade them not to emulate Achilles (ἡμέας γ', 13. 114: we, *unlike Achilles*), irrespective of how they feel about Agamemnon's responsibility for the quarrel. He is thus de-emphasizing Agamemnon's guilt in his attempt to encourage them to fight on. As Phoenix (or at least an aged man), he is a source of encouragement to Agamemnon when he places the blame, in the strongest possible terms, on Achilles. In this passage, Poseidon is probably expressing something much closer to his own opinion because, as an opponent of Zeus' plan to grant the Trojans temporary success in order to honor Achilles, he cannot look favorably upon Achilles' behavior at this point in the epic. By Book 21. 284 ff., where Poseidon reassures Achilles during his struggle with the Scamander, the god has adjusted his attitude as the mortal has his behavior. Michel is, I think, correct in summarizing the overriding message to the Achaeans as "auch ohne Achill und trotz der Menis müssen wir kämpfen und können wir siegen!"[177] In the first speech he countenances

[176] *Erläuterungen*, p. 45.
[177] *Erläuterungen*, p. 45.

Agamemnon's guilt because he is impersonating Calchas, but plays it down; in the second he overlooks it altogether because he wants to encourage Agamemnon. But in both speeches he disapproves of Achilles' actions.

I have tried to clarify how the poet uses the disguise motif to communicate with his audience on two levels. The first is that of the dramatic (for want of a better word) situation in which the perception of the mortal interlocutor or addressee is limited because of the disguise. The second is that which we may call irony. On this level the god's words are understood by the audience in a sense which is denied the mortal epic character.

It would in fact be surprising if the real Phoenix spoke line 14. 142 in particular. As we have seen, however, the disguised gods occasionally speak or act in a manner not quite consonant with the character of the persons whose shapes they assume: Iris brings knowledge to Helen that Laodice could not have had. In my opinion the advantages of a Phoenix-disguise—a specific relationship between the disguise-persona and the addressee, as well as the piquancy added if Agamemnon believes Phoenix is speaking these words (cf. his dreaming of Nestor in Book 2)—outweigh the consideration that the real Phoenix would not have expressed his disapproval of Achilles' actions in these terms.

But why does Poseidon intervene here? One has the impression from the formulaic line 14. 135 that the god has noticed something that motivates his action. The immediately preceding passage relates the meeting of the wounded Achaean chiefs. Agamemnon opens the discussion by stressing the difficulty of the situation (14. 42-51) and then—for the third time in the *Iliad*—proposes returning to Greece (14. 65-81). Odysseus manages to convince Agamemnon to stay (14. 83-102) and Diomedes proposes a plan (14. 110-132):

the chiefs are to encourage their troops but not participate in the fighting. All agree to this and as Agamemnon leads them off, Poseidon takes the Mycenean king by the hand and speaks to him. Thus the poet chooses to bring Poseidon in at a moment when Agamemnon's spirit has already been revived by his comrades and a course of action has been agreed upon. Poseidon obviously can not motivate what has already been decided. What immediately follows Poseidon's speech is the Διὸς ἀπάτη (14. 153-360), and there is no indication that this speech of Poseidon is a motivating factor after the resumption of the narration of human events after the ἀπάτη. Since Poseidon cannot be shown to motivate any human action, we must turn elsewhere for an interpretation of the passage. If the god were recognized by Agamemnon, his reaction would have to be recorded. As it is, Poseidon's words are precisely what Agamemnon wants to hear, indeed, very much what he had dreamt in Book 2.

B. 13. 355-357. Another problem involving Poseidon's appearances in disguise arises at 13. 355-357. Here we are told,

> ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πρότερος γεγόνει καὶ πλείονα ἤδη.
> τῷ ῥα καὶ ἀμφαδίην μὲν ἀλεξέμεναι ἀλέεινε,
> λάθρῃ δ' αἰὲν ἔγειρε κατὰ στρατόν, ἀνδρὶ ἐοικώς.

> But Zeus was the elder of the two and knew more. Therefore he [Poseidon] was quite loath to defend [the Achaeans] openly, but incited them in secret throughout the army, looking like a man.

Willcock, in his note on 13. 135, seems to interpret these lines as meaning that Poseidon's disguises are intended to fool Zeus.[178] That is, ἀνδρὶ ἐοικώς is taken to be explanatory of λάθρη, (13. 357). Grammatically, there is nothing to prevent this reading. There are, however, considerations arising both from the context of Poseidon's intervention in Books 13-15 and from general features of divine disguise in the *Iliad* that militate against taking ἀνδρὶ ἐοικώς as epexegetical. First, the gods regularly appear in disguise where there is no need or intent to deceive another god.[179] Examples of this are too numerous to require citation. Second, Hera has no trouble recognizing Poseidon busy in the Achaean camp at 14. 154 ff.:

> ...αὐτίκα δ' ἔγνω
> τὸν μὲν ποιπνύοντα μάχην ἀνὰ κυδιάνειραν,
> αὐτοκασίγνητον καὶ δαέρα...

Her recognition is immediate (αὐτίκα) even though Poseidon was disguised as an old man seven lines before.[180] Third, the real reason that Hera recognizes Poseidon is that she *sees* him (εἴσιδε...ὀφθαλμοῖσιν, 14. 153). Zeus does not recognize his brother because, as we know from the opening of Book 13, he is looking the other way, not expecting any god to intervene against his command. From these considerations it would seem that, a) disguise as a

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[178]"Poseidon was helping the Greeks in Book XIII, without showing himself too openly, for fear of annoying his brother Zeus. He appeared in the guise of Kalchas in XII 45, then in that of Thoas in XIII 216; now he is a nameless old man (136)." vol. 2, p. 229.

[179]When Athena wishes to escape Ares' notice at 5. 845, she makes herself invisible with the "cap of Hades."

[180]It may be Poseidon's shout that attracts her attention (147 ff.), though we are not told that she has heard it. Zeus, in any case, contemplating northern tribes from the summit of Mt. Ida, does not notice. Cedric Whitman, in an article completed and published after his death by Ruth Scodel, "Sequence and Simultaneity in *Iliad N, Ξ, and O*," (*HSCP* 85 [1985]: 1-15), has asserted that an especially complex instance of Zielinski's law is in evidence here. Immediately following the shout, according to Whitman and Scodel, the narrative leaps back in time to the beginning of Poseidon's intervention. The Διὸς ἀπάτη would then be roughly simultaneous with the disguised interventions discussed so far. If this interpretation is accepted, it is even more obvious that Poseidon's disguises are not aimed at Zeus.

human being is too normal an occurrence to serve as an explanation for Poseidon's eluding Zeus' attention; b) a god's human disguise is readily penetrated by another god and would therefore be ineffective against Zeus;[181] c) Zeus is not watching in the first place, and any disguise would thus be superfluous if intended to deceive him. This last consideration is the real reason that Zeus is unaware of Poseidon's activities. This is clear from the fact that Poseidon waits until precisely the moment when Zeus turns his attention northward to make his showy entrance. The phrase ἀνδρὶ ἐοικώς should accordingly be read as circumstantial rather than epexegetical.

C. 14. 364 ff. A question that must now be addressed for the sake of completeness is whether we are to think of Poseidon as appearing in some disguise when he delivers his speech at 14. 364 ff. We must bear in mind, while considering this problem, that, since the poet does not specify whether the god has taken on a disguise or not, any answer we may find will be conjectural.

One might assume that this passage is analogous to 13. 95 ff. In that passage it is generally assumed that Poseidon, who has just appeared to the two Ajaxes as Calchas, is still in the shape of the seer, though the poet does not tell us so explicitly. Could Poseidon have retained the form of παλαιὸς φώς, taken on at 14. 136? Even before he speaks, Poseidon takes actions which would clash considerably with this disguise: μέγα προθορὼν ἐκέλευσεν (14. 363). Moreover it is not a natural assumption that the Achaean chiefs would unquestioningly obey the orders of an anonymous old gentleman. We may therefore tentatively agree with Ameis-Hentze (*ad loc.*): "Poseidon kann hier

[181] Even the two Ajaxes are able to recognize that "Calchas" is a god (13. 66 ff.).

wohl nicht mehr in der 136 angenommenen Gestalt eines alten Mannes gedacht sein."

Leaf and Bayfield concur essentially with the view expressed by Ameis-Hentze, and partly base their decision to excise the passage (363-401 have been "substituted for N795-837" according to these commentators) on the "un-Homeric" lack of a specific disguise-identity. More importantly, however, they point out that the mortals seem not to sense the appearance of a god at all and believe that the text does not clarify whether Poseidon "makes himself visible at all" (*ad loc.*). We will return to the (unintentional) implications of these two points below.

Kullmann quite correctly insists that the god is to be thought of in human form. He contends that the specific shape—certainly a warrior of some description— is left to the audience's imagination.[182] Kullmann, like Leaf and Bayfield, has realized that the reaction of the men betrays no awareness of an undisguised divine presence. He does not, however, doubt that Poseidon really does *appear* in this passage, but reconciles Poseidon's appearance with the reaction of the men by assuming "daß er [d. h. Poseidon]...so erscheint, daß nicht alles Dagewesene durch dieses Auftreten völlig in den Schatten gestellt würde...."[183] By this he seems to mean that, had Poseidon appeared recognizably as himself, it would have been too great an event to go unnoticed by the mortals on the field and would have overstepped the bounds of observable reality.[184] The assumption that Poseidon is disguised is thus a plausible solution to this difficulty.

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[182]*Das Wirken der Götter*, p. 124.
[183]Ibid.
[184]See above, p. 4 f.

I would suggest, however, that Leaf and Bayfield, though they were attempting to justify an excision and not to offer an interpretation of the text as it stands, were closer to the truth. Their assertion that the lack of disguise is un-Homeric and their questioning of Poseidon's visibility call to mind certain other passages of the *Iliad* where a similar visual vagueness is found. Most similar, perhaps, is Apollo's speech at 4. 509 ff. Calling from the citadel (ἀπὸ πτόλιος), the god encourages the Trojans and brings Achilles' absence to their attention. We do not know how to visualize this, nor do we hear how the Trojans react, but the general picture of Apollo and the Trojans on the one side holding their ground against the Achaeans encouraged by Athena is clear. The aegis is an implement which may also shed light on this passage. It is fully described (2. 447 ff.) and so in this sense clearly intended to be visualized. Its effects, however, do not seem to proceed from a visual perception of it on the part of those affected.[185] Poseidon's sword is to this extent a similar example of divine equipment. It is described as ταυύηκες (14. 385) and εἴκελον ἀστεροπῇ (14. 386) and yet its most important characteristic, its invincibility against mortal men, is not a visual attribute. Such considerations as these suggest that Homer did not always feel it necessary to describe divine activity in terms that would have allowed his audience to visualize it as concretely as in the other passages we have been investigating. But for this kind of intervention no disguise is needed.[186]

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[185]See Kullmann, *Das Wirken der Götter*, p. 106, for a complete list of passages referring to this piece of equipment.

[186]Kullmann (p. 124) speaks of "N 357...wo von dem ganzen Auftreten des Poseidon die Rede ist...." However, the liquid first aorist and the imperfect of the 3sg (ἔγειρε, ἀλέεινε) would be indistinguishable. LSJ in fact gives the form ἀλέεινε as imperfect only. If these words are read as imperfects, then the line need not apply to everything that follows (esp. 14. 364).

APPENDIX B: DIVINE DISGUISE IN THE *ODYSSEY*

To speak of divine disguise in the *Odyssey* is perhaps an unnecessarily general way of referring to the phenomenon as it appears in the shorter epic. The only divinity to assume a human disguise in the *Odyssey* is Athena.[187] She appears in disguise only ten times, as opposed to about twenty instances of divine disguise in the *Iliad;* but several of the goddess' impersonations of mortals are quite extensive with the result that the phenomenon of divine disguise remains a relatively prominent feature of the *Odyssey* despite the comparatively low number of actual occurrences.

The following ten passages come into consideration.

1. Athena as Mentes, 1. 105. The goddess executes her plan to advise and encourage Telemachus to seek news of his father. Taking the voice and shape of the Taphian leader, Mentes, she suggests he visit Nestor in Pylos and Menelaus in Sparta. The manner of her departure reveals to Telemachus the divinity of his visitor, but not her specific identity.

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[187]Poseidon impersonates the river Enipeus, however, at 11. 241.

2. Athena as Mentor, 2. 268. Apparently in response to Telemachus' prayer to "the god who came yesterday to [his] house," Athena approaches him, this time disguised as Mentor. She instructs him to collect provisions for the journey and promises to organize a ship and crew for him.

3. Athena as Telemachus, 2. 383. Impersonating Telemachus himself, the goddess fulfills her promise, recruiting men and hiring a ship for his journey.

4. Athena as Mentor, 2. 410. Athena retains her disguise for an extraordinary length of time, departing at last at 3. 371 in such a way that all present learn that the supposed Mentor was a god.

5. Athena as a young girl, 7. 20. Disguised as a little Phaeacian girl, Athena guides Odysseus to the palace of Alcinoos and tells him of the high regard in which Queen Arete is held by all the Phaeacians. If Arete is well disposed towards him, says the "girl," Odysseus may hope to reach his home again.

6. Athena as a herald of Alcinoos, 8. 8. The goddess assembles the Phaeacians by piquing their curiosity about the stranger, Odysseus.

7. Athena as a man, 8. 194. Disguised as an unnamed Phaeacian, Athena informs Odysseus of his outstanding victory in the discus throw.

8. Athena as a shepherd boy, 13. 222. The goddess answers Odysseus' questions concerning his whereabouts. When Odysseus tells her a lying tale, she drops the Ithacan-shepherd disguise and reveals her true identity.

9. Athena as Mentor, 22. 201. Impersonating Mentor, she encourages Odysseus to kill the suitors. She then takes the form of a bird and, perching on a rafter, observes the ensuing slaughter.

10. Athena as Mentor, 24. 503. Disguised once again as Odysseus' trusted friend, the goddess inspires Laertes, who kills Eupeithes with his

spear. Once it has become clear that Odysseus and his band have the upper hand, the goddess urges the men to refrain from fighting. The *Odyssey* closes with the supposititious Mentor presiding over pledges of peace from both Odysseus and the suitors' relatives.

Introduction of the Disguised Athena.

The *Odyssey* does not display the same consistency as the *Iliad* in precisely specifying the god's disguise-identity. Six times the goddess assumes the shape and voice of an identified individual (Telemachus, Mentes, once each; Mentor four times), but in four instances the character whom she impersonates is not specifically identified. The Phaeacian man whom she impersonates during the athletic contest (8. 194) is merely a face in the crowd. The "little girl" (7. 20-78) who leads Odysseus to Alcinoos' palace is respectful and informative, but all we learn of her as an individual is that her father lives near Alcinoos, which may indicate that he is a noble. Nevertheless she remains undistinguished from any number of Phaeacian noblemen's daughters. Because the poet does not specify whether Athena takes the shape of *the* herald or of *a* herald of Alcinoos (8. 8),[188] I include this disguise among those whose personas are not specified. The shepherd at 13. 222 is also of unspecified identity.

This difference between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* can be seen partly as a result of the differing poetic situations in the two epics. In the *Iliad,* the warriors are usually surrounded by people with whom they are acquainted. The gods accordingly disguise themselves as the familiars of those whom they wish to confront, and the poet, in describing those disguises, emphasizes

[188] i.e., by giving him a name.

details which specify for the audience the relationship between the impersonated mortal and the mortal whom the god confronts. We have seen that when it is not plausible for someone known to the mortal to be present, the god impersonates a stranger whose presence *is* plausible. This is the case only with Hermes and Priam in the *Iliad*. Thus, when in the *Odyssey* Odysseus is among the Phaeacians, the man and the little girl are strangers to him, and the poet feels no need to specify their identities insofar as they have any relationship to him. The case of the shepherd is similar since Odysseus does not know that he is in Ithaca.

However, in the only passage in the *Iliad* in which a god assumes a disguise-identity unfamiliar to the mortal he confronts, Hermes gradually "reveals" to Priam that he is the seventh son of Polyctor; the god is thus impersonating an individual distinct from all other Myrmidons. In the *Odyssey* Athena's Phaeacian man, little girl, and Ithacan shepherd are not distinguishable from others who could be similarly described (i.e., as Phaeacian men, girls, and Ithacan shepherd boys). It may be that the poet nevertheless expects his audience to assume in each of these three passages that Odysseus believes he is being addressed by the stranger Athena is impersonating. Certainly the Phaeacians must be imagined as taken in by Athena's impersonation of Alcinoos' herald. On the other hand, the lack of specificity in regard to the disguise-persona may reflect a slightly different attitude toward divine impersonations than we detected in the *Iliad*. It may be that the audience is to assume that Odysseus has an inkling that Athena is present in these passages dealing with his stay in Scheria. His words in Book 13 certainly seem to suggest that he suspected the little girl at least was not what she seemed:

οὔ σ' ἔτ' ἔπειτα ἴδον, κούρη Διός...

πρίν γ' ὅτε Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν ἐν πίονι δήμῳ
θάρσυνας τ' ἐπέεσσι καὶ ἐς πόλιν ἤγαγες αὐτή (13. 318-327).

This corresponds exactly to the description of Odysseus' entry into the Phaeacian town. Odysseus has prayed to Athena for her help (6. 324-327), and, disguised as a little girl, she meets him just as he is about to enter the city (7. 18-19). Whether we should assume, on analogy with this passage, that Odysseus knows that the "man" of 8. 194 is Athena must remain undecided here. It seems certain in any case that Odysseus does not recognize Athena in the shepherd boy on the shore of Ithaca (cf. 13. 312 f.).

Though there is a higher frequency of unspecified or generic disguise-persona in the *Odyssey*, this epic displays the consistent alteration on the part of the god of both form and voice that we have observed in the *Iliad*. Each time the goddess impersonates Mentor the poet says that she comes

Μέντορι εἰδομένη ἠμὲν δέμας ἠδὲ καὶ αὐδήν (2. 268, 2. 401, 22. 206, 24. 503, 24. 548).

In other passages it is quite clear that the goddess has altered her voice because she counts on being recognized either as a specific individual (e.g., when she impersonates Telemachus, 2. 383 f.) or as a particular kind of individual (e.g., the shepherd, 3. 222). In the *Odyssey* no disguise is introduced with reference to the voice only, as is occasionally the case in the *Iliad*, so that there is little opportunity for confusion to arise on this point.

All but one of the divine disguises in the *Odyssey* are introduced in the space of a line or less, so that the spectrum of detail we found in the *Iliad* is absent. The main reason for this is that the disguises chosen for Athena are usually characters well known to the audience. When Athena appears disguised as Telemachus, the poet uses only two words: Τηλεμάχῳ ἐικυῖα (2. 383). It need scarcely be pointed out that the audience knows Telemachus by

this time. Similarly, when the goddess appears as Mentor, the fact is reported each time in a single formulaic verse (see above, 2. 268, etc.). Before Athena appears as Mentor, however, the poet introduces the real Mentor in some detail (2. 224-228, cf. also his speech before the Ithacan assembly, 2. 229-241). The poet offers only a one-line introduction of Mentes when Athena impersonates him at 1. 105, though we assume the audience did not know anything about him. As in the case of Hermes' Polyctorid in the *Iliad*, however, the divinity adds further detail to the disguise during the course of her interaction with the mortal character, who is only slightly more ignorant than the audience concerning the identity of the stranger. Athena responds to Telemachus' questions about her identity quite fully at 1. 180 ff.

Notwithstanding the paucity of detail in these descriptions, the same plausibility relative to the poetic situation that we observed in the *Iliad* is present in the *Odyssey*. This is clear for instance in the choice of what I have called the generic disguises: a shepherd is appropriate to the Ithacan countryside, as is a king's herald for the assembling of the Phaeacians. Similarly, Mentes, as Athena explains the situation to Telemachus, might reasonably appear on Odysseus' doorstep while transporting a cargo by ship from one place to another. Examples could be multiplied.

All in all, then, the mechanics of divine disguise are very similar in both *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the discrepancies being explicable mainly as due to differences in the poetic situations of the two epics.

Speech and Action of the Disguised Athena.

A detailed analysis of the speeches and actions of the disguised Athena cannot be undertaken here, but a certain similarity to the Iliadic passages is easily discernible. Some features of the speeches seem adapted to the

particular disguise that the goddess is employing. As the shepherd, for example, the goddess describes Ithaca with a pride that is appropriate to a native inhabitant of the island. A detail which seems particularly rustic is the feigned ignorance of the wider world implied in these words:

...Ἰθάκης γε καὶ ἐς Τροίην ὄνομ' ἵκει,

τήν περ τηλοῦ φασιν Ἀχαιΐδος ἔμμεναι αἴης (13. 248 f.).

Naturally, the goddess uses the masculine gender when speaking in the first person as Mentor (cf. 2. 286 f.). As a little girl, she adopts a respectful form of address towards Odysseus which is consonant with her being both young and Phaeacian (ξεῖνε πάτερ, 7. 28, 7. 48). Impersonating Mentes, Athena carefully speaks as if she knew of Laertes' hard life only by hearsay (φασί, 1. 189). She pretends that she expected to find Odysseus at home (1. 194 f.) and to *guess* that he has been detained but is still alive (1. 196 ff.). Further, she wonders whether she is addressing the son of Odysseus (1. 207 ff.), seeming to base her question on family resemblance (1. 208 f.), though of course she has sought him out deliberately and knows very well whom she is addressing.

In contrast to the *Iliad*, however, the identity of the *Odyssey's* disguised divinity is usually known to at least one of the mortals confronted. Though Athena has impersonated Mentes in the details mentioned above, Telemachus believes he has been visited by a god (1. 323). When Athena returns disguised as Mentor (2. 268), it is in response to Telemachus' prayer for the god who came to him on the previous day to return (2. 262 ff.), and this might be taken to suggest that Telemachus knows that the same god is behind the shape of Mentor. When Athena departs, the poet says

...οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔτι δὴν

Τηλέμαχος παρέμιμνεν, ἐπεὶ θεοῦ ἔκλυεν αὐδήν (2. 296 f.).

This, too, suggests that Telemachus is aware he has spoken with a god. One may then reasonably wonder whether Telemachus is completely taken in when "Mentor" returns at 2. 401, even though he addresses the goddess as Mentor (3. 22). Her departure from Pylos in the shape of a bearded vulture (3. 371) leads Nestor to guess that she is in fact Athena (3. 378). Following upon the "in-character" excuses for her departure as Mentor (3. 365-8), this revelation of her divine nature is striking. The poet does not state explicitly that Odysseus recognizes the supposed Phaeacian girl as Athena (7. 20-78). She appears in answer to Odysseus' prayer (6. 324 ff.), though in disguise because she is unwilling to offend Poseidon by visiting Odysseus openly (6. 329 f.), and Odysseus later states that he knew it was the goddess who brought him into the Phaeacian city (13. 318-327, quoted above). These features of the narrative strongly suggest that Odysseus has some idea that the νεῆνις is really Athena. Though Odysseus does not penetrate Athena's shepherd-disguise (13. 222) on his own, she reveals her true identity to him, and the encounter thus ends in open interaction between man and goddess. It seems likely that the poet has composed the passage in this way to demonstrate vividly the new kind of interaction that will henceforward obtain between the two. Now that Odysseus is on Ithaca, the goddess can appear openly to him without offending Poseidon (cf. 13. 341 ff.). Thus at 16. 157 she is recognized by Odysseus but invisible to Telemachus; similarly at 20. 31 she looks like a woman, and Odysseus instantly knows who she is. In the remaining two passages in which the goddess appears in disguise (as Mentor each time), we would thus expect Odysseus to recognize her. In fact, in the first of those two passages (22. 206 ff.) the suitors take her for Mentor, but Odysseus recognizes her (22. 210). In the second (24. 503 ff.) the poet does not state unequivocally that Odysseus recognizes the goddess, though I believe he suggests this in his

description of Odysseus' reaction when Athena approaches disguised as Mentor:

τὴν μὲν ἰδὼν γήθησε πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς (24. 504).

While it is not impossible that Homer presents Odysseus here as rejoicing at the approach of someone he takes to be Mentor, I think it more likely that the audience is to deduce that Odysseus recognizes Athena. The fact that Mentor is her preferred disguise-persona, as well as her tendency in the last half of the *Odyssey* to intervene so that she is somehow recognizable to Odysseus, strongly suggest that, when the poet says "he rejoiced seeing her," the audience was to understand that Odysseus recognized the goddess.

The *Odyssey* is similar to the *Iliad* in that the goddess usually speaks in a manner consistent with the mortal character she is impersonating, but unlike the *Iliad's* gods, the Athena of the *Odyssey* is nearly always (in all but three cases) recognized as a deity by one of the mortals she confronts. What, then, is the result of this difference between the two Homeric epics for an assessment of the effects of Athena's disguised interventions in the *Odyssey*?

The Effects of Divine Disguise in the *Odyssey*.

The disguised Athena affects her mortal interlocutors, as do the gods in the *Iliad*, by encouraging, advising, and informing them as well as by intervening physically in the action.

When disguised as Mentes and Mentor, the goddess advises Telemachus to undertake a journey in search of information about his long-absent father. In the shape of a young Phaeacian girl she advises Odysseus not to try to make contact with the passers-by (who, as the audience knows, cannot see him, cf. 7. 39 ff.) because the Phaeacians are not normally very

hospitable (7. 32). She suggests instead that he seek the queen's favor, because of her powerful influence among the Phaeacians:

εἴ κέν τοι κείνη γε φίλα φρονέῃσ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ,
ἐλπωρή τοι ἔπειτα φίλους ἰδέειν καὶ ἱκέσθαι
οἶκον ἐς ὑψόροφον καὶ σὴν ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν (7. 75-77).

Once again in the shape of Mentor, she urges Odysseus not to refrain from killing the suitors (22. 231 f.).

The disguised Athena also dispenses information. As the young Phaeacian girl she explains to Odysseus the background of Queen Arete (7. 54 ff.). In the shape of a man in the crowd of Phaeacian spectators, she informs Odysseus of his victory in the discus throw (8. 195 ff.). Taking on the form of a shepherd, Athena tells Odysseus that he is in Ithaca.

The emotional effect that Athena, disguised as Mentes, has on Telemachus is described at 1. 321 f. At 8. 199 f., Odysseus reacts with joy (γήθησεν δὲ πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς) to the information that he has won at the discus throw. Similar language describes his reaction to the news that he has returned to Ithaca (13. 250 f.), and to seeing (and probably recognizing) Athena at 24. 504.

The physical intervention of the disguised deity is also found in the *Odyssey*. In addition to the injection of physical strength as in the case of Laertes—

καὶ ῥ' ἔμπνευσε μένος μέγα Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη (24. 520)—,

the goddess collects a crew and obtains a ship for Telemachus by actually impersonating him. This kind of intervention is not exactly paralleled anywhere in the *Iliad*.[189]

A much higher proportion of passages in which a mortal recognizes the disguised deity distinguishes the *Odyssey* from the *Iliad*. While this is not the place to undertake a full study of these passages with reference to the question of human vs. divine motivation, the observation that mortals *usually* see through divine disguise in the *Odyssey* implies a different use of this device on the part of the poet in this epic than in the *Iliad*. The reason for this conclusion is that, as we saw in investigating this question in the *Iliad*, when a mortal character realizes that he is dealing—or has dealt—with a divinity, he is not free to respond as he would to another mortal. Thus, though Athena/Mentes merely increases an already existing longing for his father (1. 321 f.), there is no indication that Telemachus had been considering a journey such as the goddess suggests, nor that Telemachus might decide not to go, since he realizes that he has been visited by a god. On the surface, then, Homer in the *Odyssey* represents the disguised Athena as controlling events more openly than the gods do in the *Iliad*.

Irony and Divine Disguise in the *Odyssey*.

Though my remarks here are not meant as an exhaustive treatment of the irony arising from divine disguise in the *Odyssey*, it should be clear from the observations we have already made that irony in passages involving

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[189]When Apollo impersonates Agenor after seeing to it that he stands his ground as Achilles approaches (*Iliad* 21. 599), it is only incidentally to Agenor's advantage. What matters is that Achilles is drawn away until the Trojans are safely in the city.

divine disguise in the *Odyssey* does not have the same poetic function as in the *Iliad*.

Athena/Mentor's speech to Laertes (24. 517-519), urging him to pray to Athena, seems on the surface very similar to the irony in similar passages in the *Iliad* (e.g., Athena as Phoenix, 17. 561 f.; Apollo as Asius, 16. 725). However, in addition to poet and audience, the character Odysseus is aware of the goddess' presence and sympathies, and this awareness gives him a perspective on the situation which few of the *Iliad's* mortals ever approach. When the goddess—again in the form of Mentor—enters the hall where Odysseus is about to slaughter the suitors, there is irony in their speech to her. Addressing the goddess as Mentor (22. 213), the suitor Agelaus threatens to kill her (22. 217). It is significant that, when Athena next speaks to Odysseus, she reminds him of his Trojan exploits, which Mentor had not witnessed. This is perhaps not so egregious a slip that the suitors would notice, but she speaks in a way that indicates her assumption that Odysseus recognizes her. Because Odysseus recognizes Athena, the irony in this passage can be appreciated not only by the audience but by Odysseus as well and thus does not serve to highlight tragic ignorance. Similarly, if Odysseus really is aware that it is Athena and not a little girl who is leading him into the Phaeacian city, the disguise cannot be a device for revealing his limited perspective. The disguise here, if we can take the poet at his word, is primarily for Poseidon's consumption.

Most similar to the Iliadic use of divine disguise is Athena's first visit to Telemachus. Because Telemachus takes Athena for Mentes until her departure, the ironic language (e.g., 1. 200-202, 267) may serve to remind the audience that Telemachus does not know with whom he speaks nor how the course of action suggested to him by "Mentes" will fit into the larger scheme

of events. However, if Telemachus knows that the being that looks and sounds like Mentor at 2. 268 ff. is really the god who had visited him the previous day, then the irony in her speech (esp. 2. 286, τοῖος γάρ τοι ἑταῖρος ἐγὼ πατρώιός εἰμι) is meant perhaps rather to be understood by Telemachus himself rather than to remind the audience that he does not know of his interlocutor's divine nature and intentions.

This brief survey of divine disguise in the *Odyssey* enables us to arrive at some conclusions concerning the use of the device in the shorter epic. On the one hand, the formal aspects of disguise are for the most part quite similar to those in the *Iliad*. The god assumes the identity of someone familiar to the mortal character whom he confronts unless the poetic situation makes this implausible, as is more often the case in the *Odyssey* than the *Iliad*. Further, the disguised god normally speaks "in character" in both poems. This is especially striking in the *Odyssey* because the mortal confronted so often knows that a god is addressing him. The result of this is that the irony arising from the discrepancy between divine identity and mortal disguise can be appreciated by the particular mortal confronted who sees through the disguise, not exclusively by the audience. It thus seems likely that divine disguise should be thought of as a device rather than a theme *per se*. It has been adapted to enhance the themes of the *Odyssey* (e.g., coming of age, homecoming, vengeance) by, as it were, letting Odysseus and Telemachus in on the secret most of the time, while the characters of the *Iliad* are nearly always kept in the dark about the nature and identities of the disguised gods who are used to highlight the tragic events of that epic.

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